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1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
SUPREME COURT NO. 44546 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
LARRY GLENN FENTON, JR., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
CLERK'S RECORD 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Nez Perce 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAY P. GASKILL, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Counsel for Appellant 
Mr. Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Counsel for Respondent 
Mr. Eric D. Frederickson 
State Appellate PD 
PO Box 2816 
Boise, ID 83701 
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Date: 11/14/2016 
Time: 09:28 AM 
Page 1 of 5 
Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2016-0001591 Current Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Defendant: Fenton, Larry Glenn Jr 
User: BDAVENPORT 
























































New Case Filed-Felony 
Prosecutor Assigned Justin J. Coleman 
Affidavit Of Probable Cause 
Initial Determination Of Probable Cause 
Criminal Complaint 
Judge 
Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
Warrant Issued - Arrest Bond amount: 50000.00 Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
Defendant: Fenton, Larry Glenn Jr 
Case Sealed 
Case Status Changed: Inactive 
Change Assigned Judge 
Warrant Returned Defendant: Fenton, Larry 
Glenn Jr 
Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
Magistrate Court Clerks 
Magistrate Court Clerks 
Case Un-sealed Magistrate Court Clerks 
Case Status Changed: Pending Magistrate Court Clerks 
Arraignment/ First Appearance Magistrate Court Clerks 
Notification Of Rights-felony Magistrate Court Clerks 
Notice Of Hearing Magistrate Court Clerks 
Defendant: Fenton, Larry Glenn Jr Order Magistrate Court Clerks 
Appointing Public Defender Public defender Rick 
Cuddihy PD 2016 
Affidavit of Financial Status and Order Appointing Magistrate Court Clerks 
Public Defender 
Change Assigned Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Conference 
05/09/2016 01 :30 PM) 
Hearing Scheduled {Preliminary Hearing 
05/11/2016 01 :30 PM) 
Request For Discovery-defendant 
Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
BDAVENPORT Hearing result for Preliminary Conference Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
scheduled on 05/09/2016 01:30 PM: Hearing 
Held 
BDAVENPORT Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Preliminary Conference 
Hearing date: 5/9/2016 
Time: 2: 17 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Brittany Davenport 
Tape Number: 3 
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman 
JENNY Response To Request For Discovery-plaintiff 
JENNY Request For Discovery-plaintiff 
Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
Kent J. Merica 
Kent J. Merica 
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Time: 09:28 AM 
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Second Judicial District Court- Nez Perce County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2016-0001591 Current Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Defendant: Fenton, Larry Glenn Jr 


































Hearing type: Preliminary Hearing 
Hearing date: 05/11/2016 
Time: 1 :41 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: None 
Minutes Clerk: Evans 
Tape Number: ctrm 3 
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman 
Change Assigned Judge 
Continued (Preliminary Hearing 05/18/2016 
01:30 PM} 
Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Conference 
05/16/2016 01:30 PM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
First Supplemental Response To Request For 
Discovery-plaintlff 
Hearing result for Preliminary Conference 
scheduled on 05/16/2016 01:30 PM: Interim 
Hearing Held 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Preliminary Conference 
Hearing date: 5/16/2016 
Time: 2:22 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: BEV 
Tape Number: ctrm 3 
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Preliminary Hearing 
Hearing date: 5/18/2016 
Time: 1 :36 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: BEV 
Tape Number: ctrm 2 
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman 
Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled 
on 05/18/2016 01 :30 PM: Bound Over (after 
Prelim} 
Change Assigned Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 05/26/2016 
01:30 PM} 
Notice Of Hearing 
User: BDAVENPORT 
Judge 
Michelle M. Evans 
Kent J. Merica 
Kent J. Merica 
Kent J. Merica 
Kent J. Merica 
Kent J. Merica 
Kent J. Merica 
Kent J. Merica 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Kent J. Merlca 
Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
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Date: 11/14/2016 Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County User: BDAVENPORT 
Time: 09:28 AM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 5 Case: CR-2016-0001591 Current Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Defendant: Fenton, Larry Glenn Jr 
State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr 
Date Code User Judge 
5/18/2016 ORBO BEV Order Binding Over Carl B. Kerrick 
5/19/2016 CONT TERESA Continued (Arraignment 05/19/2016 01 :30 PM) Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
INFO SHELLIE Information Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
MINE TERESA Minute Entry Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Hearing type: Arraignment 
Hear[ng date: 5/19/2016 
Time: 1 :52 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 
Prosecutor: April Smith 
DCHH TERESA Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
05/19/2016 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
HRSC TERESA Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Motions 07/14/2016 Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
01:30 PM) 
5/24/2016 ORDR TERESA Order Setting Pretrial Motion Hearing Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
APPL TERESA Application for Transcript of Preliminary Hearing Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
ORDR TERESA Order for Transcript of Preliminary Jay P. Gasklll DJ 
Hearing--TOWLER 
6/1/2016 TRAN TERESA Transcript Filed Jay P. Gasklll DJ 
6/15/2016 MOTN TERESA Motion for Extension of Time to File Pretrial Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Motions 
ORDR TERESA Order for Extension of Time for Filing Pre Trial Jay P. Gaskill OJ 
Motions--extended to 6-23-16 
6/24/2016 MOTN TERESA Motion to Suppress and Brief in Support Jay P. Gaskill OJ 
7/14/2016 CONT TERESA Continued (Pretrial Motions 07/21/2016 01:30 Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
PM) 
OCHH TERESA District Court Hearing Held Jay P. Gaskill OJ 
Court Reporter: Linda Carlton 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
MINE TERESA Minute Entry Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Hearing type: Pretrial Motions 
Hearing date: 7/14/2016 
Time: 1 :44 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Linda Carlton 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 
Prosecutor: April Smith 
7/18/2016 MOTN TERESA Motion to Continue--State Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
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Date: 11/14/2016 Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County User: BDAVENPORT 
Time: 09:28 AM ROA Report 
Page 4 of 5 Case: CR-2016-0001591 Current Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Defendant: Fenton, Larry Glenn Jr 
State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr 
Date Code User Judge 
7/19/2016 ORDR TERESA Order to Continue Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
CONT TERESA Continued {Pretrial Motions 08/04/2016 02:30 Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
PM) 
8/4/2016 MINE TERESA Minute Entry Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Hearing type: Pretrial Motions 
Hearing date: 8/4/2016 
Time: 3:06 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
Defense Attorney: Mackenzie Welch 
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman 
ADVS TERESA Hearing result for Pretrial Motions scheduled on Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
08/04/2016 02:30 PM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement 
8/5/2016 MISC TERESA Closing Argument--State Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
8/17/2016 OPOR TERESA Opinion & Order on Defendant's Motion to Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Suppress---GRANTED 
HRSC TERESA Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
08/18/2016 01:30 PM) 
TERESA Notice Of Hearing Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
8/18/2016 DCHH TERESA Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
on 08/18/2016 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Linda Carlton 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
HRSC TERESA Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
08/25/2016 01 :30 PM) 
MINE TERESA Minute Entry Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Hearing type: Status Conference 
Hearing date: 8/18/2016 
Time: 1 :46 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Linda Carlton 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman 
8/25/2016 DCHH TERESA Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
on 08/25/2016 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
HRSC TERESA Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
09/01/2016 02:30 PM) 
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Date: 11/14/2016 
Time: 09:28 AM 
Page 5 of 5 
Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2016-0001591 Current Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Defendant: Fenton, Larry Glenn Jr 
User: BDAVENPORT 
State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr 
Date Code User Judge 
8/25/2016 MINE TERESA Minute Entry Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Hearing type: Status Conference 
Hearing date: 8/25/2016 
Time: 1 :40 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 3 
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 
Prosecutor: April Smith 
9/1/2016 CONT TERESA Continued (Status Conference 09/09/2016 09:00 Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
AM) 
DCHH TERESA District Court Hearing Held Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
9/2/2016 ORDR TERESA Order for Furlough Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
MOTN TERESA Motion for Reconsideration---State Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
9/9/2016 DCHH TERESA Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
on 09/09/2016 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
MINE TERESA Minute Entry Jay P. Gaskill OJ 
Hearing type: Status Conference 
Hearing date: 9/9/2016 
Time: 9: 12 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 3 
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman 
9/16/2016 MISC TERESA Defendant's Response to State's Motion for Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Reconsideration 
9/26/2016 NTAP BDAVENPORT Notice Of Appeal Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
APSC BDAVENPORT Appealed To The Supreme Court Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
9/30/2016 OPOR TERESA Opinion & Order on State's Motion to Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Reconsider---DENIED 
10/7/2016 MOTN SHELLIE Motion to Appoint State Appellate Public Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Defender (D) 
10/11/2016 ORDR BDAVENPORT Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
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DANIEL L. SPICKLER 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
F, LED Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 799-3073 tmG {))AR '2. P\l"l \.\ 0 2 
I.S.B.N. 2923 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARRY G. FENTON, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO.c Rl 6 -o 15 91 
AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 
WARRANT TO ISSUE PURSUANT TO 
I.C.R. 4 
Comes now the undersigned Senior Deputy Prosecutor who on oath deposes 
and says: 
l, Affiant is the duly qualified Senior Deputy Prosecutor with the Nez 
Perce County Prosecutor's Office. 
2. Affiant desires that a warrant issue for the arrest of the above-named 
defendant for the crime(s) of: COUNT I TRAFFICKING IN 
METHAMPHETAMINE, I.C.§ 37-2732B{a)( 4){C), a felony. 
3. Affiant believes probable cause exists for the issuance of this 
requested warrant; your affiant has attached to this Affidavit and incorporates by 
AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE -1-
8
reference herein an accurate copy of documents on file with the Lewiston Police 
Department which form the basis for this reque for warrant. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to b 
AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE -2-
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Law Supplemental Narrative: 
Supplemental Narratives 
Seq Name Date Narrative 
3 Stormes Joe 
DATE: 02-29-16 
11:44:18 02/29/16 
LEWISTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
CASE DISPOSITION 
IN CUSTODY: [ ] YES 
[XX] NO 
DEFENDANT: 
CAP SHEET AND 
SHEET 
Name: Larry G. Fenton, Jr. 
Address: 
Telephone: 
Date of Birth: 
Social Security Number: 
802 9th Avenue, #4, Lewiston 
208-413-7221; 208-983-3020 
LEWISTON POLICE DEPARTMENT CASE NUMBER: 16-L2915 
OTHER AGENCIES RELATED CASE NUMBERS: 
DATE OF INCIDENT: 02-28-16 
TIME OF INCIDENT: 1219 hours 
CHARGES: 
1. Trafficking Controlled Substances {Methamphetamine} 
~=========~~~=~~=============~~~=~=~========~~~~~~~=======~~~~=== 
WITNESSES: (NAME,ADDRESS,PHONE): 
1. PO Chris Jensen, 908 Idaho Street, Lewiston; 799-5030 
CO-DEFENDANTS: 
1. Ashley R. Martin, DOB 
;=-=-----=========-===-==========~==--===========~~=============~ 
EVIDENCE: 
1. Watchguard in car video and audio 
2. Photographs 
3. State lab report (pending lab results) 
================================================================= SUMMARY 
(PROBABLE CAUSE}: On 02-28-16 at approximately 1219 hours, Ofc. Eylar notified 
me on the radio that he had located a vehicle which was known to be driven by a 
subject identified as Joshua Shingleton. Shingleton is known to be a subject 
who uses narcotics and the vehicle was parked at the 8th Street A&B Foods 
grocery store. A&B Foods is also known as a location where narcotics are 
frequently sold. Ofc. Eylar informed me that he was watching the vehicle and 
observed as it pulled out of the parking lot of A&B Foods. At the same time, a 
white Pontiac Grand Prix also pulled out and began following the GMC Yukon. 
Ofc. Eylar stated that he was following behind both vehicles and both vehicles 
pulled into the Southway Zip Trip, again at the same time, however remained in 
their vehicles and did not get out. Ofc. Eylar observed from a distance and I 
met with him just west of the Southway Zip Trip in a parking lot. Ofc. Eylar 
explained to me all of the details of what he had seen and stated he was going 
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to continue watching both vehicles to see what they did and where they went. 
The red GMC Yukon is typically seen parked in the driveway at a residence on 
Country Club Drive, so I informed him I was going to go out towards that 
residence and await to see the vehicles drove by. As I pulled out of the 
parking lot and began to travel southbound on Snake River Avenue, Ofc. Eylar 
advised me over the radio that the white Grand Prix, with the male subject 
seated inside, had just exited and left the Southway Zip Trip. I was able to do 
a U turn and get behind the vehicle as it was proceeding northbound on Snake 
River Avenue. While doing a vehicle registration check through dispatch, 
dispatch advised me that the vehicle's license plate was not returning in the 
NCIC system so I initiated a traffic stop on the vehicle in the 200 block of 
Main Street. As the vehicle made a left hand turn onto 3rd Street from Main 
Street it did not immediately pull over. After it crossed onto D St. I had to 
hit my siren twice to signal the driver to pull over. I requested a cover 
officer be sent to my location and I made contact with the driver who was 
identified as Larry Fenton, Jr. 
Fenton was identified by his Idaho ID card and he also was unable to provide 
insurance for the vehicle he was driving. I returned to my vehicle to write out 
citations for Fenton. After after making my second approach to his vehicle as I 
was handing him his citations he informed me he was on felony probation. I 
asked him why he had not mentioned that information prior and he told me he was 
unaware he was supposed to notify law enforcement of his probation status. He 
told me he simply thought he was supposed to contact his PO if he was contacted 
by law enforcement. 
Prior to me giving him his second copy of his citation I returned to my patrol 
vehicle and contacted the on call P&P Officer. Chris Jensen was working as the 
on call officer and I explained the circumstances surrounding the stop to her. 
Jensen told me the vehicle needed to be searched and advised she was at her 
office and would be coming to my location shortly. I approached Fenton•s _ 
vehicle a third time and gave him his other citation. I also handed him back his 
driver's license and informed him that PO Jensen was corning to speak with him. I 
then stood by with my cover officer until PO Jensen arrived. 
Prior to PO Jensen's arrival I shut down my emergency overhead lights. Once PO 
Jensen arrived she performed a pat down of Fenton 1 s person and instructed him to 
sit on the curb. PO Jensen requested my assistance in a search of the vehicle. 
As we were searching t~e vehicle Fenton stood back up and began stretching. 
Despite being ordered to sit down on the curb he took off running in a SE 
direction. I stayed with the vehicle instead of giving chase and found a black 
plastic bag that was on the front passenger seat of the vehicle. 
Inside of the bag was a large ziplock bag containing large white crystal chunks 
which based on my training and experience was consistent with methamphetamine. 
Fenton was able to successfully elude officers and was picked up in a van driven 
by a female identified as Ashley Martin. After PO Jensen returned to the 
vehicle, we continued our search and I located inside a black jacket that was on 
the driver's seat, another bag of a white crystal like substance. These 
substances were taken to LPD where they were photographed and weighed. The total 
weight for both bags was one pound one ounce. Substances in both bags were 
tested with a narcotics identification kit (NIK) and resulted in a presumptive 
positive for metharnphetamine (as indicated by the color change for NIK U) 
The car was transported to the Lewiston Police Department indoor storage 
facility and was placed there for further investigation. PO Jensen advised me 
she was going to place an Agent's Warrant for Fenton 1 s arrest, however due to 
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the large amount of methamphetamine as well as Fenton's eluding officers despite 
be ordered by P&P to remain on scene, I request that the court issue a warrant 
for trafficking methamphetamine. Fenton will also be given a misdemeanor charge 
for resisting, evading, obstructing an officer. 
==--=======;~==~======~======~=~=======~~=====~~=====~~=~===-=~~~ 
RECOMMENDATION: [XX] WARRANT 
[ ] SUMMONS 
========~=~~~=====~~~~=======~========~~=====~~~=~====~=~=====~~~ 
OFFICERS/INVESTIGATORS: 
1. Ofc. Joe Stormes, 431 
2~ Ofc. Nick Eylar, 425 
3. Ofc. Tom Sparks, 375 
4. Sgt. Rick Fuentes, 370 
PROSECUTOR to POLICE: 
DATE: 
[ ] Charges filed 
[ ] Warrant 
[ ] -Referred to Juvenile Services 
[ ] Prosecution delayed for further investigation 
[ ] Prosecution Declined 
[ ] Summons 
Assigned Prosecutor: 
=~~~==~======================~=========~=========~==========~==== 




Police Follow-up due by: 
~~~~========~~=============;===================================== 
PROSECUTION DECLINED: (EXPLANATION) 
~~~~~======~~~===================================;========~=~=~== 
CASE DISPOSITION: 
[ ] Guilty plea as charged 
[ ] Guilty plea to other charge: 
[ ] Guilty verdict 
[ J Not Guilty verdict 
[ ] Other: 
"I certify (or declare} under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ P.ERCEO. WFJ''., 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MAGISTRATE'S FINDING OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 
WARRANT OF ARREST 
LARRY G. FENTON, 
Defendant. 
The undersigned Magistrate having examined under oath Senior Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney JUSTIN J. COLEMAN, who seeks a warrant of arrest for the 
above-referenced defendant, and after having examined said officer's Affidavit and 
the documents attached thereto, and probable cause having been shown, the 
undersigned Magistrate hereby finds that probable cause exists to believe that an 
offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, and 
authorizes the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the above-referenced 
defendant for the crime(s) of: COUNT I 
METHAMPHETAMINE, I.C.§ 37-2732B(a)(4)(C), a 
i,-. c! 




DANIEL L. SPICKLER 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
FIL ED 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 799-3073 
I.S.B.N. 2923 
ln1G ~Rff 2 l'Pl ~ 02 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




STATE OF I D A H O ) 
: ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
CASE NO. C'Rl 6-015 91 
COMPLAINT - CRIMINAL 
PERSONALLY APPEARED Before me this 2nd day of March 2016, in the 
County of Nez Perce, JUSTIN J. COLEMAN, who, being first duly sworn, complains 
and says: that LARRY G. FENTON, did commit the following crime(s): 
COUNT I 
TRAFFICKING IN METHAMPHETAMINE, I.e.§ 37-2732B(a)(4)(C), a 
felony 
That the defendant, LARRY G. FENTON, on or about the 28th day of February 
2016, in the County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho, was knowingly in actual 
and/or constructive possession of four hundred ( 400) grams or more of 
Methamphetamine, to-wit: four hundred eighty one (481) grams of 
Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance, or of any mixture or 
substance containing a detectable amount of Methamphetamine. 
COMPLAINT - CRIMINAL -1-
14
_._._.· ... _- -.. ·._-. __ ·. --·· ~_ .... _. __ :_....:......_•----- ·----~· _ ... _ - --"--'-' ......... -,-.-------·-· -- - --~ ..... - "----- - ·····--··----·-·--· - .- - ---~----------·· ""•• 
,---..,_ r ... -... ,, 
All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such 
case and against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
Said Complainant therefore prays that LARRY G. FENTON be dealt with 
according to law. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to 
COMPLAINT - CRIMINAL -2-
15
I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, CASE NO. CR 16 -0 15 91 
Plaintiff, 
WARRANT OF ARREST 
vs. 
LARRY G. FENTON, 
Defendant. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO: To any Sheriff, Constable, Marshal or Policeman of the 
State of Idaho, or the County of Nez Perce, GREETINGS: 
A complaint on oath having this day been laid before me by JUSTIN J. 
COLEMAN, charging that the crime(s) of: COUNT I - TRAFFICKING IN 
METHAMPHETAMINE, I.C. § 37-2132B(a)(4)(C), a felony; 
committed, and accusing the above-named defendant thereof. 
has been 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED, forthwith to arrest the above-named 
defendant in the daytime and bring said defendant before me at my office at 
Lewiston, in said County, or in case of my a11sence or inability to act, before the 
nearest or most accessible Judge in this County. 
2016. 
HEREIN FAIL NOT, and due return make hereof. 
f"'_ o). (XJC~~ BOND is hereby set at $ __ o ______ _ z~ 
WITNESS my hand at Lewiston, Idaho, on this the · - day of March 
GREG KALBFLEISCH 
JUDGE 
WARRANT FOR ARREST -1- AUTHORIZED FOR TELETYPE 
OR TELEGRAPH SERVICE 
16
ENDORSEMENT TO ARREST IN NIGHTTIME 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to arrest LARRY G. FENTON in the day time 
or night time and bring said defendant before me at my office at Lewiston, in said 
County, or in case of my absence or inability to act, before the nearest and most 
accessible Judge in this County. 
,;rel 
WITNESS my hand at Lewiston, Idaho, on this the"<,~ day of March 2016. 
WARRANT FOR ARREST -2-
GREG KALBFLEISCH 
JUDGE 
AUTHORIZED FOR TELETYPE 
OR TELEGRAPH SERVICE 
17
------ - ------·- ·- ---·---------- -- ---
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
,-. STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF NEZ PERCE if:// f: . 
~ STATE OF IDAHO, CASE NO. c· Rt 6 -o 1 ·•··· . _ -~ ·- - ,o 
Plaintiff, 
WARRANT OF ARREST . 
vs. 
LARRY G. FENTON, . ... JV -
HOUR _LQ~i,.1: 
Defendant. MAR O 3 2016 
NEZ PERCE COUNTY SHER!FPS OfF!:_. 
BY; ~83501 
THE STATE OF IDAHO: To any Sheriff, Constable, Marshal or Policeman of the 
State of Idaho, or the County of Nez Perce, GREETINGS: 
A complaint on oath having this day been laid before me by JUSTIN J. 
COLEMAN, charging that the crime(s) of: COUNT I - TRAFFICKING IN 
METHAMPHETAMINE, I.e. § 37-2732B(a)(4}(C), a felony; 
committed, and accusing the above-named defendant thereof. 
has been 
·•• YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED, forthwith to arrest the above-named 
defendant in the daytim~ and bring said defendant before me at my office at 
Lewiston, in said County, or in case of my aosence or inability to act, before the 
nearest or most accessible Judge in this County. 
HEREIN FAIL NOT, and due return make hereof. 
BOND is hereby set at $ __ S-0~--I b_D_D ___ _ 
WITNESS my hand at Lewiston, Idaho, on this the ~-~ of March 
2016. 
WARRANT FOR ARREST -1- AUTHORIZED FOR TELE1YPE 
OR TELEGRAPH SERVICE 
18
~-..... · ____ .·,· ... :-. __ ' .. - - - -· - . ·:, f::,::· --- · ----- - --------- - --- -- _____ ,. ___________ -. - - - --
~.r.~,- .~--
ENDORSEMENT TO ARREST IN NIGHTTIME 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to arrest LARRY G. FENTON in the day time 
or night time and bring said defendant before me at my office at Lewiston, in said 
County, or in case of my absence or inability to act, before the nearest and most 
accessible Judge in this County. 
+ L 
WITNESS my hand at Lewiston, Idaho, on this the L day 16. 
WARRANT FOR ARREST -2- AUTHORIZED FOR TELETYPE 
OR TELEGRAPH SERVICE 
19
... ·-·1:-.. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 





1'1'\11. - I ~g.__ FIL ED 
NO. -~=-=-~\Ji_ tD/6 IJPR 
vs. ) 
NOTIFICATION OF RIGHTS - 28 fJPJ (S 
FELONY cu: _PA 11 'r n , '13 
LA~~Y -.kAJTo..tl ) ) 
) 
Defendant,) 
~ Rri !\ fil•;· ,{·t f~// i-f 
~_)£lVfli. ·~ctdrJ-
,,.r-_:· :1 ,-,. 
The purpose of the initial appearance is to advise you of your rights and the charge(s) against you. 
• You have the right to be represented by an attorney at all times. 
• If you want an attorney, but cannot pay for one, the court will appoint one to help you. If 
you are found guilty or plead guilty, you may be ordered to reimburse Nez Perce County for 
the cost of your defense·. 
• You have the right to remain silent. Any statement you make could be used against you. 
• You have the right to bail. 
• You have the right to a preliminary hearing before a judge. 
• The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether probable cause exists to 
believe you have committed the crime(s) charged. A preliminary hearing is not a trial to 
decide guilt or innocence. 
• You can cross-examine all witnesses who testify against you. 
• You can present evidence, testify yourself if you wish, and have witnesses ordered to testify 
by subpoena. 
• If the court finds probable cause exists that you committed the crime(s) charged, or if you 
waive your preliminary hearing, you will be sent to the District Court for arraignment. 
If you have questions about the charge(s), about your rights or the court process, don't hesitate 
to speak up. It is important that you understand. 
Acknowledgement of Rights 
I have read this entire document, and I understand these rights as s~ above . 
. 11 />/_ .. 
Date v~ z z-CL Defendant's Signature ___ ,.,""'--,/-✓ ------1--...,<..-.-i'----
Notification of Rights• Felony 
Moneyaaver Prlntshop 42591:i 
20
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
Case Title: State V. l,-()(V !j {,_, rtn k)/1 rJ '( 
Hearing Type: Initial ArraiITTiment Case #:_~CJ!Z , 0- l sq I 
Judge: (Y'k V I ( f ..... 
Clerk: (!..U)}f1/\ 
Courtroom #: 2 
Date: ___ L-+/~· 2~1~, ·~! U=-,'--
BE IT KNOWN THAT THE FOLLO\\TING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD. TO WIT: 
':) r· u ---start Time: 1 di'._ -s 
Defendant present. ____ With/~ounsel _____________ _ 
!2fcourt advises Defendant of Rights & Charges(s) ______________ _ 
13J)efendant requests Public Defender & signs Affidavit of Financial Status 
[j}udge appoints and orders ~"'-4 to represent defendant 
Bond set $S'Di lTTJO OR'd __ _ No Contact Order entered 
Next Preliminary Conference date_s;_·_~_-q_-{_fo _____ @~l :_30-'--+-pm_ 
Next Preliminary Hearing date_S_..,._-_-/_,___/ _..___J:.....l..,,._.,,"-------.l.®=-"-1=:3-=-0..i:cp=m 
Other: 




2016 APR 26 ll11l S l\O 
PATTY 0. W[U:.':,. 
· CLr"RV OF -1AE, ~tp;L/~ VJ ,;i.,---/ 
. L ~:)~~-~ vu U{A/tf 
~ ! :~ I • '._.• ( i • 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF-TIIE SECOND ·nmrcIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
·sTAIB qF IDA,HO, IN AND FOR TIIB COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) CASE NO. [QI ( ~ - I_ S~r)..., 
) 
vs. 
) AFFIDAVIT OF FINANCIAL STATUS, 
) APPLICATIONFORPUBLIC 




Defendant. ) . 
This application must be filled out completely before it can be reviewed for assignment o~ a 
public defender. All questions must be answered. NO EXCEPTIONS. 
IP!liM•MM1"h••m• 
Full Nmne: l~o. rr~ ~eofBirtb.~ 
( Ph·# ,·,c_ . Addresf--==· - . one -~. -'= ..... z-:nC'7-it3!'-, -- ---
City: l..e..iA=I ~:----A-o '-"-- State: J=u .Zip: 835'b ( 
Income Information 
Are you employed~-- Yes ___ Where? _ 
What is your~ ~me (amount before taxes or any other withholdings are taken out)? 
Monthly: $_-1--~---- Bi-w_yekly: $ _____ Wee:!dy: $ ____ _ 
What is y01µ:, hourly mcome? $ (5) How many hours do you work per week? __ _ 
,Married?~~ Yes ___ . Spouse'sName: - · · _ . 
\-1/hat is y&tit'spouse½ ~ inco~e (amount before taxes or any other withholdiiigs ar~ taken)? 
Monthly:$-+-_.___ __ Bi-weekly:$ _Weekly:·$ ____ _ 
Do you.have ~yo er sources of income@ __ Yes __ _ 
Ifyes, from whom? ___________ Howmuchpermonth? ___ _ 
Please list which, if any, of the following public assistance you receive: 
-- Self Reliance Program Funds SSI. or SSDI _· _ Food Stamps 
-- County or General Relief. Medicare/Medicaid __ Cash Assistance 
Other. Please specify: __________________ _ 
AFFIDA V1T OF FINANCIAL STATUS AND ORDER PAGE-1 
22
/·~·-_..,, 
Please list each of the following dependents which reside in your household and for whom you 
are :financially responsible: 
__ Spouse 
t:c- Children. How many total? ___ Plea:;;e list age of each child: -_____ _ 
__ Other. Please specify relationship: ________________ _ 
·Debts ' ·_ 
Please list the following debts you pay per month: 
Mortgage/Rent: _ Food: ______ Utilities: _____ _ 
Car: ______ Medical: Credit Cards: -----'----
Child Support: ____ _ 
Doyouownyourhom·. __ Yes ___ _ 
Do you rent your horp.e. · o ---cc- (!, · 
Do you live with your parentsy~ __ Yes -
Please list the approxim~te vhlutof the following property you O'WD.: 
Motor Vehicles: _How many? ___ Total Value of All Vehicles: $ __ .;...___ 
Make and Model of Each Vehicle: -----------------
Furniture/ Appliances/Electronics: $ ___ _ 
Sporting Equipment: $____ Guns: How many? ___ Value: $ ___ _ 
Boats/Recreational Vehicles/Motorcycles/Snowmobiles: $ ----
Money in savings/checking accounts: _$ _ Name of Bank: ______ _ 
Cash on hand: $____ Stocks/Bonds: $ ___ _ 
Jewelry: $ ___ _ 
Other. Specify: __________________ _ $ ___ _ 
What is the last year you filed an income tax return? __ Amount of return: $_· ___ _ 
Can you borrow money to pay an attorney? No __ Yes __ If yes, how much? $ ---
I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I MAY BE REQUIRED_ TO REil'v.IBURSE NEZ 
PERCE COUNTY FOR THE SERVICES OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT ALL OF THE ANSWERS TO THE FOREGOING 
QUESTIONS ARE UNDER OATH AND SWEAR THAT THE SAME ARE TROE AND 
CORRECT. IF I HA VE INTENTIONALLY ANSWERED ANY OF SAID QUESTIONS 
INCORRECTLY, I MAY BE PROSECUTED FOR PERJURY. / 
. . ,. / 
. ..-,' -·· / 




AFFIDAVIT OF FINANCIAL STATIJS AND ORDER PAGE-2 
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ORDER 
Based upon the information contained in the Court record and on the above-filed 
affidavit, the Court hereby ~ru/JJJi }!~-S the defe~dant's applic~tion for. 
public defender. _ ~------ ~s hereby appomted as 
counsel to represent the defendant in the above-entitled case. · . 
Dated~ id}of +1 , 20/k 
~==-3= 
AFFIDAVIT OF FINANCIAL STATIJS AND ORDER PAGE-3 
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. ~.-.:s.r~,, . 
. - -~- . 
f \LED 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
) CASE No. co_ 1Lo-1 s-r, 1 
} <Y) 
~ <)-c) 
) ( ) 
) ( ) 
) 
NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY 
CONFERENCE 
NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY 
HEARING 
NOTICE OF SENTENCING 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN TO the above-named Defendant that the following hearing 
has been set in your case at which you are to appear in the Courtroom of the Nez Perce County 
Courthouse, as indicated below: 
PMl,JMINARY CONFERENCE to begin at \ ~) ;.m., on the 
~ day of tf'O ~ , 20 __Jfr_. _ . -
PRELIMINARY HEARil-;f G to begin at \'3Q 0.m., on the 
I. I ·fl.-aay of ma~ , 20 §. I 
( ) SENTENCING to begin at ___ ~ _.m. on the __ day of 
-----~20 __ 
( ) HEARING to begin at ___ __, _.m. on the __ day of 
20 ----~ --
YOU ARE HEREBYNOTIFIED 1HAT IF YOU DO NOT APPEAR IN COURT AT SAID 
TIME AND PLACE, ANY BOND POSTED MAY BE FORFEITED BY THE COURT AND A 
WARRANT MAY BE ISSUED FOR YOUR ARREST WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE. 
DATED this ?__ q day of ·A r V 't I 
("jJ) Copy to Prosecuting Attorney 
Cf·) Copy handed to Defendant · 
( ) Copy mailed to Defendant 
( }j ) Copy mailed/handed/placed in 
basket t , Defi ~ 's Attorney 
, 2o__l_k. 
BY ORDER OF: 
Judge 
Clerk 
Mo,neysaver Printshop 36435 
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{ ·- ~ 
Richard 1\1. Cuddihy, ISB No. 7064 
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC 
Post Office Drawel' 717 
312 Seventeenth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (l08) 746~0103 
Fax: (208) 746-0118 
Attorneys for Defell.dant 
~~:-----~ -- -
Fl LED 
Wl~ PrPR 29 Al'l 1 0 'i5 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
THE STAT:E OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Case No. CR 16-1591 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
TO! PROSECUTING ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE, STATE OF 
IDAHO: 
PLEASE TAKENOTICEthattheundersigned,pursuanttoRule 16 oftheidaho Crinrinal 
.Rules. requests discovery and inspection of the following information, evidence, and materials: 
ONE: Disclose to defense any and all material of information within your possession or 
control or which may hereafter come into your possession or control which tends to negate the guilt 
of the accused as to the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the punishment therefore. 
'REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY Pagel of 4 
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TWO: Pennission to the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any relevant, wdtten, 
or recorded statements made by the defendant or copies thereof within the possession, custody or 
control of the state. 
THREE: The substance of any relevant, oral statement made by the defendant or copies 
thereof within the possession, custody or control of the state. 
FOUR: Permission of the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any written or 
recorded statements of a co-defendant and the substance of any relevant, oral statement made by a 
co-defendant, whether before or after al1'est1 in response to in.tenogation by any person known by the 
co-defendant to be a peace officer or agent of the prosecuting attorney. 
FIVE: Furnish to the defendant a copy of the prior crilninal record of the defendmt, if any, 
SIX: Permission of the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any books, papers~ 
documents, photographs, audio recordings, video recordings, tangible objects, buildings or pl&ees, 
or copies or portions thereof, which are in the possession, custody or control of the prosecuting 
attorney and which are material to the preparation of the defense or intended for use by the 
prosecutor as evidence at trial or obtained from or belonging to the defendant. 
SEVEN: Permit the defendant to inspect and copy ot photograph any results or repol'ts of 
physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made i11 connection with the 
particular case or copies thereof within the possession, custody, or control of the prosecuting 
attorney. 
EIGHT: Provide the defendant with copies of the polatoid's taken as evidence. 
NINE: Furnish to the defendant written list of the names and addresses of all persons having 
kuowledge of relevant facts who may be called by the state as witnesses at the trial, together with 
JlEQU:EST FOR DISCOVERY l'uge2 of 4 
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Apr.29.2016 10:49AM No. 2516 P. 3/4 
.. ~ ... --,,-. 
any record of prior felony convictions of any such person which is within the knowledge of the 
prosecuting attorney. 
TEN: Furnish to the defendant statements made by the prosecution's witnesses or 
prosecuting a.ttomey or agents or to any official involved in the investigatory process of the case. 
ELEVEN: Furnish to the defendant reports and memoranda made by any police officer or 
investigator in connection with the investigation. or prosecution of the case. 
TWELVE: Provide the defendant with the name of lhe person who called any Law 
Enforcement agency. The undersigned further requests permission to inspect and copy said 
infonnation, evidence and materials not required to be furnished within fourteen (14) days from 
receipt of this notice, or at such other time as counsel may agree. 
DATED this 29th. day of Aplil, 2016. 
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC 
REQUEST FOR.DISCOVERY :Page3 of 4 
28
Apr,29.20'16 10:49AM No. 2516 P. 4/4 
.-·-~ -.. 
CERTIFICATE OF DRLIVERY 
I CERTIFY that on this 291h day of April, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Request for Discovery to be: 
[] hand delivered by providing a copy to: Valley lviessenger Sen1ice 
[] mailed postage prepaid 
0 ce1tified mail 
LX] faxed 
to the following: 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
Lewiston, Idaho 
Fa..'-'# 208-790-3080 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVEllY 
:KNOWLTON & MlLES, PLLC 
A/member of the firm 
Page4 of 4 
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DISTRICT CC.· --.,T JUDICIAL DISTRJCT COURT, ST' ···~,€ OF IDAHO 
L. _..ND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PEk _ 
1230 MAIN ST. 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
CASE TITLE: State of Idaho vs. Larry G. Fenton Jr 
HEARJNG TYPE: Preliminary Conference 
PLF ATTY: Justin J. Coleman 
DEF ATTY: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 






mDGE: Greg K. Kalbfleisch 
CLERK: Davenport 
·-""7 
Magistrate Courtroom # S 
CASE#: CR-2016-0001591 
TIME: \ :;n•'(:Y-''f\ 
BE IN KNOWN THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
Def prese@) without counsel • Def not in Custody )6iDef in Custody 
Kelleher / Smith €~~sent for State 
State / Def requests continuance of Prelim 
• Court Orders Prelim Conference continued to: at l:30p.m. 
• Court Orders Prelim Hearing continued to: at 1:30 p.m. 
• Def waives Prelim ~ Court binds Def over to District Court 
D Case set for District Court Arraignment on at Assigned to: 
• Stipulation and Motion to Continue Prelim has been filed. 
• Def is being considered for: 
Mental Health Court I DUI Court / Family Reunification Court 
• Def previously waived right to speedy prelim 
• Def waives right to speedy prelim 
• Defense addresses Court regarding bond. 
JJPreliminary Hearing going forward on Wednesday, c;); 1 / (t) at 1 :30 p.m. 
Court Minutes - Preliminary Hearing LogSheetPrclimHearing2 
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,~,~-_,,,...-.-.... 
DANIEL L. SPICKLER F 1-L ED 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
zo1, rr)ffY 1 D PM ~ 21 
JUSTIN J. COLEMAN 
Senior Deputy Prosecutor 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 799-3073 
I.S.B.N.: 8023 
PATTY 0. WEEi'.:3 
C L [ R K ~m,-,.,,.~~:,p '. " ~ T 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, CASE NO. CR2016-0001591 
Plaintiff, 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
vs. 
LARRY G. FENTON, 
Defendant. 
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho 
Criminal Rules, requests discovery and inspection of the following information, 
evidence and materials: 
1. Books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects or portions 
thereof, which are within the possession, custody, or control of the defendant, and 
which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at trial; 
2. All results or reports of physical or mental examinations and of 
scientific tests or experiments made in connection with this particular case, or 
---
copies thereof, within the possession or control of the defendant, which the 
defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the trial, or which were prepared by a 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY -1-
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.. -;-:-:-:-.. 
witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial, when the results or reports 
relate to testimony of the witness; 
3. A list of names and addresses of witnesses the defendant intends to 
call at trial. 
4. Please provide the State with a written summary or report of any 
expert witness testimony that the Defendant intends to introduce pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rules 702, 703 and 705 at trial or hearing in the above-captioned matter. 
Said summary must describe the expert's opinions, the facts and data for those 
opinions and the expert's qualifications. This request shall also include any expert 
opinions regarding mental health pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-207. 
The undersigned further requests permission to inspect and copy said 
information, within 14 days from the date of this request at the Prosecuting 
Attorney's Office, Lewiston, Idaho. 
REQUEST FOR NOTICE OF DEFENSE OF ALIBI 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-519 and Idaho Criminal Rule 12.1, the 
Prosecuting Attorney requests that you serve upon his office within ten days of your 
receipts of this request a written notice of the intention of your client to offer a 
defense of alibi in the above-referenced matter. 
Such notice must state the specific place or places at which the defendant 
claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names and 
addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely to establish such alibi. 
fu\ 
DATED this I QI.-- day of May 2016. 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
~U~TIN J. COLEMAN 




AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy 
of the foregoing REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY was 
(1) JJ-- hand delivered, or 
(2) __ hand delivered via court basket, or 
(3) __ sent via facsimile, or 
(4) __ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the 
United States Mail. 
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
Richard M. Cuddihy 
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC 
312 17th Street 
P.O. Drawer 717 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
DATED this 1& day of May 2016. 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
~c~A 
~RIN D. LEAVITT 
Senior Legal Assistant 
-3-
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~!:T'•t"-=---......... - - - ~-- -
DANIEL L. SPICKLER 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney Fl LED 
JUSTIN J. COLEMAN 20,6 1'l~~ 1 (1) f\1) ~ 21 
Senior Deputy Prosecutor 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 799~3073 
I.S.B.N.: 8023 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARRY G. FENTON, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR2016-0001591 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 
DISCOVERY 
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT AND COUNSEL: 
COMES NOW, the State in the above-entitled matter, and submits the 
following Response to Request for Discovery. 
The State has complied with such request by providing the following: 
1. Any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant, 
or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the State, the 
existence of which is known or is available to the prosecuting attorney by the 
exercise of due diligence; and also the substance of any relevant, oral statement 
made by the defendant whether before or after arrest to a peace officer, 
prosecuting attorney, or the prosecuting attorney's agent have been disclosed, 
made available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B." 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY -1~ 
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2. Any written or recorded statements of a co-defendant; and the 
substance of any relevant oral statement made by a co-defendant whether before 
or after arrest in response to interrogation by any person known by the co-
defendant to be a peace officer or agent of the prosecuting attorney, have been 
disclosed, made available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B." 
3. Defendant's prior criminal record, if any, has been disclosed, made 
available, or is attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B." 
4. Any books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, 
buildings, or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are in the possession, 
custody, or control of the prosecuting attorney and which are material to the 
preparation of the defense or intended for use by the prosecutor as evidence at trial 
or obtained from or belonging to the defendant have been disclosed, made 
available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B." 
5. Any results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of 
scientific tests or experiments, made in connection with the particular case, or 
copies thereof, within the possession, custody, or control of the prosecuting 
attorney, the existence of which is known or is available to the prosecuting attorney 
by the exercise of due diligence have been disclosed, made available, or are 
attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B." 
6. A written list of the names and addresses of all persons having 
knowledge of relevant facts who may be called by the state as witnesses at the trial 
is set forth in Exhibit "A." Any record of prior felony convictions of any such 
persons which is within the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney and all 
statements made by the prosecution witnesses or prospective prosecution 





L,_.,. ·.;;-. , ·.·.·. · .. ·.- ... · .. ·•-·-.. ··.--.·-•-,. ,.--··,·-t 
witnesses to the prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting attorney's agents or to 
any official involved in the investigatory process of the case have been disclosed, 
made available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "A." 
7. Any reports and memoranda in possession of the prosecuting attorney 
which were made by any police officer or investigator in connection with this 
investigation or prosecution of this case have been disclosed, made available, or 
are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B." 
8. All material or information within the prosecuting attorney's possession 
or control which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged 
or which would tend to reduce the punishment therefore have been disclosed, made 
available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B." In addition, with 
regard to material or information which may be exculpatory as used or interpreted, 
the State requests that the defendant inform the State, in writing, of the defense 
which will be asserted in this case, so counsel for the State can determine if any 
additional material or information may be material to the defense, and thus fulfill its 
duty under I.C.R. 16(a) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
9. Wherever this Response indicates that certain evidence or materials 
have been disclosed, made available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit 
"B," such indication should not be construed as confirmation that such evidence or 
materials exist, but simply as an indication that if such evidence or materials exist, 
they have been disclosed or made available to the defendant. Furthermore, any 
items which are listed in Exhibit \\B" but are not specifically provided, or which are 
referred to in documents which are listed in Exhibit "B," are available for inspection 
upon appointment with the Prosecuting Attorney's Office. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY -3-
r-
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10. The State reserves the right to supplement any and all sections of this 
response if and when more information becomes available. 
11. The State objects to requests by the defendant for anything not 
addressed above on the grounds that such requests are outside the scope AND/OR 
DATED this-~-
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy 
of the foregoing RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY was 
(1) 4 hand delivered, or 
(2) __ hand delivered via court basket, or 
(3) __ sent via facsimile, or 
( 4) __ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the 
United States Mail. 
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
Richard M. Cuddihy 
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC 
312 17th Street 
P.O. Drawer 717 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
DATED this I o4 
I 
day of May 2016. 
~d~cJ~g 
RIN D. LEAVITT 
Senior Legal Assistant 









LIST OF WITNESSES 
STATE OF IDAHO vs. LARRY G. FENTON 
NEZ PERCE COUNTY CASE NO. CR2016-0001591 
NAME: NICK EYLAR 
ADDRESS: Lewiston Police Department 
1224 "F" Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 746-0171 
NAME: RICHARD G. FUENTES 
ADDRESS: Lewiston Police Department 
1224 "F" Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 746-0171 
NAME: CHRIS JENSEN 
ADDRESS: Probation and Parole 
908 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 799-5030x114 
NAME: REBECCA L. LEHMAN 
ADDRESS: 612 3rd Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 743-4558 
NAME: JAMES H. LEH MAN 
ADDRESS: 612 3rd Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 816-9250 
NAME: ASHLEY R. MARTIN 
ADDRESS: 802 9th Avenue #4 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 816-9924 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY -5-





1-.-- .• - .· - . -._.._.·.,_._ ·--•-"-'·-·--·· .. -
7. NAME: CHRIS REESE 
ADDRESS: Lewiston Police Department 
1224 "F" Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 746-0171 
8. NAME: TOM SPARKS 
ADDRESS: Lewiston Police Department 
1224 F Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 746-0171 
9. NAME: JOE STORMES 
ADDRESS: Lewiston Police Department 
1224 F Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 746-0171 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY -6-
39
EXHIBIT "B" 
LIST OF REPORTS 
STATE OF IDAHO vs. LARRY G. FENTON 
NEZ PERCE COUNTY CASE NO. CR2016-0001591 
1. A copy of any audios and/or videos are available by providing blank CDs or 
DVDs to the Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney's Office and by making 
prior arrangements during normal working hours. 
2. Lewiston Police Department Cap Sheet and Case Disposition Sheet consisting 
of three (3) pages. (1-3) 
3. Lewiston Police Department LAW Incident Table consisting of three (3) 
pages. ( 4-6) 
4. Lewiston Police Department Narrative prepared by Joe Stormes consisting of 
four (4) pages. (7-10) 
5. Lewiston Police Department Supplemental Narrative prepared by Robert 
Massey consisting of two (2) pages. (11-12) 
6. Lewiston Police Department Supplemental Narrative prepared by Rick 
Fuentes consisting of one (1) page. (13) 
7. Lewiston Police Department Supplemental Narrative prepared by Tom Sparks 
consisting of two (2) pages. (14-15) 
8. Lewiston Police Department Supplemental Narrative prepared by Nick Eylar 
consisting of three (3) pages. (16-18} 
9. Lewiston Police Department Main Names Table consisting of five (5) pages. 
(19-23) 
10. Criminal History consisting of thirty (30} pages. (24-53) 
11. One (1) DVD containing Watchguard videos from Rick Fuentes, Mike Rigney, 
Tom Sparks and Joe Stormes patrol vehicles; and fifteen (15) photographs. 




State of Idaho ,,s. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr 
Hearing type: Preliminary Hearing 
Hearing date: 05/11/2016 
Time: 1:41 pm 
Judge: Michelle M. Evans 
Courtroom: 3 
Court reporter: None 
Minutes Clerk: Evans 
Tape Number: ctrm 3 
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman 
014107 
Kelleher, Welch and Fenton Jr. present 
State requests continuance 
Def waives speedy prelirn but wants the prelim set for next week 
Comt sets prelim conference on 05-16-13 at 1:30 p.m. and the prelim hearing for 05-18-
2016 at 1 :30 p.rn. 
014355 
COURT MINUTES 1 
41
FI'LE·D 
ICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
UNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
) CASE NO. c& 1 Lo--t o/i I 
~ )-,___.-'\· NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY 
) <'<~ CONFERENCE 
vs. 
Defendant, 
) ~NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY 
) ~HEARING 
) ( ) NOTICE OF SENTENCING 
) ( ) NOTICE OF HEARING ON 
) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN TO the above-named Defendant that the following hearing 
has been set in your case at which you are to appear in the Courtroom of the Nez Perce County 





P~pMINARYCONFERENCEto f1qg~ at f :.af), C?m., on the 
_JU__ day of f\,,([L-lcf • 2o_J_U'. , ,~ I 
P~IMINARY H;EARING to begin at } ,J.f) ,l ():n., on the 
--4&- day of frlA.,lJi,~/" , 20 JU . 1 
SENTENCING to begin a~J ___ _, _.m. on the __ day of _____ _, 20 . 
HEARING to begin at ___ ~ _.m. on the __ day of 
20 ------" --
YOUAREHEREBYNOTIFIEDTHATIFYOUDONOTAPPEARINCOURTATSAID 
TIME AND PLACE, ANY BOND POSTED MAY BE FORFEITED BY TIIE COURT AND A 
WARRANT MAY BE ISSUED FOR YOUR ARREST WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE. 
DATED this 1L day of f};uud, , 2JJJ)__ 
BY ORDER OF: 
<X Copy to Prosecuting Attorney 
<)<z Copy handed to Defendant 
( ) Copy mailed to Defendant 
(~· Copy mailed/handed/placed in 
/'v· baskttf[~etJ~s Attorney 
-== 
I ' ; I 
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--.;-~~--:------. 
DANIEL L. SPICKLER 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
FILED 
JUSTIN J. COLEMAN 
zorn rmy 13 PM 12 03 
Senior Deputy Prosecutor 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 799-3073 
I.S.B.N.: 8023 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARRY G. FENTON, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR2016-0001591 
FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE 
TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
JUSTIN J. COLEMAN, Senior Deputy Prosecutor for Nez Perce County, Idaho1 
comes before the Court and pursuant to Defendant's Request for Discovery in the 
case herein, makes the following first supplemental disclosure compliance pursuant 
to Idaho Criminal Rules, Rule 16. 
1. That attached hereto is AMENDED EXHIBIT "A'1 which sets forth additional 
persons who may be called by the State as witnesses at a trial, none of whom are 
known by the undersigned to have any prior felony convictions, unless otherwise 
indicated. The State will continue to provide names of any witnesses as they 
become available. 
FIRST-SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY -1-
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f 3- day of May 20() (\ ( 
0 
~, ( lJ Qli{O./\____ 
---'----___,,_ _ ___._.=----------
iefSTIN 'i. COLEMAN 
onior Deputy Prosecutor 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy 
of the foregoing FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
was 
(1) ~ hand delivered, or 
(2) __ hand delivered via court basket, or 
(3) __ sent via facsimile, or 
(4) __ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the 
United States Mail. 
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
Richard M. Cuddihy 
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC 
312 17th Street 
P.O. Drawer 717 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
DATED this fB)~ day of May 2016. 
~~v{ii 
~RIN D. LEAVI 
Senior Legal Assistant 








AMENDED EXHIBIT "A" 
AMENDED LIST OF WITNESSES 
STATE OF IDAHO vs. LARRY G. FENTON 
... --:--·.-.-,•.•,·---- ·.·.··. - .. -.·-_ ·--.-- '· . - --- ---------·-··---·--·-··-!::: 
NEZ PERCE COUNTY CASE NO. CR2016-0001591 
NAME: NICK EYLAR 
ADDRESS: Lewiston Police Department 
1224 "F" Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 746-0171 
NAME: RICHARD G. FUENTES 
ADDRESS: Lewiston Police Department 
1224 "F" Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 746-0171 
NAME: CHRIS JENSEN 
ADDRESS: Probation and Parole 
908 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 799-5030x114 
NAME: REBECCA L. LEHMAN 
ADDRESS: 612 3rd Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 816-0796 
NAME: JAMES H. LEHMAN 
ADDRESS: 612 3rd Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 816-9250 
NAME: ASH LEY R. MARTIN 
ADDRESS: 802 9th Avenue #4 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 816-9924 
FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY -3-
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,i.:-·-··· - - '·-- - - - - .• - . ·. -·. - • ·-·· .. · ... 
7. NAME: CHRIS REESE 
ADDRESS: Lewiston Police Department 
1224 "F 11 Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 746-0171 
8. NAME: DAVID C. SINCERBEAUX (EXPERT WITNESS) 




615 West Wilbur Suite B 
Coeur D'Alene, Idaho 83815 
PHONE: (208) 209-8700 
ANTICIPATED TESTIMONY: David Sincerbeaux is a Forensic 
Scientist with the Idaho State Police Forensic Services and will 
testify to his observations, findings and expert opinion as a 
result of performing the testing on the controlled substances in 
this case. 
NAME: TOM SPARKS 
ADDRESS: Lewiston Police Department 
1224 F Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 746-0171 
NAME: JOE STORMES 
ADDRESS: Lewiston Police Department 
1224 F Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 746-0171 
NAME: NICK KRAKALIA 
ADDRESS: Lewiston Police Department 
1224 F Street 
Lewiston, Ida ho 83501 
PHONE: (208) 746-0171 
FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY -4-
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AMENDED EXHIBIT "B" 
AMENDED LIST OF REPORTS 
STATE OF IDAHO vs. LARRY G. FENTON 
NEZ PERCE COUNTY CASE NO. CR2016-0001591 
1. A copy of any audios and/or videos are available by providing blank CDs or 
DVDs to the Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney's Office and by making 
prior arrangements during normal working hours. 
2. Lewiston Police Department Cap Sheet and Case Disposition Sheet consisting 
of three (3) pages. (1-3) 
3. Lewiston Police Department LAW Incident Table consisting of three (3) 
pages. ( 4-6) 
4. Lewiston Police Department Narrative prepared by Joe Stormes consisting of 
four (4) pages. (7-10) 
5. Lewiston Police Department Supplemental Narrative prepared by Robert 
Massey consisting of two (2) pages. (11-12) 
6. Lewiston Police Department Supplemental Narrative prepared by Rick 
Fuentes consisting of one (1) page. (13) 
7. Lewiston Police Department Supplemental Narrative prepared by Tom Sparks 
consisting of two (2) pages. (14-15) 
8. Lewiston Police Department Supplemental Narrative prepared by Nick Eylar 
consisting of three (3) pages. (16-18) 
9. Lewiston Police Department Main Names Table consisting of five (5) pages. 
(19-23) 
10. Criminal History consisting of thirty (30) pages. (24-53) 
11. One (1) DVD containing Watchguard videos from Rick Fuentes, Mike Rigney, 
Tom Sparks and Joe Stormes patrol vehicles; and fifteen (15) photographs. 
12. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Forensic Controlled Substance 
Analysis Report consisting of two (2) pages. {54-55) 
13. Lewiston Police Department Supplemental Narrative prepared by 
Nick Krakalia dated April 15, 2016, consisting of one (1) page. (56) 





DISTRICT co· T JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, ST/ . ')F IDAHO 
Th n.1'\1D FOR TIIE COUNTY OF NEZ PERL_ 
1230 MAIN ST. 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
CASE TITLE: State of Idaho vs. Larry G. Fenton Jr 
HEARING TYPE: Preliminary Conference 
PLF ATTY: Justin J. Coleman 
DEF ATTY: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 






JUDGE: Kent J. Merica 
CLERK: Nelson 
< Magistrate Courtroom # d 2 
CASE#: CR-2016-0001591 
TIME: ------
BE IN KNOWN THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
Start 
Def · resent iiU1 ' :1thout ;,.ounsel • Def not in Custody 
Kelleher / Srnftri / ~) present for State 
State/ Def requests continuance of Prelim 
• Court Orders P1 e'.im Co11ference contiJmed to: at 1:30 p.m. 
• Court Orders Prelim Hearing continued to: at 1:30 p.m. 
• Def waives Prelim - Comi binds Def over to District Court 
• Case set for District Court Arraignment on at Assigned to: 
• Stipulation and Motion to Continue Prelim has been filed. 
• Def is being cor:.sidered for: 
Mental Health Court / DUI Comt / Family Reunification Court 
• Def previously waived. right to speedy prelim 
• Def waives right to speedy prelim 
------ -· --------------------------------• Defense addscsses Court regarding bond. 
• Preliminary He,,ring going forward on Wednesday, at 1:30 p.m. 




State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr 
Hearing type: Preliminary Hearing 
Hearing date: 5/18/2016 
Time: 1 :36 pm 
Judge:Car!B.Kerrick 
Courtroom: 2 
Minutes Clerk: BEV 
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 












Justin Coleman present for the State 
Mackenzie Welch present with defendant 
Parties are ready to proceed. 
State calls Officer Jay Stormes as a witness - sworn in and examined. 
Welch - Objection, hearsay. 
State - Not being used for the truth of the matter. 
Court - Overruled. 
State continues exam. 
Welch - Objection, hearsay. 
Court - Overruled. 
State continues exam. 
Welch questions the witness in aid of objection. No objection after 
questioning. 

















State moves to admit exhibit 1. 
Welch questions witness in aid of objection. No objection after questioning. 
Court - Based on that, State's exhibit 1 is admitted. 
State continues exam. 
Welch cross examines. 
State re-directs. 
Welch - Nothing further. 
Officer Stormes steps down and is excused. 
State rests. 
Welch - No evidence. 
State submits. 
Defense submits. 
Court - Based on the evidence, Court finds probable cause that the offense 
occurred and defendant committed it. Information has a different amount 
than the exhibit. State may want to amend information. Defendant is bound 
over to District Court Assigned to Judge Gaskill, set for arraignment 
5/26/16 at 1:30 pm. 
recess 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
v. 











) ______________ ) 
CASE NO. CR 16-1591 
ORDER BINDWG OVER 
_,. 
The undersigned Magistrate having HEARD the Preliminary hearing in the above-entit]ed matter on 
the 181H day of May, 2016, and it appearing to me that the offense set forth in the Complaint theretofore 
filed herein has been committed, and there is sufficient cause to believe the above-named defendant guilty 
thereof. 
I ORDER that said defendant be held to answer the same, and said defendant is hereby bound over to 
the Distiict Court for trial on the charge of COUNT I: TRAFFICKING IN METIIAMPHETAMINE; I.C. § 
37-2732B(a)( 4)(C); a felony. 
' ·~ 
DATED this / ¼ day of May, 2016. 
Magistrate 
-=-=--
THIS CASE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO: JAY P. GASKILL, DISTRICT JUDGE 
ORDER BINDING OVER 1 
51
Sef_;1~rl Judicial District Court, State of lcf<'?i>)··" .. , · -
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
"' and For the County of Nez Perce 
1230 Main·st. 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Case No: 
Fl LED 











NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Arraignment 
Judge: 
Thursday, May 26, 2016 
Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in Lewiston, Idaho. 
01:30 PM 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Wednesday, 




NOTICE OF HEARING 
Larry Glenn Fenton Jr 
802 9th Ave Apt 4 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Mailed --
Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 
P.O. Drawer 717 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Mailed. __ 
Hand Delivered c// ·/n 9;__,,'_Jl 
Hand Delivered / 
Justin J. Coleman 
Mailed__ Hand Delivered / 
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DANIEL L. SPICKLER 
Nez Perce County. Prosecuting Attorney 
Fl LED 
JUSTIN J. COLEMAN 
2D1G PlA'f 1.91 Afll l l 53 
Senior Deputy Prosecutor 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 799-3073 
I.S.B.N.: 8023 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




CASE NO. CR2016-0001591 
IN FORMATION 
JUSTIN J. COLEMAN, Senior Deputy Prosecutor, in and for the County of Nez 
Perce, State of Idaho, who in the name and by the authority of the State, prosecutes 
in its behalf, comes now into the District Court of the County of Nez Perce, and states 
that LARRY G. FENTON is accused by this Information of the following crime(s): 
COUNT I 
TRAFFICKING IN METHAMPHETAMINE, I.C. § 37-2732B{a)(4)(C), a 
felony. 
That the Defendant, LARRY G. FENTON, on or about the 28th day of February 
2016, in the County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho, was knowingly in actual 
and/or constructive possession of four hundred (400) grams or more of 
Methamphetamine, to-wit: four hundred eighty one (481) grams of 
Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance, or of any mixture or 
substance containing a detectable amount of Methamphetamine. 
All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case 
and against the peace and dignity of the State rJld~ 
J STIN J. COLEMAN 







State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr 
Hearing type: Arraignment 
Hearing date: 5/19/2016 
Time: 1:52 pm 
Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Courtroom: 1 
Court reporter: Nancy TO\l\rler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 
Prosecutor: April Smith 
Defendant present, in custody, ,,vith counsel. 







Defendant understands the charge. 
Defendant understands the penalties. 
Defendant's name, date of birth and social security number are correct. 
Defendant waives the reading of the Information. 
Mr. Cuddihy addresses the Court and Defendant will enter a not guilty plea in 
CR16-1591 and intends to file a motion that ,Nill determine the outcome of both matters 
(probation violation CR13-7217) 
15546 Mr. Cuddihy to file motions by 6-16-16, response due 6-30-16 and Court will 
hear motions on 7-14-16 at 1:30 p.m. (CR13-7217 will be set for a status conference). 





LED Fl .... 
20\6 MAY 2q AM 8: 38 
PATTY 0.f .. 'Slt • ..., J/1,. ...,.. ..__, Cpl}f//11~ f~Vl, u VVDEPU y 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECO1'1D .HJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












CASE NO. CR16-01591 
ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL 
MOTION HEARING 
The above-entitled case is hereby scheduled as follows: 
All pre-trial motions shall be filed on or before; June 16, 2016; 
Supporting Briefs due: June 16, 2016; 
Responding Briefs due: June 30, 2016; 
All pre-trial motions shall be heard at the hour of 1:30 p.m. on Thursday, July 14, 2016, with the 
defendant personally present at said hearing. If no motions are filed, there will be no hearing on this 
date. 




Dated !bis 2 ~ of May, 2016. 
ORDER SETTJNG JURY TRIAL AND 2 
SCHEDULING PROCEEDINGS 
56
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL MOTION 
HEARING was: 
---band delivered via court basket, or 
r-
___ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this 2 lf day of May, 
2016,to: 
Rick Cuddihy 
PO Drawer 717 
Lewiston ID 8 3 5 0 1 
Justin Coleman 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
PATTY 0. ·wEEKS, Clerk 
ORDER SETTING JURY TRIAL AND 3 
SCHEDULING PROCEEDINGS 
57
::: May.24.20'!6 9:29AM 
'll'filUt 
No. 2897 P. 1/5 
,..•.':-.-
~= 
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC 
Post Office D:rawer 717 
312 Se~enteenth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 746-0103 
Fax: (208) 746-0118 
Atto•·neys fol' Defendant 
. •''-!"'."-""'""'' .... -- - ' 
Fl LED 
tat6 1'1ffV 2lf Rf'J 9 20 
P,.,-,,y ~.,~,-.,.. 
I •• - ~. 1 <: : , 1 r 
· " •~v. nL:~:,:_-- ~ 
• -·;... I I 
f\ :-- :: : --;--•, 
• •· I I 
lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
T~ STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZPERCE 














Case No: CR 16-1591 
APPLICATION FOR TRANSCRill' 
OF PRELIMINARY BEARING 
--------------) 
COMES NOW, Richard M. Cuddihy, Attorney for the above-named Defendant, and 
respectfully shows the court as follows: 
I. 
That Petitioner was appointed on the 28th day of April~ 2016, as Attorney for the above-named 
Defendant and on the 18th day of May, 2016 a Preliminary Heating was held, after which the Court 
issued an order binding the Defendant over to District Court. 
II. 
That thereafter on the 1 st11 day of May, 2016 the Defendant appeared in the District Court and 
entered a plea of :not guilty, and this matter has been set for jury trial. 
APPLICATION FOR TRANSCRIPT 
OF PRELIMINARY HEARING 
Page 1 of 3 
58
May.24.2016 9:29AM No. 2897 P. 2/5 
III. 
That a transcript of the Preliminary Hearing is necessary for Petitioner to properly prepare for 
cross examination and all further necessary trial preparation. 
IV. 
That said Defendant is indigent and without funds or other resmu-ces to pay for the said 
transcript. 
WHEREFORE,. Petitioner prays that an Order of the Court be made for preparation of the 
Prelirninazy Hearing transcript. 
PATED this 24th day of May, 2016. 
.AJ>PLlCATION FOR TRANSCRIPT 
OF PRELil\lllNAllY HEAllING 
KNOWLTON & Mr.LES, PLLC 
Richard M. Cucldihy 
:rage 2 of 3 
59
May. 24. 20i6 9:29AM No. 2897 P. 3/5 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 241h day of May, 2016, I caused a 1nle and correct copy 
of the foregoing Application for Transcript of Preliminary Hearing to be: 
[X] Faxed 
to the following: 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Fax: (208) 799-3080 
APPLICATION FOR TRANSCRIPT 
OF PJlEUMlNAllY HE.ARING 
ftbeFirln 
Page3 of 3 
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May. 2 4. 201 6 9: 2 9 AM No. 2897 P. 4/5 
Ft.LED 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 















Case No: CR tt-15.91 
ORDERFORTRANSCRIPT 
OF PRELIMlNARY HEARING 
THE COURT, having read and passed upon the foregoing Application for Transcript for 
Preliminary Hearing and being fully advised in the premises, 
It is hereby ordered that a transcript be prepared of the above-named.Defendant's Preliminary 
Hearing dated the 18 111 day of May, 2016. 
DATED this 2 qt;:y of May, 2016. 
ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPT 
OF PRELIMINARY HEARING Pagel of2 
TRANSGRiPT P,RSiGl~f.~l) ,O 
• CARLTON 
'fl! TO'''l'i/LEF 
tl?.TE.5 .. z..tJ: __ L~ -.-=o-=~-
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May. 2 4. 2 0 i 6 9 : 3 0 AM No. 2897 P. 5/5 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I CERTIFY that on this aday of May, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order fo:r- Ti-iu1script of Preliminary Hearing: 
[XJ faxed 
to the following: 
Nez Pe:ree County Prosecutor's Office 
Lewistoll, lD 83501 
Fa..x: (208) 799-3080 
Richard M. Cuddihy . 
KNOWLTON & MILESi PLLC 
Lew\~ton, ID 83501 
Fax: (208) 746-0118 
ORDER :FOll TRANSCI.UPT 
OF PRELIMINARY HEARING 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
Page2 of2 
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Jun. 15. 20i6 9:53AM No. 3251 P. 1/4 
'· 
Richa"fd M. Cuddihy, ISB No. 7064 
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC 
312 Seventeenth Street 
Post Office Drawer 717 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 746-0103 
Fax: (208) 746-0113 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT 












) ______________ ) 
Case No. CR 16-1591 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION 
OF TIME TO FILE PRE-TRIAL 
MOTIONS 
COMES NOW the Defendant in the above-entitled matter, by and through her Attorney 
of record, Richard M. Cuddihy of Knowlton & Miles, PLLC, and respectfully requests this Court 
grant the defense a one (1) week e>..1:ension to file Pre-Trial Motions as ordered in the Order 
Setting Jury Trial and Scheduling Proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 
DATED this fQ-1\:ray of June. 2016. 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION 
OF TIME TO FILE PRE-TRIAL 
MOTIONS 
l?:\e;c l of l 
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) _____________ ) 
Case No.CR 16-1591 
ORDER FOR EXTENSION 
OF TIME FOR FILlNG 
PRE-TlllA.L MOTIONS 
TffiS MATTER having come before the Court upon the Defendane s Motion for 
Extension of Time to File Pre-Trial Motions, and it appearing that good cause exists for granting 
said Motion; 
IT IS lIEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that deadline for filing 
all Pre-Trial Motions of June 16, 2016 in the above-entitled case, is hereby extended to June 23, 
2016. 
DATED this Way of June, 2016. 
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[X] faxed to the following: 
Richard M. Cuddihy 
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC 
312 17r11 Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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Fax: (208) 746"0113 
FILED 
201, JUN 21 PM i; a9 
' ~ ~--, 
Attorneys for Defendant CL rn to~ 1,ru°c: 6,i~:~ '") ·, i Ip ~~o 
-•·-·,.-u,11 "fl 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF -
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ1PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
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Case No. CR16"1591 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
COMES NOW the defendant, by and through his attorney, Richard M. Cuddihy of the 
law firm of Knowlton & Miles, PLLC, and respectfully requests that the Court suppress all 
evidence relating to the unlawful seizure and search of Larry Fenton by Officer Storms in Nez 
Perce County, on February 28, 2016; for the reasons that the search and seizure of Mr. Fenton 
was conducted in violation of the Idaho Constitution Article I § 17, and the U.S. Constitution 4th 
and 5th Amendments. 
ORAL ARGUMENT and leave to adduce testimony is hereby requested. 
INTRODUCTION 
The defendant was illegally stopped because the facts available to the officer at the time 
he detained the defendant did not provide a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he had 
committed, or was about to commit, a crime. Additionally, the defendant was illegally detained 
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because his detainment occUITed after the purpose of the stop had been completed; therefore 
there was no reason to prolong his detainment by ordering the defendant to remain at the scene 
for his probation officer to respond. Finally, the defendant's vehicle was illegally searched, as 
there were no reasonable grounds that would cause one to believe that the defendant had violated 
a condition of his probation. The evidence acquired as a result of these unconstitutional acts 
must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. 
FACTS 
On or about February 28, 2016, Officer Joseph Stormes was working the daytime patrol 
shift. (P.H.T. 6, 1. 20-24). He began following a vehicle that was being driven by Larry Fenton. 
(P.H. T. 7, 1. 8-9). Although no traffic infractions had occurred, Officer Stormes performed a 
registration check of Mr. Fenton's license plate number. (P.H.T. 8, 1. 9-10; 22, 1. 1-3). The 
dispatcher responded by saying that they did not find a record for that plate number. (P.H.T. 8, 1. 
13-14). Officer Stormes checked the wrong license plate number the :first time, so on the second 
attempt he asked dispatch to change out a digit to see if that produced a record for that plate 
number. (P.H.T. 8, 1. 16-20; 27, 1. 8-10). Dispatch responded that not record was found in the 
system, which caused Stormes to realize it was because he relayed the wrong number a second 
time. (P.H.T. 8, 1. 20-22; 27, 1. 10-11). Rather than correct his mistake and run the actual 
registration number, Officer Stormes elected to make a traffic stop on the vehicle with no 
reasonable suspicion and relayed the correct plate number to dispatch. (P.H.T. 9, 1. 7-9). Officer 
Stormes claimed that the purpose of the stop was to investigate why the inaccurate registration 
information that he and dispatch had run was not shov-.iing up in the system. (P.H.T. 9, 1. 13-15). 
Fianlly, dispatch ran the correct license plate number, but never communicated the registration 
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infonnation to Officer Stormes that the vehicle's registration information came back correctly to 
Mr. Fenton's vehicle. (P.H.T. 27, 1. 8-22). 
Officer Stormes obtained Mr. Fenton's registration card, compared the card with the 
license plate and vin number, and discovered that they all correctly matched. (P.H.T. 10, 1. 21-
25). Officer Stormes then communicated with dispatch regarding Mr. Fenton's prior citations 
for insurance-related issues. (P.H.T. 11, 1. 18-21). Officer Stormes cited Mr. Fenton for failing 
to purchase a driver's license and failing to provide proof of insurance. (P.H.T. 12, 1. 2-4). As he 
was handed his citation, Mr. Fenton informed Officer Stormes that he was on probation. (P.H.T. 
12, l. 5-8). Officer Stormes then contacted the on-call Probation and Parole officer to let them 
know the situation and ''just advised them." (P.H.T. 12, 1. 12-15). The probation officer, Chris 
Jensen, told Officer Stormes that she would be coming to the traffic stop and that she wanted to 
search the vehicle. (P.H.T. 12, 1. 24-25; 13, I. 1). Officer Stormes gave all of Mr. Fenton's 
information back to him and completed the purpose of the stop. (P.H.T. 13, 1. 4-6; 20, 1. 4-10). 
Officer Stormes informed Mr. Fenton that Ms. Jensen would be coming to the traffic stop 
because she wanted to speak with him and that she wanted him to stand by, indicating to Mr. 
Fenton he was not free to go and was to remain on the scene. (P.H.T. 13, 1. 4-8; 24, 1. 13-15). 
Officer Sparks also on scene stood alongside Officer Stormes, next to Mr. Fenton's vehicle. 
(P.H.T. 25, 1. 5-12). As soon as Ms. Jensen arrived, she immediately suggested that Mr. Fenton 
be handcuffed. (P.H.T. 13, 1. 14-17). 
Ms. Jensen and Officer Stormes proceeded to search the vehicle, while Officer Sparks 
was standing nearby. (P.H.T. 13, 1. 20-23). The search of Mr. Fenton's vehicle did end up 
producing illegal drugs, for which he was subsequently arrested. (P.H. T. 15, L 9-16). 
MOTION TO SUPPRESSAND 




Upon a motion to suppress, where an investigative stop results in the seizure of evidence, 
the State carries the burden of proving that the officer's actions were reasonable. State v. Haworth, 
106 Idaho 405, 406 (1984). The State must meet its burden of proof as to the reasonableness of the 
original detention and of any subsequent extension. State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562, 112 P .3d 
848, 850 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Evidence obtained by an invalid investigatory seizure is inadmissible in court. 
Dunaway v. N.Y., 442 U.S. 200, at 218-219 (1979). "Any evidence seized pursuant to an 
unlawful stop or an unreasonable detention is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' and is, therefore, 
inadmissible." Bordeaux, 217 P.3d at 6. 
ANALYSIS 
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of persons to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, "[n]o right 
is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every 
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference 
of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 
(1968). Officer Stormes unlawfully stopped Mr. Fenton because there was no reasonable 
suspicion present that would justify such action. Mr. Fenton was also unlawfully detained and 
handcuffed by Officer Stormes after the stop had concluded, when Mr. Fenton should have been 
free to leave. Lastly, both Officer Stormes and Officer Jensen unlawfully and unreasonably 
searched Mr. Fenton's vehicle, as there was no reasonable grounds for doing so. For the reasons 
stated above, the evidence found during the search of Mr. Fenton's car should be suppressed. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESSAND 
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There was no reasonable suspicion present to justify the stop of Mr. Fenton. 
The stop of Mr. Fenton's vehicle was unlawful because there was no reasonable 
suspicion present to justify such action. A traffic stop constitutes "a seizure within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment," and "is constitutional if it is either based upon probable cause to 
believe a traffic violation has occurred or justified by reasonable suspicion." United States v. 
Spoerke, 568 F.3d 1236, 1248 (11th Cir.2009). When a police officer stops a vehicle for 
investigative purposes, the Fourth Amendment is not violated if the officer has a "reasonable and 
objective basis for suspecting that the vehicle ·or an occupant is involved in criminal activity." 
State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 737 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
663; State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 963 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 613, 615 
(Ct. App. 1997)). More succinctly, the officer must have "reasonable articulable suspicion that a 
person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime." State v. Morgan, 294 P.3d 1121, 1125 
(2013). 
This test is based upon the "totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before 
the time of the stop." Id. Although the required information leading to fonnation of reasonable 
suspicion is less than that required to form probable cause, it still must be "more than speculation 
or instinct on the part of the officer." State v. Kimball, 141 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 2005). 
"There must be 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion."' Cerino, 141 Idaho at 738 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). 
Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity so as to justify stop must be based on specific, 
articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts; reasonable 
suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or inchoate and unparticularized suspicion. Morgan, 
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294 P.3d at 1124. In Morgan, the officer stopped a vehicle driving without a front license plate, 
which would be illegal if the vehicle was registered in Idaho. Id. at 1123. However, the vehicle 
was registered in a different state, therefore making the stop unlawful. Id The court held that 
the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant violated car registration 
statute, so as to justify stop of defendant. Id. at 1125. 
In this case, there was no reasonable or objective basis for suspecting that Mr. Fenton 
was involved in criminal activity. In Morgan, the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to 
believe that defendant violated the state's registration statute, so as to justify a traffic stop of the 
defendant. Here, Officer Stormes similarly did not have reasonable suspicion that would justify 
the stopping of Mr. Fenton, as the registration did not come back as invalid or mismatched with 
the license plate number; the registration did not come back at all, which should have been a 
clear indication that the number was entered incorrectly. The first time Mr. Fenton's license 
plate number was ran, Officer Stormes told dispatch the incorrect number, so no record of the 
registration came up. The second time Mr. Fenton's license plate number was ran, either 
dispatch ran the wrong number or Officer Stormes, once again, told dispatch the incorrect 
number. At that point, Officer Stormes made the decision to unlawfully stop the vehicle for no 
other purpose than to investigate why Mr. Fenton's registration infom1ation was not showing up 
in the system. Meanwhile, on the third attempt, the license plate number was ran correctly and 
produced registration that matched with the plate number. This is where the stop should have 
immediately ended, as there was absolutely no reason to initiate that stop in the first place. 
However, Officer Stormes proceeded with the stop, and subsequently issued Mr. Fenton two 
citations. 
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There was no reasonable, aiticulable suspicion of criminal activity so as to justify the 
stop. Officer Stormes pulled Mr. Fenton's vehicle over solely based upon the fact that the 
license plate number was incorrectly ran through dispatch, at the fault of both Officer Stormes 
and the dispatcher. Therefore, the stop of Mr. Fenton was unlawful. 
Mr. Fenton's detention by Officer Stormes was unlawful. 
Mr. Fen ton's detention by Officer Stormes was unlawful, because the stop was 
unreasonably and unjustifiably extended. Officer Stormes purposefully withheld information 
from Mr. Fenton that the probation officer, Ms. Jensen, intended to search the vehicle, as well as 
his person; he only told Mr. Fenton that she wanted to speak with him, and that she wanted him 
to "stand by." This caused Mr. Fenton to feel as if he had to remain with the officers. 
Additionally, Officer Stormes failed to inform Mr. Fenton that he was free to leave. 
Once the purpose of a valid traffic stop has been completed and an officer's initial 
suspicions have been verified or dispelled, the detention must end unless there is additional 
reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts. United States v. Estrada, 459 F.3d 627, 631 
(5th Cir.2006); United States v. Jackson, 517 F. Supp. 2d 859, 862 (W.D. La. 2007). In Jackson, 
the government failed to show a sufficient, reasonable suspicion to prolong the defendant's 
traffic stop. Id. at 863. The court held that there were insufficient reasons for suspicion to 
continue once the defendant's identification cleared. Id A constitutional violation occurred 
when the detention continued past that point. Id. A person is "seized" within the meaning of 
Fourth Amendment only when by means of physical force or show of authority his freedom of 
movement is restrained. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). Additionally, if a 
reasonable person believes that he is not free to leave, in view of all the surrounding 
circumstances, it effectively constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Florida v. 
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Royer, 460 U.S. 491,502 (1983). In Royer, the officers asked the defendant to follow them to a 
room without indicating in any way that he was free to leave, which effectively constituted a 
seizure. Id. at 501. The Court held that the police exceeded the limits of the investigative stop. 
Id. at 501. 
Officer Stormes did not have reasonable suspicion to continue detaining :Mr. Fenton after 
handing back his ID card and registration card. There was nothing inherently suspicious about 
:rvrr. Fenton's statement that he was on probation that would have warranted renewed detention 
after initial traffic stop. Similar to Royer, where the defendant felt like he had to abide by the 
officer's instructions, here Mr. Fenton felt as though he had to remain with the officers until 
Officer Jensen arrived. And understandably so, especially since both officers stood only a few 
feet av,.ray from l\1r. Fenton the entire time, until Officer Jensen arrived, which likely caused him 
to feel extremely intimidated and frightened. Additionally, upon Officer Jensen aniving on 
scene, and before the search began, Mr. Fenton was subsequently handcuffed. 
In this situation, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. Therefore, the 
continued detainment of Mr. Fenton by Officer Stormes was unlawful. 
The search of Mr. Fenton's vehicle was unreasonable. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, Section 1 7 of the 
Idaho Constitution forbid unreasonable searches. A warrantless search is per se unreasonable 
and the fruits of that search are suppressible, unless the search falls within certain specific and 
well-delineated exceptions. State v. Harwood, 495 P.2d 160, 162 (1972). 
"The exceptions to searches conducted outside the judicial process without a 
warrant include the following, (See generally: Wheeler v. Goodman, 330 F.Supp. 
1356 (W.D.N.C.1971)): (a) Search incident to and following a lawful arrest, but 
only of the suspect's person and of areas within his immediate reach or physical 
control necessary to protect police against hidden weapons, destruction of the 
evidence or fruits of the crime, etc. Chimel v. California, supra; Von Cleef v. New 
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Jersey, 395 U.S. 814, 89 S.Ct. 2051, 23 L.Ed.2d 728 (1969). (b) Search of a 
vehicle upon probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains articles that the 
officers are entitled to seize and where the ease and probability of mobility for 
escape or destruction of the evidence is clear. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 
90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). (c) Consent searches where such consent is 
knowing and voluntary. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 
L.Ed. 436 (1948); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 
L.Ed.2d 797 (1968). (d) Search, with probable cause, for and in hot pursuit of a 
fleeing and dangerous felony suspect. Warden Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 
387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). (e) Search of abandoned real 
estate or personal property. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 
L.Ed.2d 668 (1960). (f) A search under urgent necessity (a medical emergency or 
screams from within a dwelling). United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (2d. Cir. 
1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004, 84 S.Ct. 1940, 12 L.Ed.2d 1053 (1964). (g) 
Search pursuant to custodial prerogative (as in a vehicle held for forfeiture). 
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). (h) 
Search, with probable cause, necessary to prevent loss or destruction of the thing to 
be seized. United States v. Barone, supra; Johnson v. United States, supra" 
Quoting Harwood, 495 P.2d at 163. 
Additionally, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that searches conducted pursuant to the 
administration of probation are an exception to the warrant restriction. State v. Vega, 718 P.2d 
598,600 (Ct. App. 1986); See State v. Pinson, 657 P.2d 1095 (Ct.App.1983). However, the state 
must show that any such warrantless search conducted by the parole officer is reasonable. Vega 
at 600. A parole officer may make a warrantless search of a parolee and his residence if the 
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the parolee has violated some probation condition, 
and the search is reasonably related to disclosure or confirmation of that violation. Pinson at 
1101. A probation officer may also enlist the aid of the police when conducting a justified 
search. Id. However, it is impermissible for the police to use parole officers in lieu of a warrant 
to search, when conducting a criminal investigation. Vega at 601. 
In our case, the search of Mr. Fenton's car was unreasonable because neither the parole 
officer, nor the police officer, had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Fenton has violated a 
condition of his probation. The related events occurred as follows: First, Mr. Fenton, wanting to 
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cover all of his bases, informed Officer St01mes as the stop was concluding that he ,.,vas on 
probation. Then, Officer Stormes contacted the on-call probation officer to inform her that he 
just pulled Mr. Fenton over and issued him two citations. She said that she was on her way to 
the scene and wanted to search Mr. Fenton's vehicle. Officer Stormes informed Mr. Fenton that 
the Officer Jensen wanted to speak with him, but failed to inform him that the she planned on 
searching the vehicle. Lastly, after indicating that he was not free to leave, based on reasons 
stated earlier, Officer Stormes, along with Officer Jensen, handcuffed Mr. Fenton and began 
searching his person and vehicle. Up until that point, no issues had arisen that would have given 
Officer Stormes reason to believe that Mr. Fenton violated a condition of his probation. Officer 
Jensen also did not have reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Fenton violated some probation 
condition; she only knew that he had received to minor citations - citations that occurred as a 
result of an unlawful stop. Thus, the search was not reasonably related to the confirmation of 
that violation, as there was nothing to confirm. Therefore, the search of Mr. Fenton's vehicle by 
Officer Stormes and Ms. Jenson was not only unreasonable, but also unlawful. 
CONCLUSION 
Any evidence seized pursuant to the unlawful stop, the unreasonable detention, and the 
illegal and unlawful search is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' and is, therefore, inadmissible. Thus, 
the evidence found as a result of the unlawful search should be suppressed . .,,-~ 
DATED this l, day of June, 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
011....,tVl 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisP41 _-----=-_ day of June, 2016, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be: 
[X] faxed 
to the following: 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Fax: 208-799-3080 
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MAY 18, 2016 1:3t> P.M. 
PROCEEDINGS 
MR. COLEMAN: Next if we could take up State 
of Idaho versus Larry Fenton, CR16-1591. Mr; Fenton is 
present. He's currently being represented by Ms. Welch. 





THE COURT: And are you as well, 
Ms. Mackenzie -- Ms. Welch, I mean? 
MS. WELCH: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Based on that then, 
Mr. Coleman, you may call your first witness on behalf 
of the State. 
MR. COLEMAN: Thank you, Your Honor, State 
calls Officer Joe Stormes. 
THE COURT: Sir, if you'd like to come 
forward, you'll need to raise your right hand and be 
sworn. You can then have a seat in the witness stand. 
JOSEPH STORMES, 
a witness of lawful age, having been first duly sworn to 
tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth, was thereupon called as a witness on behalf of 
the State and testified upon his oath as follows: 
THE COURT: All right. You can have a seat 
there. 
And, Mr. Coleman, you may inquire. 
MR. COLEMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
1--'"" ~ . 
BY MR. COLEMAN: 
Q. Good afternoon. 
A. Good afternoon. 
Q. Could you please state your name and spell your 
last for the record? 
A. Joseph Stormes, It's S-T-O-R-M-E-5. 































Q. Okay. So you had prior law enforcement 
experience before --
A. Idid. 
Q. -- working in Lewiston? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you do before that? 
A. I was a patrol officer in Bosque Farms, New 
Mexico. 
Q. How long did you do that? 
A. Two-and-a-half years. 
Q. As a part of your training and e_?(perieric~·; ri1;1ve _ 
you been trained how to recognlz~· c~ntrol\ed sub;tance;? 
A. Yes. ·'" 
Q. What kind of training have you had as regards to 
that? 
A. I've had a narcotics class in the academy in 
which various types of narcotics were brought into the 
class and we were shown those narcotics and what they 
look like. And also through my experience on the job. 
Q. Were you working in your current capacity on 
February 28th of this year? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall what shift you were working? 
A. I was working day shift patrol. 
Q. What hours does that cover? 
A. It covers 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. 
Q. on that day while you were on -- when you were on 
7 




Mr. Larry Fenton? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Can you describe how that came about? 
A. I was driving on Snake River Avenue heading 7 
8 northbound, and I observed Mr. Fenton and his Pontiac 
9 Grand Prix. 
10 
11 
Q. What did the Pontiac Grand Prix look like? 
A. It was a white four-door sedan. 1 
2 A. I'm employed with the Lewiston Police Department 12 Q. And you said -- what street did you say that was 
as a patrol officer. 
Q, How long have you been doing that? 
A. Since October of 2015. 
-Q. Are you certified to be a police officer in the 
state of Idaho? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What certifications do you hold? 
A. Basic. 
Q. You"ve attended POST and all that comes along 
with that? 
A. I've been certified through the -- my academy was 
in New Mexico, but through all the paperwork, I've been 
certified here in New -- or Idaho. 
13 on? 
14 A. Snake River Avenue. 
15 Q. And was that in Nez Perce County and the state_ of 
16 Idaho? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q, What -- what did you do next when you observed 
19 that vehicle? 
20 A. Once I observed the vehicle traveling northbound, 
21 I completed a registration check through my dispatch, 
22 And my dispatchers advised me that the --
23 MS. WELCH: Objection. Hearsay. 
24 THE COURT: Mr. Coleman? 
25 MR. COLEMAN: Your Honor, this isn't being 
" /01/2016 10:36:23 AM Page 4 to 7 of 31 4 of 11 sheets 
78
1.1 show~_-n---_-t-hi-s-is_n_'_t_b_e_in_g_u_s_e_d_t_o_s_h_o_w_t_h ... -cr_u_t_h_o_f_t_he ___ 8_.....,.._1 ___ A_.-I~a-sk_e_d_h_~=:.-,-~ _fo_r_h-is_d_r-iv-e-r'_s_l_ic_e_n_s_e_,_a_n_d_h_e __ 1_0 __ 
2 matter. It's just being used to show the effect it had 2 provided me with an Idaho identification card. 
1.:43 ostnopth. is listener, what he did next with regards to the 34 Q. Who was it? 















THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection on 
that basis. 
BY MR. COLEMAN: 
Q. Go ahead. 
A. I completed a registration check through my 
dispatcher, and they told me that the registration did 
not return. 
Q. What does that mean? 
A. It means they were not finding a record coming 
back in the computer system. 
Q. Okay. So what did you do next? 
A. I tried changing one of the digits on the license 
plate. I thought I might have mistaken the letter eight 
for the -- excuse me, the number eight for the letter 
"B." So I asked dispatch to change that digit and see 
if it had any record that would return, and dispatch 
still told me that they did not have a record coming 
back in the system. 
Q. Have you experienced this before where there's 
been no record return even though you're reading the 
license plate number? 
A. Yes, 
9 
5 Q. Do .you see Larry Fenton in the courtroom today? 
6 A. Yes, sir. 
7 Q. Can you point to him and describe what he's 
8 wearing? 
9 A. He's in the striped jumpsuit sitting next to 
10 defense counsel, 
11 Q. Okay. So what•did you do next- in .regard!j·to the 
12 investigation you were conductini;r al that "ti~~? '". 
13 A. So after I obtained Mr, Fent'on's ID card, I 
14 advised him of the reason for the stop. I also 
15 requested his insurance and registration information 
16 such as a registration card. 
17 Q. Did he provide those to you? 
18 A. He provided me the registration card. However, 
19 he did not provide me current proof of insurance. 
20 Q. And what happened? 
21 A. S_o then I began to compare the registration card 
22 with the license plate and also the VIN on the car to 
23 make sure that they all matched. And all the numbers 
24 did match and they were correct, indicating that this 
25 was the correct car to the license plate and the VIN. 
11 
1 Q. Have you ever experienced something like that 
I! Q. And in the past, has that -- well, scratch that. So when you redid the numbers just to clarify it and 
there was no record return, what did you do next? 
2 happening before? 









A. Once I got behind the vehiei"e; I told my 
dispatch -- when I say "behind the vehicle," I got 
closer to the vehicle. I told my dispatch that I was 
going to make a traffic stop on that vehicle. I read 
the plate off a third time to them. And then as we got 
close to the intersection of Third Street and Main 
Street, I turned on my overhead emergency lights and 
initiated the traffic stop. 
Q. And what was the purpose of the stop? 
A. To investigate the issue of the registration not 
coming back in the system. 
Q, Did the vehicle stop? 
A. Yes, the vehicle did end up ptopping at the 
intersection of Third Street and Capitol. 
Q. And that's still in Nez Perce County, state of 
Idaho? 
4 Q. Typically, what does that indicate? 
5 A. Sometimes when a car is registered on, let's say, 
6 for instance, as an example, a Friday and the person is 
7 stopped on a Saturday, there may not be enough time for 
8 all the documentation and paperwork to make its way 
9 through the system to indicate that the license plate is 
10 currently up to date and registered to the car. 
11 Q. Okay. so now at this point, you've indicated he 
12 didn't have insurance for the vehicle? 
13 A. Or he didn't have it with him --
14 Q. Okay. 
15 A. -- is what he indicated. 
16 Q, So what did you do with that information? 
17 A. So I went back to my car and began to write out 
18 citations. And I also asked my dispatch if Mr. Fenton 
19 has had any prior citations for insurance-related 
20 issues. And dispatch informed me that he had prior been 
1 A. Yes. 21 suspended for ha'{ing insurance citation~. And then I 
22 Q. Were you able to identify the individual driving 22 completed writing my citations. 
13 the vehicle? 23 Q. Okay. Then what happened after that? 
1
"24 A. Yes, I did. 24 A. After I finished writing my citations and talking 
25 Q, How did you do that? 25 to my dispatch, I went back to Mr, Fenton at his car. 
1'--------~-----___,J 
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back his information, told him I was going to be issuing 
citations for failing to purchase a driver's license and 
also failing to provide proof of insurance, As I wrote 
out -- or as I was giving him the first citation and he 
was talking to me, he told me that he was pn probation, 
which he had not stated at any point prior to that in my 
contact with him. 
Q, And how does that change the nature of the 
investlgation for you at that point, or what do you do 
with that information? 
A. Well, what I did with the information is I went 
back to my car. I contacted the on-call Probation and 
Parole officer to let them know the totality of the 
circumstances, what had happened, and just advised them. 
Q. And what happened next? 
A. So as I finished -- I was starting to complete my 
conversation with the on-call Probation and Parole 
officer Chris Jensen. She told me that she was at her 
office --
MS. WELCH: Objection. Hearsay. 
THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the 
objection. 
THE WITNESS: She told me she was at her 
office and would be coming to the traffic stop and that 
13 
she wanted to search the vehicle. 
BY MR. COLEMAN: 
Q. Did you make Mr. Fenton aware of this? 
A. Yes. I told him, after I gave him his citation, 
his second citation, and also all of ills information 
back, his driver's license, I told him that Chris Jensen 
was going to be coming to the traffic stop because she 
wanted to speak with him. 
Q. Did Ms. Jensen ever arrive? 
A. Yes, she did. 
Q. What happened after she arrived? 
A. When she arrived, I, again, reiterated to her the 
reason for my stopping Mr. Fenton and also observations 
that had been observed. And then she told me that, 
again, she wanted to search the vehicle and she wanted 
to search his person for officer safety, and also 
suggested that we should handcuff Mr. Fenton. 
Q. And did -- did you_guys then complete a search of 
the vehicle? 
A. Yes, a search of-the vehicle began to be 
conducted by myself and Chris Jensen. And Officer Tom 
Sparks was standing by as a back-up officer, And he was 
at the traffic stop as well. 
Q. Is it common for you, as a patrol officer, to 
assist Probation in searches of this nature? 
-~--~.-.. 
14 
1 A. Yes. If they request us to help them, then yes. 
2 Q. And had you been requested to help in this 
3 situation? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. ls Ms. Jensen a felony probatlon officer? 
6 A. Yes, she is. 
7 Q, So describe how the search of the vehicle went. 
8 A. So the search of the vehicle, I -- after Chris 











have a seat on the curb. I walked to the passenger door 
of the vehicle and Chris Jensen. w:al~.e~: t~ ~~~ ~~i~e~s 
door of the vehicle, and.we c;,p~hed them up and began our 
search. Just a few· seconds into the se~rch, I located 
on the driver's seat a black plastic bag. And as I had 
my hands on the bag, I looked over to where Mr, Fenton 
had been sitting, and I observed that he was now 
standing back on his feet. 
Q. And what did you do? 
A. I told Mr. Fenton to sit back down, at which time 
20 he took off running. 
21 Q. Did you complete your search of the vehicle? 
22 A. Yes. It was completed, and there was another bag 
23 in addition to the one I located that had a white 
24 crystal --
25 MS. WELCH: Object. May I ask a question in 
15 
1 aid of objection? 
2 THE COURT: You may. 
3 MS, WELCH: This other bag that you just 
4 referred to, dld you locate that? 
5 THE WITNESS: I located the other bag. 
6 MS. WELCH: No objection. 
7 THE COURT: All right. 
8 BY MR. COLEMAN: 
9 Q. So what did you find ln -- well, first of all, 
10 the second bag, where did you find that one? 















the driver's seat where Mr. Fenton had been sitting. 
Q. And where specifically was the first bag you 
described located? 
A. That was· on the passenger seat, in the front (f' 
passenger seat of the vehicle. 
Q. Passenger seat. I think you had previously 
testified that it was located on the driver's seat, but 
that's not where you found it? 




A. There was the first one I found; which was in a 
black plastic bag on the front passenger seat. After 
Mr. Fenton had left the scene and we came back to 
complete the search of the vehicle, there was another 
,.:.-·1 
~; .. 
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. 2 driver's license and also failing to provide proof of 2 that point? 
I' -3 insurance, 3 A. At that point, no. 
, 4 Q. And had the investigatlon with regards to the 4 Q. Okay, So you got behind the vehicle and called 
, 5 traffic stop that you were conducting concluded at that 5 in the license plate to dispatch as Idaho plate 180728? 
I .. -6 point? 6 A. Correct. 
, 7 A. Yes. I had handed him back all of his driver's 7 Q. And you thought that the dispatcher knew that you 
- 8 license information,. registration card, and also his 8 were referring to a local Hcense plate? 
'.;.' ·
0
g citations. And I had shut off my emergency overhead 9 A. Correct. 
~ lights. 10 Q. And, in fc!ct, the vehlcle -- or the registration 
'11 Q, So you were just waiting for the probation 11 that was ran was I-180728? 
li2 officer to respond at that point? 12 A. That's what the dispatcti~/h~ci iat~~ t~l•d.me ~he 
~3 A. Yes. 13 thought that was the plate that w.;s;' ru~. So that's how 
ij'. 4: Q. And you had indicated to him that she intended to 14 she ran it in the computer system. come and talk to him? 15 Q. And so that was the reason that the vehicle 
A. Yes. 16 i:egistration information did not come back as valid? 
~
_7: MR. COLEMAN: I have no further questions. 17 · A. Correct. 
THE COURT: Ms. Welch? 18 Q, And so you pulled over the vehicle based upon the 
MS. WELCH: Thank you, Your Honor. 19 license plate number having been ran through dispatch .1,o1 CROSS-EXAMINATION 20 incorrectly? BY MS. WELCH: 21 A. Correct. 
: 22 Q. Prior to stopping Mr. Fenton, you were in 22 Q. Okay. And so you stopped the vehicle based upon 
·,!:1
4
3 communication with several other officers; is that 
correct? 



















Q. Okay. And who was that? 
A. Officer Nick Eylar. 
Q. Okay. And what vehicle were you watching? 
A. Which -- which vehicle was I watching? 
Q, Correct. 
A. I saw a couple vehicles, but I wasn't watching 
any particular vehicle. 
Q. Okay. 
21 
A. As I left the area where I had been speaking with 
Officer Eylar, I looked over at the gas pumps, and I 
could see a male subject sitting in a white Pontiac 
Grand Prix at the gas pumps-at Southway Zip Trip. And 
then I pulled out and I left. 
Q. Okay. So you pulled out and started following 
the Pontiac -- Pontiac Grand Prix? 
A. I pulled out and began heading northbound -- or 
excuse me, southbound on Snake River Avenue, Then I was 
advised by Officer Eylar that at the same time I had 
pulled out and cleared the roundabout on Snake River 
Avenue, that the vehicle had pulled out and was now 
going -- coming towards the roundabout. So I pulled a 
U-turn and saw the white Pontiac Grand Prix go through 
the roundabout and start heading northbound on Snake 
River Avenue -- Snake River Avenue. And that's when I 
got behind him, 
23 that and ended up contacting the driver, who you 
24 identified was Larry Fenton? 
25 A. Correct. 
1 Q. And you asked him for his registration and 
2 insurance? 
3 A. Correct. 
4 Q. Went back to your car? 
5 A. Correct. 
6 Q. And at that time, did you determine that you were 
7 going to cite Mr. Fenton for failure to purchase a 
8 driver's license and failure to provide proof of 
9 insurance? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Okay. Did you write out the citations at that 
12 point? 
13 A. I went back and looked at his license plate and 
14 looked at the registration sticker to make sure that 
15 those matched. 
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A. But yes, I went back and wrote the -- the 
18 citations for that. 
19 Q. Okay. And then you handed him the citatlons? 
20 A. I handed him one citation. 
21 Q. Okay. Which citation was that? 
22 A. I don't recall. It was one of the'ones_ I had 
23 written out. There was two. · 
24 Q, Okay. And then you went back to your car and 
25 called Probation and Parole? 
23 




1 A. After he told me that he was on probation, yes. 
2 I didn't give him his second citation back. I went back 
3 to my car and I called Probation and Pa-role. 
Q. Okay. And do you recall what time you called 
Probation and Parole at? 
A. I don't. 
Q. Okay, And so after you talked to Probation and 
Parole, you went back and gave him your second citation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at that point, you said -- then you told him 
you were going to hold him after that until Chris Jens.en 
arrived on scene? 
A. No. I told him that Chris Jensen from Probation 
and Parole was coming to speak with him and that she 
wanted him to stand by. 
Q. Okay. And so you held him there with you? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. He wasn't outside the car at that tlme? 
9 A. No. He was inside his car. 





A. I was standing just a few feet away with my 
partner. 
Q. Okay, And so was he free to leave? 
A. Yes. Had he left, there wasn't anything I could 
have done to stop him. My traffic stop was concluded. 
25 
Q. And so how long was it before Jensen -- Chris 
Jensen arrived on scene? 
A. I don't know. I could only give a guesstimation, 
but I don't know. 
Q. You said Tom Sparks was on =~cene as a cover 
officer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where was he at at this time? 
A. He was standing next to me. 
Q. So next to the vehicle? By the vehicle? 
A. Yeah, a few feet from the vehicle standing next 
to me. 
Q. You said you don't recall how long It was before 
Chris Jensen showed up? 
A. I don't know an exact time period, no. 
Q. So when she showed up, was Mr. Fenton removed 
from the vehlcle? 
A. Yes. She told him to step out of the vehicle, 
Q, And you said that you collected the evidence and 
sent it to the lab. Can you tell me which lab item 
number corresponds with the two different items that you 
located in the vehicle? 
A. I'm sorry, could you repeat the question? I 
don't understand what you're asking. 
Q, The lab item number on State's Exhibit 1? 
26 
1 A. Uh-huh. 
2 Q. Can you tell me whlch lab item number corresponds 
3 with the two different packages that were found in the 
4 vehicle? 
5 A. I can't. I can only tell you what's on the 
6 report here. 
7 Q. And did you have the black plastic sack or any of 
8 the packages tested for fingerprints? 
9 A. I requested that they be tested for fingerprints, 
10 and I don't know if that was ever done. 
11 Q. Who did this vehicle belong to? .· 
12 A. This vehicle was regist¢:red .. to anot:"tier couple. 
13 Q. Okay. So it wasn't registered'-"to Mr. Fenton? 
14 A. No, it wasn't. 
15 Q. Did he inform you that he was purchasing it? 
16 A. Yes. He informed me he was in the process of 
17 purchasing the vehicle. 
18 MS. WELCH: I don't believe I have ariy 
19 further questions. 
20 THE COURT: Anything in light of that? 
21 MR. COLEMAN: Just a couple of things, Your 
22 Honor. 
23 
24 BY MR. COLEMAN: 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
25 Q. With regards to the license plate number, did you 
1 know at the time that you made the stop that dispatch 
2 had entered the number wrong? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. When did you find out the reason why it was 
5 returning as no registration? 
6 A. After I got back to the station, I was able to 
7 listen to the audio recording of the radio traffic 
27 
8 between myself and dispatch, And that's when it was 
9 confirmed that I had run the plate wrong initially with 
10 the digits messed up. And then the second time, again, 
11 it was run wrong. 
12 The third time when I actually told dispatch what 
13 plate I was going to be out with, I actually spelled it 
14 out correctly, gave it to them correctly, However, 
15 throughout the entire time of the stop, they never -
16 informed me that they had gotten a return back on, I 
17 believe, the third time that I ran it. 
18 Q. You don't know if they ran it the third time or 
19 not at that point? 
20 A. I was told later they had run it and had gotten a 
21 return, but they didn't tell me they had.gotten a return 
22 while I was on my stop. 
23 Q. You had already made the stop by that point? 
24 A. Right, I had already made the stop, and 
25 everything had been concluded before -- I found out 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, CASE NO. CR2016-0001591 
Plaintiff, 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
vs. 
LARRY G. FENTON, 
Defendant. 
JUSTIN J. COLEMAN, Senior Deputy Prosecutor for Nez Perce County, State of 
Idaho, comes before the Court and moves that the Pretrial Motion Hearing which 
was scheduled for July 21, 2016, at 1:30 P.M., be rescheduled for a time that is 
convenient for all parties. 
This Motion is being made based upon a key witness for the State being 
unavailable and will not return until July 28, 2016. 
125-Y½ DATED this ___ day of July 2016,----- . .. . --------- _ 
ior Deputy Prosecutor 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 1 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full 1 true, complete and correct copy of 
the foregoing MOTION TO CONTINUE was 
(1) 
I 1') , I 
\__, hand delivered, or 
(2) __ hand delivered via court basket, or 
(3) __ sent via facsimile, or 
(4) __ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the 
United States Mail. 
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
Richard M. Cuddihy 
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC 
312 17th Street 
P.O. Drawer 717 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
DATED this i ytb day of July 2016. 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
,,.q ~ / -'~/ , 
( / L~ I. /,/\._, . (_ j. r-~;c~:ia I /)~;/-;;t·~ 
/7ERIN D. LEA VITI,,/ / 
---- Senior Legal Assistant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, CASE NO. CR2016-0001591 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER TO CONTINUE 
vs. 
LARRY G. FENTON, 
Defendant. 
Having read and considered the foregoing Motion to Continue, and being fully 
advised in this matter, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Pretrial Motion Hearing which was 
. r,. 
scneduled for July 21, 2016, at 1:30 P.M. be rescheduled for the ~ day of 
\ 
. ~~+- , 204, at the hour of Z : 3tJ ~-M. 
DATED this [t:jf--.. day of July 2016. 
ORDER TO CONTINUE 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER TO 
CONTINUE, was 




/ hand delivered via court basket, or 
__ sent via facsimile, or 
__ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the 
United States mail, addressed to the following: 
Prosecutor's Office 
P. O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Richard M. Cuddihy 
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC 
312 17th Street 
P.O. Drawer 717 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
DATED this ,qr day of July 2016. 


















State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr 
Hearing type: Pretrial Motions 
Hearing date: 8/4/2016 
Time: 3:06 pm 
Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Courtroom: 1 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
Defense Attorney: Mackenzie Welch 
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman 
Defendant present, in custody, with counsel. 
Ms. Welch addresses the Court re: oral correction to brief page 4. 
Mr. Coleman addresses the Court re: stipulation to admission probation 
Ms. Welch has no objection and stipulates to admission probation agreement. 
Mr. Coleman calls Officer Nicholas Eylar, Sworn, Mr. Coleman begins direct 
Ms. Welch begins cross examination Officer Nicholas Eylar. 
Witness steps down. 
Mr. Coleman calls Officer Joseph Stormes, sworn, Mr. Coleman begins direct 
--- ----··-·-···~--- --·-----···--------· ---- ····-· .. --·····------···. 
Ms. Welch begins cross examination Officer Joseph Stormes. 
Mr. Coleman begins redirect Officer Joseph Stormes. 
Witness steps down. 
34435 Mr. Coleman requests he be able to file written closing argument and attach 
the stipulated probation agreement. 
Court Minutes 
88
34450 Court will auow Mr. Coleman to file written closing dnd will take matter 
under advisement. 
34454 Court recess. 
Court Minutes TERESA DAMMON 
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DANIEL L. SPICKLER 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney ZDl&, AU'G - 5 PH 2: 0 1 
JUSTIN J. COLEMAN 
Senior Deputy Prosecutor 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARRY GLENN FENTON, JR., 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR2016-0001591 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
JUSTIN J. COLEMAN, Senior Deputy Prosecutor for Nez Perce County, State 
of Idaho, comes before this Court and hereby provides the following Argument in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 24, 2014, Larry Fenton (hereinafter Defendant) was found guilty of 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DELIVER, a felony, 
-~commi-tt-ecl-on---erab0ut-September-2-3r--2Q-l~nd-wa-s-sentenced---to--tl:lecustody-of ...... ________ _ 
the IDAHO STATE BOARD OF CORRECTIONS in Nez Perce County Case No. CR2013-
0007217. On March 16, 2015, the Court suspended the remainder of Defendant's 
sentence and placed the Defendant on probation for five (5) years beginning April 
24, 2014. The Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation was signed and 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 1 
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initialed by the Defendant on April 20, 2015. The Defendant also signed and 
initialed the Idaho Department of Correction Standard Agreement of Supervision on 
April 20, 2015. The Defendant's probation agreement is attached as stipulated to 
by the parties and marked as Exhibit A. 
On February 28, 2016, Officer Joseph Stormes of the Lewiston Police 
Department was working day shift patrol. Transcript of Preliminary Hearing 
(hereinafter "Tr.") at p. 6, I. 24. Officer Stormes testified at the evidentiary hearing 
on August 4, 2016, before this Court, that during his patrol he came in contact with 
Officer Nick Eylar regarding suspicious activity involving two (2) vehicles. Officer 
Eylar testified that he recognized one of the vehicles as belonging to a known drug 
associate and that he observed the vehicles at a parking lot where drug activity 
frequently occurs. He observed the vehicles merely park, with no one exiting the 
vehicles, then leave the parking lot and appeared to travel together. Officer Eylar 
testified that he followed the vehicles and eventually saw them stop at a gas station 
together, again with no individuals appearing to exit either vehicle. At that point 
he contacted Officer Stormes. Officer Stormes testified that he personally 
observed the vehicles, one of which was a white four-door sedan, at a gas station 
on Southway Avenue. Officer Stormes testified that he left the gas station after 
discussing the matter with Officer Eylar and proceeded southbound on Snake River 
Avenue. Within moments he was notified that the white car had left the gas station 
---• •• •••••----.••-•-••----- -• •••• ••---••••••• •••-----• ••--•- •••••••---.. •--•r--•••••••--•--•• •••••••--- -••••••-- ---
-------
and was heading towards Snake River Avenue. Officer Stormes turned around and 
proceeded to drive northbound on Snake River Avenue. Tr. p. 7, II. 2-22. Officer 
Stormes testified that he was traveling behind the white car and proceeded to have 
dispatch run the license plate as he read the numbers. Officer Stormes completed 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 2 
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one (1) registration check through dispatch and was told that the registration did 
not return. Tr. p. 8, II. 9-11. In order to be sure, he asked dispatch to complete the 
registration check again but replacing the number eight for the letter "B" in the 
event that he had been mistaken. Tr. p. 8, II. 16-22. This occurred as Officer 
Stormes continued to travel behind the white car on Snake River Avenue. Dispatch 
told him that the second search did not pull up a record for the vehicle either. Tr. p. 
8, II. 20-22. At that point Officer Stormes determined he would make a traffic stop 
on the vehicle to further investigate. Officer Stormes testified at the evidentiary 
hearing, that it is a standard practice for him to stop a vehicle that is not returning 
a registration through dispatch. He explained that there could be many reasons why 
this was occurring, several of which would signify a traffic violation. Officer 
Stormes next notified dispatch that he was going to conduct a traffic stop in order 
to investigate why the registration was not pulling up, and for a third time read 
dispatch the license plate number. Tr. p. 9, II. 5-9. Dispatch never informed Officer 
Stormes of the results of the third record check while he conducted the stop. 
During the traffic stop Officer Stormes asked the driver, identified as the 
Defendant, for his driver's license and the Defendant provided him with an Idaho 
identification card. Tr. p. 10, II. 1-2. Officer Stormes then requested to see 
insurance and registration, of which the Defendant was only able to procure a 
-~------------- registration card. Tr. p. 10, II. 14-19. Officer Stormes also completed his 
---·-··-···--···~---·--~ ---------··---
investigation regarding the license plate not returning a valid registration. After 
comparing the registration card with the license plate and the VIN Officer Stormes 
concluded that the numbers matched and were correct. Tr. p. 10, II. 21-25. 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 3 
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Officer Stormes proceeded to write out citations for failing to purchase a 
driver's license and failure to provide proof of insurance for the Defendant. Tr. p. 
12, II. 1-5. As he gave the first citation to the Defendant, the Defendant told him 
that he was on probation. Tr. p.12, II. 5-8. Officer Stormes inquired as to who the 
Defendant's probation officer was, and testified that he was able to discern that the 
defendant was on felony probation. After receiving this new information Officer 
Stormes went back to his patrol car and contacted the on-call Probation and Parole 
officer, Chris Jensen, to let them know about the incident. Tr. p. 12, II. 12-15. 
Officer Stormes testified that he relayed all the information regarding the stop as 
well as the suspicious activities that had been observed prior to the stop. Ms. 
Jensen told officer Stormes that she would be coming to the traffic stop to talk to 
the Defendant and that she wanted to search the vehicle. Tr. p. 12, II. 24-25. 
Officer Stormes then proceeded to give the Defendant his second citation and told 
him that Ms. Jensen was going to be coming to the traffic in order to speak with 
him. Tr. p. 13, II. 4-8. At this point the Defendant was not free to leave as he had 
been instructed that his probation officer was coming to meet him. When she 
arrived, Ms. Jensen wanted to search his person for officer safety reasons and 
search the vehicle. Tr. p. 13, II. 14-17. During the course of the search, as 
explained by Officer Stormes, the Defendant fled the scene on foot. The search 
yielded the discovery of a large amount of narcotics leading to the charges before 
the Court. Tr. p. 15, II. 9-16. 
ISSUES 
I. Whether or not the search of the Defendant's vehicle was lawful? 
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II. Whether or not Officer Stormes had reasonable suspicion to stop the 
Defendant? 
III. Whether the detention of the Defendant was lawful?-
ARGUMENT 
I. The search of the Defendant's vehicle was lawful. 
The condition of probation that a defendant consent to a search of his person 
by a law enforcement officer without a search warrant is a supervisorial procedure 
related to his reformation and rehabilitation in light of the offense of which he was 
convicted. State v. Gawron, 736 P.2d 1295 (Idaho 1987). The purpose of an 
unexpected, unprovoked search of defendant is to ascertain whether he is 
complying with his terms of probation; to determine not only whether he disobeys a 
law, but also whether he obeys the law. Id. The court in its discretion may allow a 
probationer to be subject to warrantless searches if they waive that right as a 
condition of their probation. Id. 
The defendant signed and dated his court-ordered probation and the Order 
Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation. See Exhibit A. The Defendant also 
signed and initialed the Standard Agreement of Supervision which explicitly stated 
that he would consent to searches as a condition of his probation and that he 
waived his Fourth Amendment rights regarding searches. See Exhibit A at 
Condition #11. As such, the Defendant, rightfully, waived his Fourth Amendment 
-------------------····--··---··-·····------------------
right as a condition of his probation and is subject to warrantless searches by his 
probation officer even if the probation officer does not have reasonable grounds to 
- believe that a probation violation has occurred. Additionally, the Defendant is also 
required to notify all law enforcement he comes in contact with that he is under 
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supervision and tell them the name of his supervising officer. See Exhibit A at 
Condition #2. Furthermore, the Defendant must obey all requests by probation and 
parole offic<:fr: Id. As Defendant's probation officer, ·Officer Jensen- was within the 
law to request the Defendant to remain where he was located as she responded to 
the scene. She was also allowed to search the Defendant and the Defendant's 
vehicle. 
II. Officer Stormes had reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct 
a traffic stop on the Defendant's vehicle. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a person may be detained by an 
officer even though he does not possess probable cause; the seizure is justified 
under the Fourth Amendment if there is a reasonable articulable suspicion that the 
person has committed or is about to commit a crime. State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 
930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992) (rehearing denied)(citing Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491 (1983)). The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable 
cause, but more than speculation or instinct on the part of an officer. Id. at 664. 
An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the 
person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity. United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411(1981). The reasonableness of the suspicion must be 
evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. Mason v. 
State Department of Law Enforcement, 103 Idaho 748, 750, 653 P.2d 803, 805 
(Ct.App. 1982). In orcter to detai11 a person for purposes of an investigator)' stop, 
law enforcement officers must have specific facts which would "warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate''-that a 
traffic law has been violated or that some criminal activity has been or is about to 
be committed. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968); see also United States v. 
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Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 {1975); State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 103, 831 
P.2d 942, 945 (Ct. App. 1991). A police officer's reasonable, good-faith mistake 
· does not violate a person's Fourth Amendment rights. Heien v. North Carolina, -135 
S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014), 
In this case, Officer Stormes had articulable reasonable suspicion that a 
traffic violation had occurred or that he needed to further investigate a clear 
concern of possible violation. Pursuant to this reasonable suspicion he made a 
traffic stop. He made multiple attempts to check the registration on a vehicle and 
dispatch told him on two (2) different occasions that no records were coming up for 
that license plate number. On the third attempt to have dispatch check the license 
plate numbers, he did not receive any response from them as to whether or not the 
registration was valid and had already stopped the vehicle to investigate. While it 
turns out that the registration was up to date, this does not diminish the legitimacy 
of the traffic stop because at the time the stop was conducted Officer Stormes had 
reasonable articulable suspicion to support the stop. Officer Stormes also testified 
that the ultimate mistake was that dispatch had ran the wrong county of origin 
number. Officer Stormes was operating under a good faith belief that the 
registration was not returning after he made every effort to verify the numbers. 
III. Even if the Defendant was not on Felony Probation, Officer 
Stormes did not unlawfully detain the Defendant. 
Law enforcement officers may pose questions, ask for identification, and 
even request consent to search items provided they do not induce cooperation by 
coercive means. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991). The proper 
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inquiry necessitates a consideration of \'all the circumstances surrounding the 
encounter." Id., at 439. 
In this Case -Officer Stormes-conducted his traffic ·stop and began writing two 
(2) citations because of the Defendant's failure to purchase a driver's license and 
his lack of insurance. While handing him the first citation the Defendant told Officer 
Stormes that he was on probation. Officer Stormes then contacted a probation 
officer to let them know that a probationer had just been stopped and cited, and 
had previously been engaged in suspicious activity with a vehicle known by officers 
to belong to a suspected drug dealer. The probation officer requested to speak to 
the Defendant and informed Officer Stormes she intended to search the 
Defendant's car. Officer Stormes then told the Defendant that a probation officer 
wanted to speak to him and that they were on their way to the location. At this 
point the traffic stop was concluded since the Defendant had by that point received 
both citations for the traffic violations, and the Defendant was no longer being 
detained by Officer Stormes for the stop. He was however not free to leave, as he 
had received a specific request from a probation and parole officer and was 
required to follow those instructions per the terms of his probation. The detention 
and search were valid and lawful. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests this court deny 
-····"···----------------
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
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I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy 
of the foregoing CLOSING BRIEF was 
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(2) __ hand delivered via court basket, or 
(3) __ sent via facsimile, or 
(4) __ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United 
States Mail. 
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lDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
Standard Agr'ee.ment of Supervision 
1. Supemsion_Levei: The defendant's level of supervision, il}_ch~_din~ ~eltied type.and electronic monitoring 
. shall be determined by the Idaho Department of Correction {IDOC). k-C: · --- -. -- -- -- --
2. Laws and Conduct: The defendant shall obey all laws, municipal, county, state and federal. The defendant 
shall comply with all lawful requests of the \DOC district manager, section supervisor, or probation and parole· 
officer (PPO). The defendant e;hall be completely truthful at all times with the IDOC district manager, section 
supervisor, or PPO. During any contact with law enforcement pen;onnel the defendar-it shall provide his identity, 
notify the law enfoi"'?ement officer(s) that he is under supervision and provide thp ~Jlof his supervising PPO. 
The defendant shall notify his supervising PPO of the contact within 24 hrs. C......--1 · · 
3. Residence.: The defenqant shall not change residence without first obtaining permission from the lDOC disbict 
manager, section supervisor, or PPO. 1 .,, Y 
4. Reporting: The defendant snall report to his supervising PPO as directed. The1clefendant shall provlde truthful 
and accurate information or docurnenta.tion whenever requested by the IDDC. L. i~ . 
5, T~v:I: The de~endant s~~II not leave!:~ of Idaho or the assigned districl without first obtaining 
permIss1on f.rom his supervising PPO. 
6. Extradition: lf the defendant does leave the stale of Idaho, with or without permission, the defendant does . 
hereby w~iv.e.,ex:tradition to the state of Idaho and will not contest any effort to return the defendant to the state of 
Idaho. t 1/ - . 
7. Empfoyment or Alternative Plan: The defendant shall seek and maintain gainful, verifiable, full-time 
employment The defendant shall not accept, cause to )?e terminated from, or change employment without first 
obtaining written permission from his supervising PPO. In lleu of full-time employment, the defendant may 
participate \n full-time education, a combination of employment and education, vocational program or otljer,.-
altemative plan based on the defendant's specific situation and as approved by his supervising PPO. l,.. J-
8. Al~ohol: The defendant shall not purchase, possess, or consume alcoholic beverages in any form and will not 
enter any establishment where alcohol is a primary source of income. l.- '=: 
9. Controlled Substances; The defendant shall not use or possess any illegal iirug. The defendant shaU not use 
or possess any paraphernalia for the purpose of ingesting any illegal drug. The defendant shall not use or 
poe;sess any controlled substances unless lawfully prescribed for him by a licensed physician or dMlisl The 
defendant shall use medications only in the manner prescribed by his physician or dentisl L, L 
1 O. Firearms· or Weapons: Toe defendant shall not purchase, carry,• possess or have control of any firearms, 
chemical weapons, electronic weapons, explosives or other dangerous weapons. Other dangerous weapons may 
include, but are not limited to, \Q"lives with blades over two and one half inches (2 ½") in length; switch-blade 
_.Ji:iives; bra.ss knuckles; swords; throwing stars; and other martial arts weapons. Any weapons or firearms seized 
will be forfeited to IDOC for disposal. The defendant shall not reside in any location that contains firearm)! upless 
the fir9?rtns are secured and this portion of the rule is exempted in writing by the district manager. (.....,-,--
11. Search: The defendant shall consent to the search of his person, residence, vehicle, personal property, and 
other real property or structures owned or leased by the defendant or for which the defendant is the controlling 
authority. The search will be conducte~ by the IDOC district manag7r, section su~ervisor, or PPO ozr. )a~ 
enforcement officer. The defenda_nt waives his Fourth Amendment-nghts concerning searches. _ ..-: r-:-
12.- Cost of Supervision: The defendant shaii·comply with Idaho Code, Section 20-225, which authorlzes the 
IDOC to collect a co1t of.supervision tee. The defendant shall.make payments as prescribed in his monthly cost of 
supervision bill.• - L,. (--: -
13. Associations: The defendant shall not associate with any person(s) designated by the IDOC district 
---ma~E!ger,section supe~r,-Gr-P:P-0-==t,. k ___ :_ .: ,-- . ' · 
14. Substance Abuse Testing: The defendant shall submit to any test for alcohol or controlled e;ubstances as·-- ~--- · · 
requested ancf directed by the IDO~ district manager, section supervjs~r, or PPO or Jaw enforcement officer. The 
defendant may be requirec:j to obtain t~ts at his own expense. If the results of_ the test inqicg,ie-an adulterant has 
been used to interfere with the results, that test will be deemed to have been positive. __.,L=-·t-__ · 
15. Evaluation and Program Plan: The defendant shall obtain any treatment evaluation deemed necessary and 
as ordered by the court c;ir 1009 disbict manager, section supervisor, or PPO. The defendant shall meaningfully 
participate in and successfully complete any treatmen~ counseling or other programs deemed beneficial and as 
directed by the court or IDOC district manager, section supervisor, or PPO. ;t:Ae defendant may be required lo 
attend treatmen~ counseling or-other programs at his own expense, (.;...t- . 
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I' 
16. Cooperation with Supervision: When home, the defendant shall answer the door for the PPO. The 
---- -defetidanrsliall:allow the PPO to· enter his residence,-other real property, place .of employment and vehicle for the __ 
purpose of visitation, inspections and other supervision functions. The defendant shall not possess, install or use. 
any monitoring instrumen~ camera, or other surveillance device to observe or alert them to the PPO's visit The 
defendant shall not keep any vicious or dangerous dog or other animal on~ Ip.his property that the PPO 
perceives as an impetliment to accessing the defendant or his property. __.,i.,,,""-'\-_ 
17, Absconding Supervtsion: The defendant Will not leave or attempt to leave the state of Idaho or the assigned 
district in an effort tci abscond or flee supervision. The defendant will make himself available for supervi:~~an• 
program participation as instructed by his supervising PPO and will not actively avoid supervision. Ld.'t 
1 B. Court Ordered Flnari"c::iaf Obligations: The defendant shall pay all costs, fees, tines and restitution in the 
amount and manner ordered by the court The defendant shall make payments as ordered by the court or.as 
designated in a payment agreement and promissory not!io-;be completed with the !DOC district manager, section 
supervisor, or PPO and signed by the defendant ~ ¼-' • 
19. Confidential fnfomrant The defendant shall not act as a oonfide,ntial informant for law enforcemen~e~t 
as allowed. per IDOC standard operating procedure (SOP) 701 .04.02.019, Informants: Confidenttal. _..,.k'. .. ..... t=___ _ 
20. Intrastate. or Interstate Violations: If allowed to transfer supervision to another district or state, the 
defendant agrees to accept any violation allegation documents purportedly submitted by the agency or officer 
supervisipg the defendant in the receiving district or state as admissible into eviqery;e as credible and reliable. 
The defendant waives any right to confront the author of such documents. _ __..&_"'-",--
21. Additional Rules: The defendant agrees that other supervision rules may be imposed depending on the 
district or specific district office that provides his supeNision. At all times, these additional rules•Will be impC!sed 
only after considering the successful supervision of the defendant and the secure operation of the district or 
sp~cific district office. All additional rules will "e exp!ained/o tt:i,e.defendant and provided to him, in writing, by the 
!DOC district manager, section supervisor, o PPO. __ ,__,cc-✓ ----\--__ _ 
\ have read, or have had read to me, the ab e agreement I understand and accept these conditions of 
supervision. I a e abide by anti ca o thei;n and understand that my failure to do so may rlt in the 
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GOVERNOR 
District Two Additional Rules 
KEvlNKEMPF 
DIR.ECTOR 
1. I will ~~t go into any g~· establishment without first obtaining permission from my 
supeIVIsrng officer. ---r---
2. I will not associate 'With any person who is engaged in illegal activities, is on probation or parole, 
or who has been convicted of a felony crime; without prior authorization of my supervising 
officer. l J;: 
3. · 1 understand my curfew is from 10pm-6am, where I must be at my residence during these times, 
with. some exceptions that have already been explained to me. My supervising officer can_..Jaise . 
or lower my curfew, based upon my actions, at my supervising officer's discretion. lt--: 
4. I understand that if! owe.my PSI fee, and/or if my Cost of Supervision reaches $120, my curfew 
automatically reduces to 8pm-6am (with exceptions th.at have already been explained to me.) 
My curfew does not revert to its prior time until my Cost of Supervision and/or PSI fee are paid 
in~. l~ - · 
5. I will not accwt any loan without first obtaining the permission ofmy supervising 
officfil.---'L,;~1----__ LF-
6. I will ensure all persons in my presence have valid photo identification at all times. --=-.... L--
7. I will obey all rules of any city or county jail in which I am incarcerated. L~ 
8. I will not visit any perso: :!,u any jail or prison without first obtaining written permission from my 
supervising officer. l--l:: L,.,,-
9. I will fill any prescriptions I receive in the State ofldaho only. \-
I have read, or have had read to me, the above agreement I unaerstand and accept these additional 
rules of supervision, I agree to abide by and conform to them and understand that my failure to do 
so may result in the bmission of a report of violation to my sentencing authority. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
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CASE NO. CR 2016-1591 
OPINION AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
1bis matter came before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The 
State ofldaho was represented by Justin Coleman, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Nez 
Perce County. The Defendant was represented by Mackenzie Welch, of the firm 
Knowlton & Miles. Evidence was presented to the Court on August 4, 2016. The Court 
allowed the parties additional time to submit briefing. The Court, being fully advised in 
the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
-----·--·····--····---·--····-··-······-------- .................. ····-·······-·····-·-·-·-······-------------·-·-·······-·-··-···-·-·-·-···········-··- ........... , ..... , .. ,, ....•...... ,,. __ _ 
OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 1 
102
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
On February 28, 2016, Officer Nick Eylar of the Lewiston Police Department was 
on patrol when he saw a red/maroon GMCYukon thathe recognized from previous 
narcotic activity. Officer Eylar observed the Yukon enter the parking lot of A&B Foods, 
and then when the vehicle left the parking lot there was a white Grand Prix following it 
out of the parking lot. Officer Eylar testified that in his experience drug activity was 
common at the A&B Foods parking lot. 
Officer Eylar followed the vehicles as they traveled south on 8th Street and then 
west on Southway, until the vehicles both entered into the Zip Trip gas station. The 
Yukon parked in a parking stop at the gas station and the Grand Prix parked at the gas 
pumps. Officer Eylar also parked in a parking spot and he was met there by Officer 
Stormes. The officers discussed the vehicles and then Officer Stormes left the gas station 
parking lot. Shortly thereafter, the white Grand Prix left the parking lot and Officer Eylar 
contacted Officer Stormes by radio to inform him. Officer Eylar stayed and continued to 
observe the Yukon. 
Officer Stormes testified that after he was informed the white Grand Prix left the 
gas station, he observed the car driving north on Snake River A venue. Officer Stormes 
estimated he was about 100 yards, or 10 car lengths, away from the white Grand Prix 
when he contacted dispatch to check the license number of the car to see if the 
registraifon was current. Offfcer Sforiiies-first reported to dispatch a licerise-iiiinilier 
"Ida" 18028, which dispatch returned as record not found. Officer Stormes then asked 
dispatch to run the same plate number, but change the last number to the letter "B". This 
number also returned as record not found. 
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Officer Stormes caught up with the white Grand Prix and the intersection of 
Snake River Avenue and the Prospect Grade. He decided to initiate a traffic stop in order 
-- --- -to "investigate thewliether the-car registration was up to date. Officer Stotriles informed 
dispatch he was making the stop and he repeated the plate number for a third time, this 
time stating «Nora" 18028. Dispatch did not respond on this plate number before 
Stormes initiated the traffic stop. Later in the day, well after the stop was completed, 
Stormes found out that dispatch did get a return on the third plate number, which was the 
correct plate number. 
Officer Stormes contacted the driver of the white Grand Prix, who identified 
himself as Larry Fenton, Jr. Fenton provided Officer Stormes with the registration 
information for the car and Officer Stormes was able to verify that the vehicle was 
currently registered, thus, the registration concerns were taken care of. Officer Stormes 
also found out that Fenton did not have a current driver's license or proof of insurance, so 
Officer Stormes decided to write citations for these two violations. 
Officer Stormes retumed to the vehicle to issue the citations to the driver. He 
handed the first citation to Fenton, and at that time, Fenton informed him that he was on 
probation. Stormes asked Fenton the name of the probation officer, and when Stormes 
heard the name, he was able to discem that Fenton was on felony probation. Based on 
this information, Officer Stormes did not issue the second citation, but instead returned to 
-- hls patrol car and contacted the prooaiioiioffice~---Officei Stormes explaineato the 
probation officer that he had stopped Fenton for a traffic infraction and also relayed to the 
probation officer the observations Officer Eylar had made of the two vehicles at A&B 
Foods and the Zip Trip gas station. 
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The probation officer stated to Officer Stormes that she would come to the stop 
and search the vehicle based upon the information Stormes had provided. Officer 
Fenton that the probation officer was coming to the stop and that she wanted him to stand 
by. Tr. at 24. Officer Stormes turned the overhead lights off on his patrol vehicle and 
stayed near Fenton's vehicle with his partner until the probation officer arrived on scene 
approximately ten minutes later. Officer Stormes testified that he did not inform Fenton 
that he was free to leave; however, Stormes believed Fenton was free to leave because if 
Fenton chose to leave there wasn't anything Stormes could have done to stop him 
because the traffic stop was concluded Tr. at 24. 
When the probation officer arrived she asked Fenton to step out of the vehicle and 
he was handcuffed for officer safety reasons. Officer Stormes assisted the probation 
officer with the search of the vehicle. During the search methamphetamine was located 
in the vehicle. 
ANALYSIS 
The Defendant asserts he was illegally stopped, searched, and seized because the 
facts available to Officer Stormes at the time he detained him did not give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution protects citizens against unreasonable search and seizure. U.S. 
CONST: amend. I\( Evidence obtained in violation of tliis amendment generally may not 
be used as evidence against the victim of an illegal government action. State v. Page, 
140 Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454,459 (2004); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471,485, 83 S.Ct. 407,416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441,453 (1963). "When a defendant moves 
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to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, the government carries the burden of proving that the search or seizure in 
-- -question wasreasonable.'; Siaiev. Bishop, 146-Idaho--804~ 811, 203P3dl203,----
1210 (2009); citing State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484,486, 95 P.3d 635, 637 (2004). 
Brief investigatory detentions must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878, 20 L.Ed.2d 889,904 (1968). 
The issue in this case is whether Officer Stormes bad reasonable, articulable 
suspicion to stop the Defendant's vehicle based upon information he received from 
dispatch after he provided the incorrect license number to be checked. The State 
contends that Officer Stormes had reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic violation 
had occurred or that he needed to investigate further regarding the potential registration 
violation. Specifically, the State contends that at the time the stop was conducted, the 
officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to support the stop. 
The Defendant relies on State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109,294 P.3d 1121 (2013) to 
assert that there was not reasonable suspicion in this case. In Morgan, the officer stopped 
a vehicle driving without a front license plate, which would be illegal if the vehicle was 
registered in Idaho pursuant to LC. § 49-428. Id. at 111,294 P.3d at 1123. This 
requirement does not extend to vehicles registered in other states, which was recognized 
by the officer during cross-examination. Id. at 112, 294 P.3d at 1124. The officer had 
also testified that it appeared the driver was either very lost or trying to -avoia]iim. Tne--
Court found these observations were not sufficient to create reasonable, articulable 
suspicion. 
The police officer's suspicion of Morgan was based primarily on a series 
of four left-hand turns that Morgan made. Although the officer stated that 
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Id. 
he believed Morgan may have been trying to avoid him, the officer 
provided no factual justification for that belief. Absent other 
circumstances, driving around the block on a Friday night does not rise to 
the level of specific, articulable facts that justify an investigatory stop. 
---.. - .. ·- ··- --·--·· -. ··-. ··-·· . ---· 
The case at hand is similar to Morgan where the police officer believed there was 
a violation, but then learned later that there was not. In the case at hand, the officer 
checked the vehicle registration information and confirmed the car was lawfully 
registered. The State contends that a police officer's reasonable, good-faith mistake does 
not violate a person's Fourth Amendment rights. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 
530, 190 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2014). 
As the text indicates and we have repeatedly affirmed, "the ultimate 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness.' "Riley v. 
California, 573 U.S.-,--, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 
(2014) (some internal quotation marks omitted). To be reasonable is not to 
be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the 
part of government officials, giving them "fair leeway for enforcing the 
law in the community's protection." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 
160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). We have recognized that 
searches and seizures based on mistakes of fact can be reasonable. The 
warrantless search of a home, for instance, is reasonable if undertaken 
with the consent of a resident, and remains lawful when officers obtain the 
consent of someone who reasonably appears to be but is not in fact a 
resident. See fl lino is v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-186, 110 S. Ct. 
2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 ( 1990). By the same token, if officers with 
probable cause to arrest a suspect mistakenly arrest an individual matching 
the suspect' s description, neither the seizure nor an accompanying search 
of the arrestee would be unlawful. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 
802-805, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971). The limit is that "the 
mistakes must be those of reasonable men." Brinegar, supra, at 176, 69 
---- -S.CC1302.------- ---------- ---- ----- ------- - --- ------ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Id. at 536. 
In the case at hand, this Court must decide whether the mistake of fact made by 
the officer or dispatch in the transmission of the license plate number was objectively 
reasonable, and thus, whether the mistake of fact will operate to forgive or validate the 
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Fourth Amendment violation. Mistake of fact and mistake of law were discussed in State 
v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300,303,246 P.3d 673,676 (Ct. App. 2010). 
The parties, in essenc-e, disagree whetlier the officer's misialce heie\vas 
one of fact or law, and the line between the two is not always easy to 
draw. For instance, in McCarthy, 133 Idaho at 124-25, 982 P.2d at 959-
60, an officer stopped a vehicle for speeding but was mistaken concerning 
the location of a sign where the speed limit decreased from 3 5 mph to 25 
mph. The state asserted that the mistake was one of fact (the sign's 
location) and we cited United States Supreme Court precedent to the effect 
that a mistake of fact will sometimes operate to forgive or validate a 
Fourth Amendment violation. However, we did not blindly accept the 
state's characterization of the officer's mistake as one of fact as the 
applicable speed limit is certainly a question oflaw. We noted a split of 
authority from other jurisdictions as to whether a mistake of law can ever 
be held to be reasonable and further noted that the issue in Idaho was 
undecided. See, e.g., United States v. King, 244 F.3d 736, 737-41 (9th 
Cir.2001) (officer's mistake of law, although reasonable, cannot form basis 
for reasonable suspicion to initiate traffic stop); United States v. Twilley, 
222 F.3d 1092, 1096 n. 1 (9th Cir.2000) (officer's correct understanding of 
the law, together with a good-faith error regarding the facts, can establish 
reasonable suspicion) (also citing McCarthy, supra); compare People v. 
Glick, 203 Cal.App.3d 796,250 Cal.Rptr. 315,318 (1988) (mistake of fact 
and law treated the same) with People v. White, 107 Cal.App.4th 636, 132 
Cal.Rptr.2d 371, 376-77 (2003) (distinguishing and disagreeing with 
Glick rationale). See also State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646,649 n. 1, 167 
P.3d 783, 786 n. 1 (Ct.App.2006); State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595,599 
n. 3, 38 P.3d 633,637 n. 3 (Ct.App.2001). Ultimately, in McCarthy we 
held that the two types of mistakes were "inextricably connected/' but 
found it unnecessary to decide whether a mistake of law is unreasonable 
per se because, were that the correct characterization of the mistake, we 
concluded that the officer's mistake was not objectively reasonable. 
McCarthy, 133 Idal10 at 125, 982 P .2d at 960. 
Id. at 303,246 P.3d at 676. 
In this matter, Officer Stormes candidly testified that he was a significant distance 
--···-·--····-·-·-··-·---- -- -------····-··--··--···-··--···-----·-·-·--- ---- ---- -~----------- ---- ------ ------·-~~~------- -----
from the car when he first read the license plate number to dispatch. It is clear he was not 
certain regarding the numbers he read off in his second communication with dispatch, 
where he suggested the last number may be the letter "B" rather than the number "8". 
Officer Stormes provided dispatch with a license number three times based upon the 
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uncertainty of the plate number. Therefore, based upon the facts of this case, this Court 
cannot find the officer's mistake was objectively reasonable, and thus, created a 
reasonable, articulable basis for the traffic stop. 
A similar issue was addressed in the State of Washington, in State v. Creed, 170 
Wash. App. 534, 319 P.3d 80 (2014). In this case, an officer ran the defendant's license 
plate number as part of a routine check during his nighttime patrol. The officer 
erroneously entered the number as "154 YMK" instead of the actual number-"154 
YDK". The incorrect number returned that the car was stolen and the officer initiated a 
traffic stop on this basis. Id. at 537-538, 319 P.3d at 81. 
Extending Snapp on the facts presented here would elevate the 
innocence or culpability of an officer over the real concern of article I, 
section 7: the right of citizens to be protected from unwarranted invasions 
and intrusions. As our Supreme Court explained in Day, "[w]e suppress 
[unlawfully seized] evidence not to punish the police, who may easily have 
erred innocently. We suppress unlawfully seized evidence because we do 
not want to become knowingly complicit in an unconstitutional exercise of 
power. See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484-85, 48 
S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)." 161 Wash.2d at 
894, 168 P.3d 1265 (emphasis added). 
This means that while police may sometimes reasonably rely on 
incorrect information provided by third parties, they may not reasonably 
rely on their own mistaken assessment of material facts. See, e.g., State v. 
Mance, 82 Wash.App. 539,918 P.2d 527 (1996) (holding that police may 
not rely upon information that is incorrect or incomplete through their 
fault); State v. O'Cain, 108 Wash.App. 542, 31 P.3d 733 (2001) (holding 
that a police dispatch indicating vehicle driven by defendant had been 
reported stolen did not provide reasonable suspicion for investigatory 
stop); State v. Sandholm, 96 Wash.App. 846,848,980 P.2d 1292 (1999) 
-------a------------------- ___________ (notingj:hat "exclusive reliance on the WACIC stolen vehicle report would 
not have provid~d sufficient basis"rorthe-State to establish probable cause - -
to arrest"); cf State v. Gaddy, 152 Wash.2d 64, 71, 74, 93 P.3d 872 (2004) 
( distinguishing officers' right to rely on erroneous license information 
from Department of Licensing, which is not a police agency and whose 
information is presumptively reliable, from information subject to the 
"fellow officer rule"). 
Id. at 542-43, 319 P.3dat 83-84. 
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While this Court is not bound by the determination in Creed, it is instructive in 
the case at hand. In this case, Officer Stormes testified he provided the incorrect license 
number to dispatch. Officer Stormes distance from-the Defendant's vehfole-riiayba.ve 
been a factor in this error. It is clear in this case, that other than the error regarding the 
license plate number, the Defendant was driving in a lawful manner. The officer did not 
observe any other traffic infractions. Further, Officer Eylar' s observations of the vehicle 
at the grocery store and gas station1 a.lso did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion to 
conduct a traffic stop. In this case, the only claim of reasonable articulate suspicion is 
based upon the officer's incorrect recitation of the license plate number. This, without 
more, is not a sufficient basis for the traffic stop. Therefore, the Defendant's motion to 
suppress is granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the defendant's motion to suppress is granted. 
ORDER 
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this I 7 ~a; of August 2016. 
10fticer Eylar did recognize the GMC Yukon as a vehicle owned by someone who had been involved in 
other narcotic investigations. However, the fact that this vehicle and the Defendant's vehicle were seen, in 
the middle of the day, at a local grocery store and a gas station was not sufficient evidence to give rise to a 
traffic stop, or Officer Eylar would have presumably stopped the vehicles at the gas station. These facts are 
similar to those of the driver going around the block in State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109,294 P.3d 1121 
(2013). 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS as: ------ ---- ---- --:ii(,, - ---
~ delivered via court basket, or 
___ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this 
day of August, 2016, to: 
Rick Cuddihy 
Mackenzie Welch 
P O Drawer 717 
Lewiston ID 83501 
Justin Coleman 
Deputy Prosecutor 
P OBox 1267 
Lewiston ID 83501 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, CLERK 
B 
Deputy 
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Ser~nd Judicial District Court, State of lrl"'l.io 
11::and For the County of Nez Perce 
1230 Main St. tp'rtnrr,o 83501 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
lOl&i t\US l 7 Pf'» 1 > ~1 
) 
_ PATTY e. i1-::':!..:_: J 
J._: R;- ~;,-0~~,Q_C~o: CR-2016-0001591 
Larry Glenn Fenton Jr, 
Defendant. 
,, :- : , , .. · } NOTICE OF HEARING 
. . . " ) 
) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Status Conference 
Judge: 
Thursday, August 18, 2016 01 :30 PM 
Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in Lewiston, Idaho. 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Wednesday, 




NOTICE OF HEARING 
Larry Glenn Fenton Jr 
802 9th Ave Apt 4 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Mailed 
Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 
P.O. Drawer 717 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Mailed 
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State ofldaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr 
Hearing type: Status Conference 
Hearing date: 8/18/2016 
Time: 1:46 pm 
Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Courtroom: 1 
Court reporter: Linda Carlton 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman 
Defendant present, in custody, with counsel. 
14644 Mr. Coleman addresses the Court and requests continuance to determine the 
next step and potential appeal. 
14709 Mr. Cuddihy addresses the Court. Bond is set at $50,000.00 and the Court 
recently granted Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
14942 Court will continue 1 week until 8-25-16 at 1:30 p.m. Court would like to 
review the files re: bond and will let Mr. Cuddihy know this afternoon. 






.... _- .. , -~' ~· ·. 
COURT MINUTES 
CR-2016-0001591 
State ofldaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr 
Hearing type: Status Conference 
Hearing date: 8/25/2016 
Time: 1:40 pm 
Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Courtroom: 3 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 3 
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 
Prosecutor: April Smith 
Defendant present, in custody, with counsel. 
14042 Ms. Smith addresses the Court and may file motion to reconsider and just 









Mr. Cuddihy addresses the Court. 
Ms. Smith requests the probation violation CR13-7217 be set for pv merit 
Court sets CR13-7217 for pv merit hearing 9-1-16 at 2:30 p.m. 





lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND illDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












CASE NO. CR16-01591 
ORDER FOR FURLOUGH 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant shall be released on a TWENTY-FOUR 
(24) hour furlough for the birth of his child. Ashley Martin Felton is to call the jail once she goes in 
to labor and Defendant shall be released on his furlough. tJ. . 
Dated this ~ day of September, 2j)=l=6·'---~ 
- ------------------------------
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR FURLOUGH was: 
___ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this 2 nJ.... day of 
September, 2016, to: 
~~ftJ: Pr-oJtwHJy-/ tf,,. 'lk. ~')y 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk ~1t..!4l h:J .' /J ;J{ J 11:A \ / 
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DANIEL L. SPICKLER 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
JUSTINJ.COLEMAN 
-- ------·senior Deputy Prnsecutor 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 799-3073 
I.S.B.N. 8023 
---~-----··----
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, CASE NO. CR2016-0001591 
Plaintiff, 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
vs. 
LARRY G. FENTON, 
Defendant. 
i•.·.-,.:,::·--·'.·.-;· .. -... ·-..··.·.-.-. .: ·.•-·.-.•.·-,1 
JUSTIN J. COLEMAN, Senior Deputy Prosecutor, for Nez Perce County, State of Idaho, 
comes before the Court and moves this Court to reconsider the Opinion and Order filed on 
August 17, 2016, suppressing the evidence in this case. 
This Motion is being made based upon Defendant's diminished expectation of privacy as 
a result of his active parole/probation status and the attenuation doctrine as recently articulated in 
Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. _ (June 2016)(attached as Exhibit A, for the Court's convenience). 
---···--·-·-···--·····-··-·--- --- -···--·-···--·········--····-·····--··--·····----
The State submits that the Defendant did not have a Fourth Amendment right that was intruded 
upon by the officer and asks the Court to reconsider its decision. 
The attenuation doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule and allows for the 
admission of evidence even in the face of an impermissible stop. In Strief/, a vehicle stop was 
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determined to be illegal. The officer who stopped the car subsequently learned that there was an 
arrest warrant for the driver of the vehicle. The officer arrested the individual and searched him, 
finding ·controlled substance. The Supreme Court applied the attenuation-doctrine. In applying --
three factors the Court found the evidence to be admissible. First, the Court looked at the 
sequential closeness between the unconstitutional act and the discovery of the evidence. Second, 
the Court determined if there were "intervening circumstances" that existed. And Third, the 
Court considered the "purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct" The Supreme Court 
found that evidence obtained after the stop admissible as the pre-exiting arrest warrant was a 
sufficient attenuation between finding the evidence and the illegal stop. 
Particularly important to note, if the Court were to continue to impose "a reasonable 
suspicion requirement" on the ability to search a probationer, as it seems to be doing, it "would 
give parolees greater opportunity to anticipate searches and conceal criminality." Samson v. 
California, 541 U.S. 843,854 (2006). 
As was submitted and established previously in this case, on April 24, 2014, the 
Defendant was found guilty of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH 
INTENT TO DELIVER, a felony, committed on or about September 23, 2013, and was 
sentenced to the custody of the IDAHO STATE BOARD OF CORRECTION in Case No. 
CR2013-07217. On March 16, 2015, the Court suspended the remainder of Defendant's 
sentence and placed the Defendant on probation for five (5) years beginning April 24, 2014. The 
-----·-···· .. ···-----
Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation was signed ancnnitialed bytnef>efendant-o-n- ----
April 20, 2015. The Defendant also signed and initialed the Idaho Department of Correction 
Standard Agreement of Supervision on April 20, 2015. The Defendant's probation agreement is 
attached again, as previously stipulated to by the parties and marked as Exhibit B. 
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Given the defendant's active parole/probation status as determined by Officer Stormes 
and confinned by Probation Officer Jensen, a search of the defendant's vehicle is justified 
without reasonable suspicion. ·--Officer.Stormes· dfd riot· 1earn of the Defendant's felony probation 
status until after the initial stop and investigation for traffic infractions. Officer Stormes testified 
that he did not learn that the Defendant was on felony probation until after he had completed the 
traffic infractions and was giving the citations to the Defendant. This is clearly an intervening 
circumstance after the officer had stopped the vehicle. Additionally, the officer's conduct was 
by no means involved "flagrant" police misconduct. The attenuation doctrine should apply and 
the subsequent search found to be constitutionally permissible. 
Based on the foregoing analysis the State respectfully requests the Court reconsider its 
decision to suppress the evidence. 
DATED this 2nd day of September, 2016 
JUSTINJ.COLEMAN 
Senior Deputy Prosecutor 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 3 
119
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION was 
(1) _ h~ delivered, or 
(2) _v{_an andd delivered via court basket, or 
(3) __ sent via facsimile, or 
( 4) __ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the 
United States Mail. 
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
Richard Cuddihy 
Knowlton & Miles 
PO Drawer 717 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
DATED this 2nd day of September, 2016. 
ERIN D. LEAVITT 
Senior Legal Assistant 
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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2015 
Syllabus 
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 
being done in connection with this case, at the time t.he opinion is issued. 
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 
1 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
UTAH v. STRIEFF 
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
No. 14-1373. Argued February 22, 2016---Decided June 20, 2016 
Narcotics detective Douglas Fackrell conducted surveillance on a South 
Salt Lake City residence based on an anonymous tip about drug ac-
tivity. The number of people he observed making brief visits to the 
house over the course of a week made him suspicious that the occu-
pants were dealing drugs. After observing respondent Edward Strieff 
leave the residence, Officer Fackrell detained Strieff at a nearby 
parking lot, identifying himself and asking Strieffwhat he was doing 
at the house. He then requested Striefl's identification and relayed 
the information to a police dispatcher, who informed him that Strieff 
had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation. Officer 
Fackrell arrested Strieff, searched him, and found methamphetamine 
and drug paraphernalia. Strieff moved to suppress the evidence, ar-
guing that it was derived from an unlawful investigatory stop. The 
trial court denied the motion, and the Utah Court of Appeals af-
firmed. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, however, and ordered the 
evidence suppressed. 
Held: The evidence Officer Fackrell seized incident to Striefl's arrest is 
admissible based on an application of the attenuation factors from 
Brown v. fllinois, 422 U. S. 590. In this case, there was no flagrant 
police misconduct. Therefore, Officer Fackrell's discovery of a valid, 
pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant attenuated the connection 
between the unconstitutional investigatory stop and the evidence 
seized incident to a lawful arrest. Pp. 4-10. 
(a) As the primary judicial remedy for deterring Fourth Amend-
ment violations, the exclusionary rule encompasses both the "primary 
evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure" 
and, relevant here, "evidence later discovered and found to be deriva-
tive of an illegality." Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804. 
But to ensure that those deterrence benefits are not outweighed by 
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the rule's substantial social costs, there are several exceptions to the 
rule. One exception is the attenuation doctrine, which provides for 
admissibility when the connection between unconstitutional police 
conduct and the evidence is sufficiently remote or has been interrupt-
ed by some intervening circumstance. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 
U. S. 586, 593. Pp. 4-5. 
(b) As a threshold matter, the attenuation doctrine is not limited to 
the defendant's independent acts. The doctrine therefore applies 
here, where the intervening circumstance is the discovery of a valid, 
pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant. Assuming, without de-
ciding, that Officer Fackrell lacked reasonable suspicion to stop 
Strieff initially, the discovery of that arrest warrant attenuated the 
connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized from 
Strieffincident to his arrest. Pp. 5-10. 
(1) Three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 
lead to this conclusion. The first, ''temporal proximity" between the 
initially unlawful stop and the search, id., at 603, favors suppressing 
the evidence. Officer Fackrell discovered drug contraband on Strieff 
only minutes after the illegal stop. In contrast, the second factor, 
"the presence of intervening cil'Cumstances, id., at 603-604, strongly 
favors the State. The existence of a valid warrant, predating the in-
vestigation and entirely unconnected with the stop, favors :finding 
sufficient attenuation between the unlawful conduct and the discov-
ery of evidence. That warrant authorized Officer Fackrell to arrest 
Strieff, and once the arrest was authorized, his search of Strieff inci-
dent to that arrest was undisputedly lawful The third factor, "the 
purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct," id., at 604, also 
strongly favors the State. Officer Fackrell was at most negligent, but 
his errors in judgment hardly rise to a purposeful or flagrant viola-
tion of Strieffs Fourth Amendment rights. After the unlawful stop, 
his conduct was lawful, and there is no indication that the stop was 
part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct. Pp. 6-9. 
(2) Strieffs counterarguments are unpersuasive. First, neither 
Officer Fackrell's purpose nor the flagrancy of the violation rises to a 
level of misconduct warranting suppression. Officer Fackrell's pur-
pose was not to conduct a suspicionless .fishing expedition but was to 
gather information about activity inside a house whose occupants 
were legitimately suspected of dealing drugs. Stri.eff conflates the 
standard for an illegal stop with the standard for flagrancy, which 
requires more than the mere absence of proper cause. Second, it is 
unlikely that the prevalence of outstanding warrants will lead to 
dragnet searches by police. Such misconduct would expose police to 
civil liability and, in any event, is already accounted for by Brown's 
"purpose and flagrancy" factor. Pp. 9-10. 
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2015 UT 2, 357 P. 3d 532, reversed. 
3 
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 
C. J., and KENNEDY, BREYER, and ALITo, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined as to Parts I, 
II, and III. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., 
joined. 
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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publice.tion in the 
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United Ste.tes, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 
1 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 14-1373 
UTAH, PETITIONER v. EDWARD 
JOSEPH STRIEFF, JR. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[June 20, 2016] 
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
To enforce the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against 
"unreasonable searches and seizures," this Court has at 
times required courts to exclude evidence obtained by 
unconstitutional police conduct. But the Court has also 
held that, even when there is a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion, this exclusionary rule does not apply when the costs 
of exclusion outweigh its deterrent benefits. In some 
cases, for example, the link between the unconstitutional 
conduct and the discovery of the evidence is too attenuated 
to justify suppression. The question in this case is whether 
this attenuation doctrine applies when an officer makes 
an unconstitutional investigatory stop; learns during that 
stop that the suspect is subject to a valid arrest warrant; 
and proceeds to arrest the suspect and seize incriminating 
evidence during a search incident to that arrest. We hold 
that the evidence the officer seized as part of the search 
incident to arrest is admissible because the officer's dis-
covery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection 
between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized inci-
dent to arrest. 
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I 
This case began with an anonymous tip. In December 
2006, someone called the South Salt Lake City police's 
drug-tip line to report "narcotics activity" at a particular 
residence. App. 15. Narcotics detective Douglas Fackrell 
investigated the tip. Over the course of about a week, 
Officer Fackrell conducted intermittent surveillance of the 
home. He observed visitors who left a few minutes after 
arriving at the house. These visits were sufficiently fre-
quent to raise his suspicion that the occupants were deal-
ing drugs. 
One of those visitors was respondent Edward Strieff. 
Officer Fackrell observed Strieff exit the house and walk 
toward a nearby convenience store. In the store's parking 
lot, Officer Fackrell detained Strieff, identified himself, 
and asked Strieff what he was doing at the residence. 
As part of the stop, Officer Fackrell requested Strieff's 
identification, and Strieff produced his Utah identification 
card. Officer Fackrell relayed Strieff's information to a 
police dispatcher, who reported that Strief£ had an out-
standing arrest warrant for a traffic violation. Officer 
Fackrell then arrested Strieff pursuant to that warrant. 
When Officer Fackrell searched Strieff incident to the 
arrest, he discovered a baggie of methamphetamine and 
drug paraphernalia. 
The State charged Strieff with unlawful possession of 
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Strieff moved 
to suppress the evidence, arguing that the evidence was 
inadmissible because it was derived from an unlawful 
investigatory stop. At the suppression hearing, the prose-
cutor conceded that Officer Fackrell lacked reasonable 
suspicion for the stop but argued that the evidence should 
not be suppressed because the existence of a valid arrest 
warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful 
stop and the discovery of the contraband. 
The trial court agreed with the State and admitted the 
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evidence. The court found that the short time between the 
illegal stop and the search weighed in favor of suppressing 
the evidence, but that two countervailing considerations 
made it admissible. First, the court considered the pres-
ence of a valid arrest warrant to be an '"extraordinary 
intervening circumstance."' App. to Pet. for Cert. 102 
(quoting United States v. Simpson, 439 F. 3d 490, 496 
(CAS 2006). Second, the court stressed the absence of 
flagrant misconduct by Officer Fackrell, who was conduct-
ing a legitimate investigation of a suspected drug house. 
Strief£ conditionally pleaded guilty to reduced charges of 
attempted possession of a controlled substance and pos-
session of drug paraphernalia, but reserved his right to 
appeal the trial court's denial of the suppression motion. 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. 2012 UT App 245, 
286 P. 3d 317. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed. 2015 UT 2, 357 
P. 3d 532. It held that the evidence was inadmissible 
because only "a voluntary act of a defendant's free will (as 
in a confession or consent to search)" sufficiently breaks 
the connection between an illegal search and the discovery 
of evidence. Id., at 536. Because Officer Fackrell's discov-
ery of a valid arrest warrant did not fit this description, 
the court ordered the evidence suppressed. Ibid. 
We granted certiorari to resolve disagreement about 
how the attenuation doctrine applies where an unconstitu-
tional detention leads to the discovery of a valid arrest 
warrant. 576 U. S. _ (2015). Compare, e.g., United 
States v. Green, 111 F. 3d 515, 522-523 (CA7 1997) (hold-
ing that discovery of the warrant is a dispositive interven-
ing circumstance where police misconduct was not fla-
grant), with, e.g., State v. Moralez, 297 Kan. 397, 415, 300 
P. 3d 1090, 1102 (2013) (assigning little significance to the 
discovery of the warrant). We now reverse. 
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II 
A 
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
Because officers who violated the Fourth Amendment 
were traditionally considered trespassers, individuals 
subject to unconstitutional searches or seizures histori-
cally enforced their rights through tort suits or self-help. 
Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 
Mich. L. Rev. 547, 625 (1999). In the 20th century, how-
ever, the exclusionary rule-the rule that often requires 
trial courts to exclude unlawfully seized evidence in a 
criminal trial-became the principal judicial remedy to 
deter Fourth Amendment violations. See, e.g., Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 655 (1961}. 
Under the Court's precedents, the exclusionary rule 
encompasses both the "primary evidence obtained as a 
direct result of an illegal search or seizure" and, relevant 
here, "evidence later discovered and found to be derivative 
of an illegality," the so-called '"fruit of the poisonous 
tree.'" Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796, 804 (1984). 
But the significant costs of this rule have led us to deem it 
"applicable only ... where its deterrence benefits outweigh 
its substantial social costs." Hudson v. Michigan, 547 
U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
"Suppression of evidence ... has always been our last 
resort, not our first impulse." Ibid. 
We have accordingly recognized several exceptions to 
the rule. Three of these exceptions involve the causal 
relationship between the unconstitutional act and the 
discovery of evidence. First, the independent source doc• 
trine allows trial courts to admit evidence obtained in an 
unlawful search if officers independently acquired it from 
a separate, independent source. See Murray v. United 
States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988). Second, the inevitable 
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discovery doctrine allows for the admission of evidence 
that would have been discovered even without the uncon-
stitutional source. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S. 431, 
443-444 (1984). Third, and at issue here, is the attenua-
tion doctrine: Evidence is admissible when the connection 
between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence 
is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening 
circumstance, so that "the interest protected by the consti-
tutional guarantee that has been violated would not be 
served by suppression of the evidence obtained." Hudson, 
supra, at 593. 
B 
Turning to the application of the attenuation doctrine to 
this case, we first address a threshold question: whether 
this doctrine applies at all to a case like this, where the 
intervening circumstance that the State relies on is the 
discovery of a valid, pre-existing, and untainted arrest 
warrant. The Utah Supreme Court declined to apply the 
attenuation doctrine because it read our precedents as 
applying the doctrine only "to circumstances involving an 
independent act of a defendant's 'free will' in confessing to 
a crime or consenting to a search." 357 P. 3d, at 544. In 
this Court, Strieff has not defended this argument, and we 
disagree with it, as well. The attenuation doctrine evalu-
ates the causal link between the government's unlawful 
act and the discovery of evidence, which often has nothing 
to do with a defendant's actions. And the logic of our prior 
attenuation cases is not limited to independent acts by the 
defendant. 
It remains for us to address whether the discovery of a 
valid arrest warrant was a sufficient intervening event to 
break the causal chain between the unlawful stop and the 
discovery of drug-related evidence on Strieff's person. The 
three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 
(1975), guide our analysis. First, we look to the "temporal 
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proximity" between the unconstitutional conduct and the 
discovery of evidence to determine how closely the discov-
ery of evidence followed the unconstitutional search. Id., 
at 603. Second, we consider "the presence of intervening 
circumstances." Id., at 603-604. Third, and "particularly" 
significant, we examine "the purpose and flagrancy of the 
official misconduct." Id., at 604. In evaluating these 
factors, we assume without deciding (because the State 
conceded the point) that Officer Fackrell lacked reasonable 
suspicion to initially stop Strief£. And, because we ulti-
mately conclude that the warrant breaks the causal chain, 
we also have no need to decide whether the warrant's 
existence alone would make the initial stop constitutional 
even if Officer Fackrell was unaware of its existence. 
1 
The first factor, temporal proximity between the ini-
tially unlawful stop and the search, favors suppressing the 
evidence. Our precedents have declined to find that this 
factor favors attenuation unless "substantial time'' elapses 
between an unlawful act and when the evidence is ob-
tained. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 633 (2003) (per 
curiam). Here, however, Officer Fackrell discovered drug 
contraband on Strieff 's person only minutes after the 
illegal stop. See App. 18-19. As the Court explained in 
Brown, such a short time interval counsels in favor of 
suppression; there, we found that the confession should be 
suppressed, relying in part on the ''less than two hours" 
that separated the unconstitutional arrest and the confes-
sion. 422 U.S., at 604. 
In contrast, the second factor, the presence of interven-
ing circumstances, strongly favors the State. In Segura, 
468 U.S. 796, the Court addressed similar facts to those 
here and found sufficient intervening circumstances to 
allow the admission of evidence. There, agents had proba-
ble cause to believe that apartment occupants were deal--
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ing cocaine. Id., at 799-800. They sought a warrant. In 
the meantime, they entered the apartment, arrested an 
occupant, and discovered evidence of drug activity during 
a limited search for security reasons. Id., at 800-801. The 
next evening, the Magistrate Judge issued the search 
warrant. Ibid. This Court deemed the evidence admissi-
ble notwithstanding the illegal search because the infor-
mation supporting the warrant was "wholly unconnected 
with the [ arguably illegal] entry and was: known to the 
agents well before the initial entry." Id., at 814. 
Segura, of course, applied the independent source doc-
trine because the unlawful entry "did not contribute in 
any way to discovery of the evidence seized under the 
warrant." Id., at 815. But the Segura Court suggested 
that the existence of a valid warrant favors finding that 
the connection between unlawful conduct and the discov-
ery of evidence is "sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the 
taint." Ibid. That principle applies here. 
In this case, the warrant was valid, it predated Officer 
Fackrell's investigation, and it was entirely unconnected 
with the stop. And once Officer Fackrell discovered the 
warrant, he had an obligation to arrest Strief£. "A war-
rant is a judicial mandate to an officer to conduct a search 
or make an arrest, and the officer has a sworn duty to 
carry out its provisions." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 920, n. 21 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Officer Fackrell's arrest of Strieff thus was a ministerial 
act that was independently compelled by the pre-existing 
warrant. And once Officer Fackrell was authorized to 
arrest Strief£, it was undisputedly lawful to search Strieff 
as an incident of his arrest to protect Officer Fackrell's 
safety. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009) 
(explaining the permissible scope of searches incident to 
arrest). 
Finally, the third factor, "the purpose and flagrancy of 
the official misconduct," Brown, supra, at 604, also strongly 
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favors the State. The exclusionaxy rule exists to deter 
police misconduct. Davis v. United States, 564 U. S. 229, 
236-237 (2011). The third factor of the attenuation doc-
trine reflects that rationale by favoring exclusion only 
when the police misconduct is most in need of deter-
rence-that is, when it is purposeful or flagrant. 
Officer Fackrell was at most negligent. In stopping 
Strieff, Officer Fackrell made two good-faith mistakes. 
First, he had not observed what time Strief£ entered the 
suspected drug h~use, so he did not know how long Strief£ 
had been there. Officer Fackrell thus lacked a sufficient 
basis to conclude that Strief£ was a short-term visitor who 
may have been consummating a drug transaction. Second, 
because he lacked confirmation that Strief£ was a short-
term visitor, Officer Fackrell should have asked Strieff 
whether he would speak with him, instead of demanding 
that Strieff do so. Officer Fackrell's stated purpose was to 
"find out what was going on [in] the house." App. 17. 
Nothing prevented him from approaching Strieff simply to 
ask. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 434 (1991) ("[A] 
seizure does not occur simply because a police officer 
approaches an individual and asks a few questions"). But 
these errors in judgment hardly rise to a purposeful or 
flagrant violation of Strieff 's Fourth Amendment rights. 
While Officer Fackrell's decision to initiate the stop was 
mistaken, his conduct thereafter was lawful. The officer's 
decision to run the warrant check was a "negligibly bur-
densome precautio[n]" for officer safety. Rodriguez v. 
United States, 575 U. S. _, _ (2015) (slip op., at 7). 
And Officer Fackrell's actual search of Strief£ was a lawful 
search incident to arrest. See Gant, supra, at 339. 
Moreover, there is no indication that this unlawful stop 
was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct. 
To the contrary, all the evidence suggests that the stop 
was an isolated instance of negligence that occurred in 
connection with a bona fide investigation of a suspected 
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drug house. Officer Fackrell saw Strieff leave a suspected 
drug house. And his suspicion about the house was based 
on an anonymous tip and his personal observations. 
Applying these factors, we hold that the evidence dis-
covered on Strieff 's person was admissible because the 
unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the pre-
existing arrest warrant. Although the illegal stop was 
close in time to Strieff's arrest, that consideration is out-
weighed by two factors supporting the State. The out-
standing arrest warrant for Strieff 's arrest is a critical 
intervening circumstance that is wholly independent of 
the illegal stop. The discovery of that warrant broke the 
causal chain between the unconstitutional stop and the 
discovery of evidence by compelling Officer Fackrell to 
arrest Strieff. And, it is especially significant that there is 
no evidence that Officer Fackrell's illegal stop reflected 
flagrantly unlawful police misconduct. 
2 
We find Strieff's counterarguments unpersuasive. 
First, he argues that the attenuation doctrine should not 
apply because the officer's stop was purposeful and fla-
grant. He asserts that Officer Fackrell stopped him solely 
to fish for evidence of suspected wrongdoing. But Officer 
Fackrell sought information from Strieff to find out what 
was happening inside a house whose occupants were 
legitimately suspected of dealing drugs. This was not a 
suspicionless fishing expedition "in the hope that some-
thing would turn up." Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U. S. 687, 
691 (1982). 
Strieff argues, moreover, that Officer Fackrell's conduct 
was flagrant because he detained Strieff without the 
necessary level of cause (here, reasonable suspicion). But 
that conflates the standard for an illegal stop with the 
standard for flagrancy. For the violation to be flagrant, 
more severe police misconduct is required than the mere 
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absence of proper cause fm the seizure. See, e.g., Kaupp, 
538 U.S., at 628, 633 (finding flagrant violation where a 
warrantless arrest was made in the arrestee's home after 
police were denied a warrant and at least some officers 
knew they lacked probable cause). Neither the officer's 
alleged purpose nor the flagrancy of the violation rise to a 
level of misconduct to warrant suppression. 
Second, Strieff argues that, because of the prevalence of 
outstanding arrest warrants in many jurisdictions, police 
will engage in dragnet searches if the exclusionary rule is 
not applied. We think that this outcome is unlikely. Such 
wanton conduct would expose police to civil liability. See 
42 U.S. C. §1983; Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); see also Segura, 468 
U. S., at 812. And in any event, the Brown factors take 
account of the purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct. 
Were evidence of a dragnet search presented here, the 
application of the Brown factors could be different. But 
there is no evidence that the concerns that Strieff raises 
with the criminal justice system are present in South Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
* * * 
We hold that the evidence Officer Fackrell seized as part 
of his search incident to arrest is admissible because his 
discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection 
between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized from 
Strief£' incident to arrest. The judgment of the Utah Su-
preme Court, accordingly, is reversed. · 
It is so ordered. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No.14-1373 
UTAH, PETITIONER u. EDWARD 
JOSEPH STRIEFF, JR. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[June 20, 2016} 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG 
joins as to Parts I, II, and III, dissenting. 
The Court today holds that the discovery of a warrant 
for an unpaid parking ticket will forgive a police officer's 
violation of your Fourth Amendment rights. Do not be 
soothed by the opinion's technical language: This case 
allows the police to stop you on the street, demand your 
identification, and check it for outstanding traffic war-
rants-even if you are doing nothing wrong. If the officer 
discovers a warrant for a fine you forgot to pay, courts will 
now excuse his illegal stop and will admit into evidence 
anything he happens to find by searching you after arrest-
ing you on the warrant. Because the Fourth Amendment 
should prohibit, not permit, such misconduct, I dissent. 
I 
Minutes after Edward Strieff walked out of a South Salt 
Lake City home, an officer stopped him, questioned him, 
and took his identification to run it through a police data-
base. The officer did not suspect that Strieff had done 
anything wrong. Strieff just happened to be the first 
person to leave a house that the officer thought might 
contain "drug activity." App. 16-19. 
As the State of Utah concedes, this stop was illegal. 
App. 24. The Fourth Amendment protects people from 
"unreasonable searches and seizures." An officer breaches 
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that protection when he detains a pedestrian to check his 
license without any evidence that the person is engaged in 
a crime. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (1968). The officer deepens 
the breach when he prolongs the detention just to fish 
further for evidence of wrongdoing. Rodriguez v. United 
States, 575 U.S._,_-_ (2015) (slip op., at 6-7). In 
his search for lawbreaking, the officer in this case himself 
broke the law. 
The officer learned that Strieff had a "small traffic 
warrant." App. 19. Pursuant to that warrant, he arrested 
Strieff and, conducting a search incident to the arrest, 
discovered methamphetamine in Strieff 's pockets. 
Utah charged Strieff with illegal drug possession. Be-
fore trial, Strieff argued that admitting the drugs into 
evidence would condone the officer's misbehavior. The 
methamphetamine, he reasoned, was the product of the 
officer's illegal stop. Admitting it would tell officers that 
unlawfully discovering even a "small traffic warrant" 
would give them license to search for evidence of unrelated 
offenses. The Utah Supreme Court unanimously agreed 
with Strief£. A majority of this Court now reverses. 
II 
It is tempting in a case like this, where illegal conduct 
by an officer uncovers illegal conduct . by a civilian, to 
forgive the officer. After all, his instincts, although uncon-
stitutional, were correct. But a basic principle lies at the 
heart of the Fourth Amendment: Two wrongs don't make a 
right. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 392 
(1914). When "lawless police conduct" uncovers evidence 
of lawless civilian conduct, this Court has long required 
later criminal trials to exclude the illegally obtained evi-
dence. Terry, 392 U. S., at 12; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 
643, 655 (1961). For example, if an officer breaks into a 
home and finds a forged check lying around, that check 
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may not be used to prosecute the homeowner for bank 
fraud. We would describe the check as "'fruit of the poi-
sonous tree."' Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
488 (1963). Fruit that must be cast aside includes not 
only evidence directly found by an illegal search but also 
evidence "come at by exploitation of that illegality." Ibid. 
This "exclusionary rule" removes an incentive for offic-
ers to search us without proper justification. Terry, 392 
U.S., at 12. It also keeps courts from being "made party 
to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens 
by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits 
of such invasions." Id., at 13. When courts admit only 
lawfully obtained evidence, they encourage "those who 
formulate law enforcement polices, and the officers who 
implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals 
into their value system." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 
492 (1976). But when courts admit illegally obtained 
evidence as well, they reward "manifest neglect if not an 
open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution." 
Weeks, 232 U. S., at 394. 
Applying the exclusionary rule, the Utah Supreme 
Court correctly decided that Strieff's drugs must be ex-
cluded because the officer exploited his illegal stop to 
discover them. The officer found the drugs only after 
learning of Strieff's traffic violation; and he learned of 
Strieff 's traffic violation only because he unlawfully 
stopped Strieff to check his driver's license. 
The court also correctly rejected the State's argument 
that the officer's discovery of a traffic warrant unspoiled 
the poisonous fruit. The State analogizes finding the 
warrant to one of our earlier decisions, Wong Sun v. United 
States. There, an officer illegally arrested a person 
who, days later, voluntarily returned to the station to 
confess to committing a crime. 371 U.S., at 491. Even 
though the person would not have confessed ''but for the 
illegal actions of the police," id., at 488, we noted that the 
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police did not exploit their illegal arrest to obtain the 
confession, id., at 491. Because the confession was ob-
tained by "means sufficiently distinguishable" from the 
constitutional violation, we held that it could be admitted 
into evidence. Id., at 488, 491. The State contends that 
the search incident to the warrant-arrest here is similarly 
distinguishable from the illegal stop. 
But Wong Sun explains why Strieff 's drugs must be 
excluded. We reasoned that a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion may not color every investigation that follows put it 
certainly stains the actions of officers who exploit the 
infraction. We distinguished evidence obtained by innocu-
ous means from evidence obtained by exploiting miscon-
duct after considering a variety of factors: whether a long 
time passed, whether there were "intervening circum-
stances," and whether the purpose or flagrancy of the 
misconduct was "calculated" to procure the evidence. 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-604 (1975). 
These factors confirm that the officer in this case discov-
ered Strieff's drugs by exploiting his own illegal conduct. 
The officer did not ask Strieff to volunteer his name only 
to find out, days later, that Strieff had a warrant against 
him. The officer illegally stopped Strieff and immediately 
ran a warrant check. The officer's discovery of a warrant 
was not some intervening surprise that he could not have 
anticipated. Utah lists over 180,000 misdemeanor war-
rants in its database, and at the time of the arrest, Salt 
Lake County had a "backlog of outstanding warrants" 
so large that it faced the "potential for civil liability." 
See Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Survey of State Criminal History Information Systems, 
2014 (2015) (Systems Survey) (Table 5a), online at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bjs/grants/249799.pdf (all 
Internet materials as last visited June 16, 2016); Inst. 
for Law and Policy Planning, Salt Lake County Crim-
inal Justice System Assessment 6. 7 (2004), online at 
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http://www.slco.org/cjac/resources/SaltLakeCJSMmal.pdf. 
The officer's violation was also calculated to procure evi-
dence. His sole reason for stopping Strieff, he acknowl-
edged, was investigative--he wanted to discover whether 
drug activity was going on in the house Strieff had just 
exited. App. 17. 
The warrant check, in other words, was not an "inter-
vening circumstance" separating the stop from the search 
for drugs. It was part and parcel of the officer's illegal 
"expedition for evidence in the hope that something might 
turn up." Brown, 422 U.. S., at 605. Under .our- precedents, 
because the officer found Strieff 's drugs by exploiting his 
own constitutional violation, the drugs should be excluded. 
III 
A 
The Court sees things differently. To the Court, the fact 
that a warrant gives an officer cause to arrest a person 
severs the connection between illegal policing and the 
resulting discovery of evidence. Ante, at 7. This is a re-
markable proposition: The mere existence of a warrant not 
only gives an officer legal cause to arrest and search a 
person, it also forgives an officer who, with no knowledge 
of the warrant at all, unlawfully stops that person on a 
whim or hunch. 
To explain its reasoning, the Court relies on Segura v. 
United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984). There, federal agents 
applied for a warrant to search an apartment but illegally 
entered the apartment to secure it before the judge issued 
the warrant. Id., at 800-801. After receiving the warrant, 
the agents then searched the apartment for drugs. Id., at 
801. The question before us was what to do with the 
evidence the agents then discovered. We declined to sup-
press it because "[t]he illegal entry into petitioners' 
apartment did not contribute in any way to discovery of 
the evidence seized under the warrant." Id., at 815. 
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According to the majority, Segura involves facts "simi-
lar" to this case and "suggest[s]" that a valid warrant will 
clean up whatever illegal conduct uncovered it. Ante, at 
6-7. It is difficult to understand this interpretation. In 
Segura, the agents' illegal conduct in entering the apart-
ment had nothing to do with their procurement of a search 
warrant. Here, the officer's illegal conduct in stopping 
Strieff was essential to his discovery of an arrest warrant. 
Segura would be similar only if the agents used infor-
mation they illegally obtained from the apartment to 
procure a search warrant or discover an arrest warrant. 
Precisely because that was not the case, the Court admit-
ted the untainted evidence. 468 U. S., at 814. 
The majority likewise misses the point when it calls the 
warrant check here a '"negligibly burdensome precau-
tio[ n]'" taken for the officer's "safety." Ante, at 8 (quoting 
Rodriguez, 575 U. S., at _ (slip op., at 7)). Remember, 
the officer stopped Strieff without suspecting him of com-
mitting any crime. By his own account, the officer did not 
fear Strieff. Moreover, the safety rationale we discussed 
in Rodriguez, an opinion about highway patrols, is con-
spicuously absent here. A warrant check on a highway 
"ensur[es] that vehicles on the road are operated safely 
and responsibly." Id., at_ (slip op., at 6). We allow such 
checks during legal traffic stops because the legitimacy of 
a person's driver's license has a "close connection to road-
way safety." Id., at_ (slip op., at 7). A warrant check of 
a pedestrian on a sidewalk, ''by contrast, is a measure 
aimed at 'detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrong-
doing."' Ibid. (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. 8. 
32, 40-41 (2000)). Surely we would not allow officers to 
warrant-check random joggers, dog walkers, and lemonade 
vendors just to ensure they pose no threat to anyone else. 
The majority also posits that the officer could not have 
exploited his illegal conduct because he did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment on purpose. Rather, he made "good-
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faith mistakes." Ante, at 8. Never mind that the officer's 
sole purpose was to fish for evidence. The majority casts 
his unconstitutional actions as "negligent" and therefore 
incapable of being deterred by the exclusionary rule. Ibid. 
But the Fourth Amendment does not tolerate an officer's 
unreasonable searches and seizures just because he did 
not know any better. Even officers prone to negligence can 
learn from courts that exclude illegally obtained evidence. 
Stone, 428 U.S., at 492. Indeed, they- a;re perhaps the 
most in need of the education, whether by the judge's 
opinion, the prosecutor's future guidance, or an updated 
manual on criminal procedure. If the officers are in doubt 
about what the law requires, exclusion gives them an 
"incentive to err on the side of constitutional behavior." 
United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537, 561 (1982). 
B 
Most striking about the Court's opinion is its insistence 
that the event here was ''isolated/' with "no indication that 
this unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent 
police misconduct." Ante, at 8-9. Respectfully, nothing 
about this case is isolated. 
Outstanding warrants are surprisingly common. When 
a person with a traffic ticket misses a fine payment or 
court appearance, a court will issue a warrant. See, e.g., 
Brennan Center for Justice, Criminal Justice Debt 23 (2010), 
online at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/ 
files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf. When a 
person on probation drinks alcohol or breaks curfew, a 
court will issue a warrant. See, e.g., Human Rights 
Watch, Profiting from Probation 1, 51 (2014), online at 
https: //www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/05 /profiting-probation/ 
americas-offender-funded-probation-industry. The States 
and Federal Government maintain databases with over 
7.8 million outstanding warrants, the vast majority of 
which appear to be for minor offenses. See Systems Sur-
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vey (Table 5a). Even these sources may not track the 
"staggering" numbers of warrants, "'drawers and draw-
ers"' full, that many cities issue for traffic violations and 
ordinance infractions. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., 
Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department 4 7, 55 
{2015) (Ferguson Report), online at https://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/ default/files/ opa/press-releases/ attachments/ 2015 / 0 3 / 
04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf. The county in 
this case has had a ''backlog" of such warrants. See supra, 
at 4. The Department of Justice recently reported. that in 
the town of Ferguson, Missouri, with a population of 
21,000, 16,000 people had outstanding warrants against 
them. Ferguson Report, at 6, 55. 
Justice Department investigations across the country 
have illustrated how these astounding numbers of war-
rants can be used by police to stop people without cause. 
In a single year in New Orleans, officers "made nearly 
60,000 arrests, of which about 20,000 were of people with 
outstanding traffic or misdemeanor warrants from neigh-
boring parishes for such infractions as unpaid tickets." 
Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the 
New Orleans Police Department 29 (2011), online at 
https://www.justice.gov/ sites/ default/files/ crt/legacy/2011/ 
03/ 17 /nopd_report. pdf. In the St. Louis metropolitan area, 
officers "routinely'' stop people-on the street, at bus 
stops, or even in court-for no reason other than "an of-
ficer's desire to check whether the subject had a municipal 
arrest warrant pending." Ferguson Report, at 49, 57. In 
Newark, New Jersey, officers stopped 52,235 pedestrians 
within a 4-year period and ran warrant checks on 39,308 
of them. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation 
of the Newark Police Department 8, 19, n. 15 (2014), 
online at https: II www .justice.gov I sites/ default/files/ crt/ 
legacy/2014/07/22/newark_findings_7-22-14.pdf. The Jus-
tice Department analyzed these warrant-checked stops 
and reported that "approximately 93% of the stops would 
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have been considered unsupported by articulated reason-
able suspicion." Id., at 9, n. 7. 
I do not doubt that most officers act in "good faith" and 
do not set out to break the law. That does not mean these 
stops are "isolated instance[s] of negligence," however. 
Ante, at 8. Many are the product of institutionalized 
training procedures. The New York City Police Depart-
ment long trained officers to, in the words of a District 
Judge, "stop and question first, develop reasonable suspi-
cion later." Ligon v. New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 4 78, 537-
538 (SDNY), stay granted on other grounds, 736 F. 3d 118 
(CA2 2013). The Utah Supreme Court described as '"rou-
tine procedure' or 'common practice'" the decision of Salt 
Lake City police officers to run warrant checks on pedes-
trians they detained without reasonable suspicion. State 
v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ,r2, 76 P. 3d 1159, 1160. In the 
related context of traffic stops, one widely followed police 
manual instructs officers looking for drugs to "run at least 
a warrants check on all drivers you stop. Statistically, 
narcotics offenders are ... more likely to fail to appear on 
simple citations, such as traffic or trespass violations, 
leading to the issuance of bench warrants. Discovery of an 
outstanding warrant gives you cause for an immediate 
custodial arrest and search of the suspect." C. Rems-
berg, Tactics for Criminal Patrol 205-206 (1995); C. 
Epp et al., Pulled Over 23, 33-36 (2014). 
The majority does not suggest what makes this case 
"isolated" from these and countless other examples. Nor 
does it offer guidance for how a defendant can prove that 
his arrest was the result of "widespread" misconduct. 
Surely it should not take a federal investigation of Salt 
Lake County before the Court would protect someone in 
Strieff's position. 
IV 
Writing only for myself, and drawing on my professional 
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experiences, I would add that unlawful "stops" have severe 
consequences much greater than the inconvenience sug-
gested by the name. This Court has given officers an 
array of instruments to probe and examine you. When we 
condone officers' use of these devices without adequate 
cause, we give them reason to target pedestrians in an 
arbitrary manner. We also risk treating members of our 
communities as second-class citizens. 
Although many Americans have been stopped for speed-
ing or jaywalking, few may realize how degrading a stop 
can be when the officer is looking for more. This Court 
has allowed an officer to stop you for whatever reason he 
wants-so long as he can point to a pretextual justification 
after the fact. Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 813 
(1996). That justification must provide specific reasons 
why the officer suspected you were breaking the law, 
Terry, 392 U. S., at 21, but it may factor in your ethnicity, 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-887 
(1975), where you live, Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 
147 (1972), what you were wearing, United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1989), and how you behaved, 
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-125 (2000). The 
officer does not even need to know which law you might 
have broken so long as he can later point to any possible 
infraction--even one that is minor, unrelated, or ambigu-
ous. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154--155 (2004); 
Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S._ (2014). 
The indignity of the stop is not limited to an officer 
telling you that you look like a criminal. See Epp, Pulled 
Over, at 5. The officer may next ask for your "consent'' to 
inspect your bag or purse without telling you that you can 
decline. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991). 
Regardless of your answer, he may order you to stand 
1'helpless, perhaps facing a wall with [your] hands raised." 
Terry, 392 U. S., at 17. If the officer thinks you might be 
dangerous, he may then "frisk'' you for weapons. This 
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involves more than just a pat down. As onlookers pass by, 
the officer may '"feel with sensitive fingers every portion 
of [your] body. A thorough search [may] be made of [your] 
arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area 
about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to 
the feet."' Id., at 17, n. 13. 
The officer's control over you does not end with the stop. 
If the officer chooses, he may handcuff you and take you to 
jail for d~ing nothing more than speeding, jaywalking, or. 
"driving [your] pickup truck ... with [your] 3-year-old son 
and 5-year-old daughter ... without [your] seatbelt fas-
tened." Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 323-324 
(2001). At the jail, he can fingerprint you, swab DNA from 
the inside of your mouth, and force you to "shower with a 
delousing agent" while you ''lift [your] tongue, hold out 
[your] arms, turn around, and lift [your] genitals." Flor-
ence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burling-
ton, 566 U. S. _, _-_ (2012) (slip op., at 2-3); Mary-
land v. King, 569 U. S. _, _ (2013) (slip op., at 28). 
Even if you are innocent, you will now join the 65 million 
Americans with an arrest record and experience the "civil 
death" of discrimination by employers, landlords, and 
whoever else conducts a background check. Chin, The 
New Civil Death, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1789, 1805 (2012); see 
J. Jacobs, The Eternal Criminal Record 33-51 (2015); 
Young & Petersilia, Keeping Track, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 
1318, 1341-1357 (2016). And, of course, if you fail to pay 
bail or appear for court, a judge will issue a warrant to 
render you "arrestable on sight'' in the future. A. 
Goffman, On the Run 196 (2014). 
This case involves a suspicion.less stop, one in which the 
officer initiated this chain of events without justification. 
As the Justice Department notes, supra, at 8, many inno-
cent people are subjected to the humiliations of these 
unconstitutional searches. The white defendant in this 
case shows that anyone's dignity can be violated in this 
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manner. See M. Gottschalk, Caught 119-138 (2015). But 
it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate 
victims of this type of scrutiny. See M. Alexander, The 
New Jim Crow 95-136 (2010). For generations, black and 
brown parents have given their children "the talk"-
instructing them never to run down the street; always 
keep your hands where they can be seen; do not even 
think of talking back to a stranger-all out of fear of how 
an officer with a gun will react to them. See, e.g., W. E. B. 
Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (1903); J. Baldwin, The 
Fire Next Time (1963); T. Coates, Between the World and 
Me (2015). 
By legitimizing the conduct that produces this double 
consciousness, this case tells everyone, white and black, 
guilty and innocent, that an officer can verify your legal 
status at any time. It says that your body is subject to 
invasion while courts excuse the violation of your rights. 
It implies that you are not a citizen of a democracy but the 
subject of a carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged. 
We must not pretend that the countless people who are 
routinely targeted by police are "isolated." They are the 
canaries in the coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal, 
warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere. See 
L. Guinier & G. Torres, The Miner's Canary 274--283 
(2002). They are the ones who recognize that unlawful 
police stops corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all 
our lives. Until their voices matter too, our justice system 
will continue to be anything but. 
* * * 
I dissent. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No.14-1373 
UTAH, PETITIONER v. EDWARD 
JOSEPH STRIEFF, JR. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[June 20, 2016] 
JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins, 
dissenting. 
If a police officer stops a person on the street without 
reasonable suspicion, that seizure violates the Fourth 
Amendment. And if the officer pats down the unlawfully 
detained individual and finds drugs in his pocket, the 
State may not use the contraband as evidence in a crimi-
nal prosecution. That much is beyond dispute. The ques-
tion here is whether the prohibition on admitting evidence 
dissolves if the officer discovers, after making the stop but 
before finding the drugs, that the person has an outstand-
ing arrest warrant. Because that added wrinkle makes no 
difference under the Constitution, I respectfully dissent. 
This Court has established a simple framework for 
determining whether to exclude evidence obtained 
through a Fourth Amendment violation: Suppression is 
necessary when, but only when, its societal benefits out-
weigh its costs. See ante, at 4; Davis v. United States, 564 
U.S. 229, 237 (2011). The exclusionary rule serves a 
crucial function-to deter unconstitutional police conduct. 
By barring the use of illegally obtained evidence, courts 
reduce the temptation for police officers to skirt the 
Fourth Amendment's requirements. See James v. lllinois, 
493 U. S. 307, 319 (1990). But suppression of evidence 
also "exacts a heavy toll": Its consequence in many cases is 
to release a criminal without just punishment. Davis, 564 
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U.S., at 237. Our decisions have thus endeavored to 
strike a sound balance between those two competing 
considerations-rejecting the "reflexive" impulse to ex-
clude evidence every time an officer runs afoul of the 
Fourth Amendment, id., at 238, but insisting on suppres-
sion when it will lead to "appreciable deterrence" of police 
misconduct, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 
(2009). 
This case thus requires the Court to determine whether . 
excluding the fruits of Officer Douglas Fackrell's unjusti-
fied stop of Edward Strieff would significantly deter police 
from committing similar constitutional violations in the 
future. And as the Court states, that inquiry turns on 
application of the "attenuation doctrine," ante, at 5--our 
effort to "mark the point" at which the discovery of evi-
dence "become[s] so attenuated" from the police miscon-
duct that the deterrent benefit of exclusion drops below its 
cost. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984). 
Since Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604-605 (1975), 
three factors have guided that analysis. First, the closer 
the "temporal proximity" between the unlawful act and 
the discovery of evidence, the greater the deterrent value 
of suppression. Id., at 603. Second, the more "pur-
pose[ful]" or "flagran[t]" the police illegality, the clearer 
the necessity, and better the chance, of preventing similar 
misbehavior. Id., at 604. And third, the presence (or 
absence) of "intervening circumstances" makes a differ-
ence: The stronger the causal chain between the miscon-
duct and the evidence, the more exclusion will curb future 
constitutional violations. Id., at 603-604. Here, as shown 
below, each of those considerations points toward suppres-
sion: Nothing in Fackrell's discovery of an outstanding 
warrant so attenuated the connection between his wrong-
ful behavior and his detection of drugs as to diminish the 
exclusionary rule's deterrent benefits. 
Start where the majority does: The temporal proximity 
148
•:,. _ ~•.e•••••-•,,_•.:.:~;<~.:...:.......:..:...:...:••••.",",•••••••••:::..:::....i.:.. !_••-=.:.:••••••~•• ••" •••,_•••~-- •••,.S. " t•••T....Z........,,-...L•~••• ••••••• • ••• ••• • F--,..•.•--.• ;·~~--~----•~ •- --~----•--•--•-• 
Cite as: 579 U. S. _ (2016) 3 
KAGAN, J., dissenting 
factor, it forthrightly admits, "favors suppressing the 
evidence." Ante, at 6. After all, Fackrell's discovery of 
drugs came just minutes after the unconstitutional stop. 
And in prior decisions, this Court has made clear that only 
the lapse of "substantial time" between the two could favor 
admission. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626,633 (2003) (per 
curiam); see, e.g., Brown, 422 U. S., at 604 (suppressing a 
confession when "less than two hours" separated it from 
an unlawful arrest). So the State, by all accounts, takes 
strike one. 
Move on to the purposefulness of Fackrell's conduct, 
where the majority is less willing to see a problem for 
what it is. The majority chalks up Fackrell's Fourth 
Amendment violation to a couple of innocent "mistakes." 
Ante, at 8. But far from a Barney Fife-type mishap, 
Fackrell's seizure of Strieff was a calculated decision, 
taken with so little justification that the State has never 
tried to defend its legality. At the suppression hearing, 
Fackrell acknowledged that the stop was designed for 
investigatory purposes-i.e., to "find out what was going 
on [in] the house" he had been watching, and to figure out 
"what [Strief£] was doing there." App. 17-18. And 
Fackrell frankly admitted that he had no basis for his 
action except that Strieff "was coming out of the house." 
Id., at 17. Plug in Fackrell's and Strieff's names, substi-
tute "stop" for "arrest" and "reasonable suspicion" for 
"probable cause," and this Court's decision in Brown per-
fectly describes this case: 
"[I]t is not disputed that [Fackrell stopped StrieffJ 
without [reasonable suspicion]. [He] later testified 
that [he] made the [stop] for the purpose of question-
ing [Strieff] as part of [his] investigation . . . . The il-
legality here ... had a quality of purposefulness. The 
impropriety of the [stop] was obvious. [A]wareness of 
that fact was virtually conceded by [Fackrell] when 
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[he] repeatedly acknowledged, in [his] testimony, that 
the purpose of [his] action was 'for investigation': 
[Fackrell] embarked upon this expedition for evidence 
in the hope that something might turn up." 422 U. S., 
at 592, 605 (some internal punctuation altered; foot-
note, citation, and paragraph break omitted). 
In Brown, the Court held those facts to support suppres-
sion-and they do here as well. Swing and a miss for 
strike two. 
Finally, consider whether any intervening circumstance 
"br[oke] the causal chain" between the stop and the evi-
dence. Ante, at 6. The notion of such a disrupting event 
comes from the tort law doctrine of proximate causation. 
See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 
639, 658--659 (2008) (explaining that a party cannot "es-
tablish[] proximate cause" when "an intervening cause 
break[s] the chain of causation between'' the act and the 
injury); Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the 
Exclusionary Rule, 99 Geo. L. J. 1077, 1099 (2011) (Fourth 
Amendment attenuation analysis ''looks to whether the 
constitutional violation was the proximate cause of the 
discovery of the evidence"). And as in the tort context, a 
circumstance counts as intervening only when it is unfore-
seeable--not when it can be seen coming from miles away. 
See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, B. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser 
and Keeton on Law of Torts 312 (5th ed. 1984). For rather 
than breaking the causal chain, predictable effects (e.g., X 
leads naturally to Y leads naturally to Z) are its very links. 
And Fackrell's discovery of an arrest warrant-the only 
event the majority thinks intervened-was an eminently 
foreseeable consequence of stopping Strief£. As Fackrell 
testified, checking for outstanding warrants during a stop 
is the "normal" practice of South Salt Lake City police. 
App. 18; see also State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ,r2, 76 
P. 3d 1159, 1160 (describing a warrant check as "routine 
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procedure" and "common practice" in Salt Lake City). In 
other words, the department's standard detention proce-
dures-stop, ask for identification, run a check-are partly 
designed to find outstanding warrants. And find them 
they will, given the staggering number of such warrants 
on the books. See generally ante, at 7-8 (SOTOMAYOR, J., 
dissenting). To take just a few examples: The State of 
California has 2.5 million outstanding arrest warrants (a 
number corresponding to about 9% of its adult ·popula-
tion); Pennsylvania (with a population of about" 12.8 mil-
lion) contributes 1.4 million more; and New York City 
(population 8.4 million) adds another · 1.2 million. See 
Reply Brief 8; Associated Press, Pa. Database, NBC News 
(Apr. 8, 2007), online at http://goo.gl/3Yq3Nd (as last 
visited June 17, 2016); N. Y. Times, Oct. 8, 2015, p. A24. 1 
So outstanding warrants do not appear as bolts from the 
blue. They are the run-of-the-mill results of police stops-
what officers look for when they run a routine check of a 
person's identification and what they know _will turn up 
with fair regularity. In short, they are nothing like what 
intervening circumstances are supposed to be. 2 Strike 
1 What is more, outstanding arrest warrants are not distributed evenly 
across the population. To the contrary, they are concentrated in 
cities, towns, and neighborhoods where stops are most likely to occur-
and so the odds of any given stop revealing a warrant are even higher 
than the above numbers indicate. One study found, for example, that 
Cincinnati, Ohio had over 100,000 outstanding warrants with only 
300,000 residents. See Helland & Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on 
Public Versus Private Law Enforcement from Bail Jumping, 47 J. Law 
& Econ. 93, 98 (2004), And as JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR notes, 16,000 of the 
21,000 people residing in the town of Ferguson, Missouri have out-
standing warrants. See ante, at 8. 
2The majority relies on Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796 (1984), 
to reach the opposite conclusion, see ante, at 6---7, but that decision 
lacks any relevance to this case. The Court there held that the Fourth 
Amendment violation at issue "did not contribute in any way" to the 
police's subsequent procurement of a warrant and discovery of contra-
band. 468 U.S., at 815. So the Court had no occasion to consider the 
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three. 
The majority's misapplication of Brown's three-part 
inquiry creates unfortunate incentives for the police--
indeed, practically invites them to do what Fackrell did 
here. Consider an officer who, like Fackrell, wishes to stop 
someone for investigative reasons, but does not have what 
a court would view as reasonable suspicion. If the officer 
believes that any evidence he discovers will be inadmissi-
ble, he is likely to think the unlawful stop not worth mak-
ing-precisely the deterrence the exclusionary rule is 
meant to achieve. But when he is told of today's decision? 
Now the officer knows that the stop may well yield admis-
sible evidence: So long as the target is one of the many 
millions of people in this country with an outstanding 
arrest warrant, anything the officer finds in a search is 
fair game for use in a c1·iminal prosecution. The officer's 
incentive to violate the Constitution thus increases: From 
here on, he sees potential advantage in stopping individu-
als without reasonable suspicion-exactly the temptation 
the exclusionary rule is supposed to remove. Because the 
majority thus places Fourth Amendment protections at 
risk, I respectfully dissent. 
question here: What happens when an unconstitutional act in fact leads 
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hereby ~ivAexlradi!lon to the slate of Idaho and will not contest any ef'fon to return the defondant to the state· of 
-~i~ . . 
7. Empfoyment or Alternative Plan: The defendant shail seek and maintain galnfu\, verifiable, full-tlme. · 
employment The defendant shall not acc:ep~ cause to tJe terminated from, or ohange employment without first 
obtaining wn1ten permission from his supervising PPO; In lieu of fUJl-t!roe employment, the defendant may 
parl:iclpma In full-time education, a combination of employment and education, vocatlonal program or o~ef(-
aftematlve plan based on the defendanfs specific sitUatlon and as approved by hili supaivlslng PPD. -· ~-t-__ 
8, AlpohoI: The defendant shaR not purchase, possess, or conE>ume alcoholic beverages In any form and wlll not 
enter any establishment where alcohol ls a pr\maiy source of income. £,. r: 
9, C-ontrollad Substances: The defendant shaft not use or possess any illegal ilnJg. The defendant shaO not use 
or possess any paraphernalia for the purpose of ingesting any illegal drug. The defendant shall nol use or 
possess any controlled substances unless lawfully prescribed for him by a IJc:ensed physlclan !dl;li:iflsl The 
defendant shall use medications only in the manner prescribed by his physician or dentist. y t: · 
1 o. Firearms or Weapons: The defendant shall not purchase, carry,. possess er have control of any firearms, 
chemical weapons, elecb"onlc weapons, explosives or other dangen;,us weapons. Other dangerous weapons may 
include, but are not llmlted to, kflives with blades over two and one half Inches (2 ¼."} In lensthi swftc:h-blaqe 
_j;n.ives; bn.-sss knuckles; sWords; throwing starsi and other martial arts weapons. Any weapons or fuea.rrns seized 
will be forfeited to IDOC for disposal, The defendant shall not reside in eny location that contains fitearrnJI ullless 
the firep.rtns are secured and thia portion of the 11-1le is exempted· In writing by the district manager. __ v-_r _ 
1.1. Search: The defendant shall consent to the search of his pmon, residence, vehicle, personal property, and 
other real property or slnlc!tJres owned or leased by the defendant or for which the defendant ls the controlling 
autliortty. The search wlll be conducted by the !DOC dlstrict manager, section supervisor, or PPO o!)ayr-
enforcement officer. The defendapt waiVes his Fourth Amendment-rights c:onoemlng searohes. L-c ~ 
12.· Cost of Supe.rvfslon: The. defendant shall·c:omply with ltlaho Code, Section 20-225, which authorizes the 
IDOC to collect a co11t of.supervision fee. The defendant shall.make payments as prescribed in his monthly cost of 
supervislo-n bDI. · L, t: 
13, Associations: The defendant shall not associate with any person(s) designated by the !DOC dlstrlcl 
mari~eer1 section SUpfl{Vlsor, or PPO. L f:. • , • 1 • 
14. Substanc:e Abuse Testing: The defendant shall submit to any tei.t for alcohol or controlled substances as 
requested and" directed by the IDO,C district manag-er, section supe~, or PPD or law enforcement officer, The. 
defendant may be requirecl to obtain ~ests at his own expense. If the resulls of.the test ln~an adulterant has 
been used to interfere with tha results, that test will be cl.aemed to have. been positive. --=kt::""-'-- · 
15. Eva/iJatlon and Program Plan: Toe defendant shall obtain any treatment evaluaoon deemed neoes1-ary and 
as ordered by the court qr ID Dy distrfct manager, sec:Uon supervisor, or PPO, The defendant shall meaningfully 
participate in and successfully complete any treatment, counseling or other programs deemed beneflclal and as 
directed by the court or ID.DC district manager, section supervisor, or PPO. J:l:le defendant may be required to 
attend treatment, counseling orother p1t>grams at his own expense. bt"" . 




·-· ; .. 






16. Cooperation with Supervision: When home1 the defendant shall answer the door for the PPO. The • 
defendant shall_ aDcw the PPO 1D enter his residence, other real property, place of employment and vehicle for the 
purpose of visitation, Inspections and other supeJVlslon functions. The defendant shall not possess, install o,r use. 
any monitorlng lnstrume.n\ camera, or other surveillance device to obiaerve or alert them to the PPO's visit The 
defendant shall not keep anyvic:.lous or dangerous dog or other animal on ~bl.his property that the PPO 
perceives as an ilJlpedlme.nt to accas:slng tha defendant or his properly, ...... b_\--..__ 
17. Absconding Supervision: The defendant wiU not leave or attempt to leave the state of Idaho or the assigned 
dlstrlci: in an effort to abscond or flee supervision. The defendant win make himself available for supervl~~anc 
program partic\patlon as lnsbucted by his supeniising PPD and will not ac:tlvely avoid supervision. -~LJ.-...t: __ 
1 a. Court Ordered Finariclaf Obflgations: The defend;;mt shell pay au costs, fees, fines and restitution 111 the 
amount and manner ordered by the court. The defendant shall make payments as ordered by the court or as 
daslgnated ln a payment agreement and promissory not~{o..be completed with the IDOC district manager, section 
supervisor, or PPO and signed by the defendant. k ~ • 
19. Confidential Informant Toe defendant shall not act as a oontidentlal Informant for law enforcernen~~t 
as allowed per !DOC standard operating procedure (SOP) 701.04,02..019, Informants: Confid&ntJal. -=L..__..1:,.__ _  
20. Intrastate. or Interstate V1olations: If allowed to transfer supervision lo another district or state, the 
derendant agrees to ai::cept any violation allegation docurnents purportedly submitted by the agency or offi~ 
superv!si11g the defendant In the receiving distrlct or stata as admissible Into evi~~e as credible and reliable. 
The defendant waives any right to confront the author of such documents. --~ .... r-__ _ 
21. Additional Rules: The defendant agrees that other supervision rules may be imposed depending on the 
distrlt:t or specific disbict office that provides his supervision. M. all times, these addltlonal ru\es,will be lmp~sed 
only after considering the 5uccessful supervision of the defendant and the secure operation of the district _or 
sp~clfic district office. All additional n.iles wm explalnad/o ~efenclant and prow.led to him, In writing, by the 
lDOC district manager, section supeNlsor, o PPO. _ __,_..,.✓"'"'~ \-__ _ 
I have read, or have had read to me, the ab e agreement I unden-tand and accept these condilions of 
supervision. I a e abide by ancl co • lhei;n and undemtand that my failure to do so may rlt In the -~on a "'I> rt of ~olallon Y, oen no\ng aulhorlly. • ~( ) 
Date: 
# 
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I 
C. L. "BUTCH" OTTER 
GOVERNOR 
District Two Additional :B,.ules 
'KBvIN'KEMPP 
Dm.ECTOR 
1. I will ~t go into any ~ establishment without first obtainmgpemrlssion from my 
supervismg officer._Lt=----- . 
2. I will not associate with any person vvho is engaged in. illegal activities, is on probation or parole,, 
or who has been convicted of a f.elony crime, with.out prior authorization otiny superviBing 
officer. l ... E · · · 
3. · I understand my curfew is from 10pm-6am, where I must be at my residence during these times, 
with some exceptions that have already been explain.ed to me. My supervising officer can,..Jllise . 
or lower my curfew, based upon my actions, at my supervising officer's discretion. l~ 
4. I understand th.at if I owe.my PSI fee, and/or if my Cost of Supervision reaches $120, my curfew 
a:utoma:ti.cally reduces to &pm~6am (with exceptions that have already been explained to me.) 
My curfew ~es not revert to its prior time until my Cost of Supervision and/or PSI fee are pai.d 
mfull. L'r · · 
5. I will not 13Jc~lt any loan without first obtaining the permission of my supervising 
officer .. -=-- Lt_. 
6. I will ensure all persons in my presence have valid photo idettti:fication at all fun.es. --=-1----
7. I will ooey all rules of any city or county jail in which I am incarcerated. LJ, 
8. I will not visit any perso~w.any jail or prison with.out first obtaining written pemrlssion from my 
supervismg officer. l/r L,,.,,. 
9. I will fill any prescriptions I receive in the State of Idaho only. \-
I have read1 or have had read to meJ the above agreement. I understand and accept these additional 
rules of supervision. I agree to abide by and canfo:a:n to them and understand that my failure to do 
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COURT MINUTES 
CR-2016-0001591 
--- . - - - - ~-~ ·. .-..... : . - ;- . - - - - .:. . --. - - .. ' . - - - .... -. - . 
State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr 
Hearing type: Status Conference 
Hearing date: 9/9/2016 
Time: 9:12 am 
Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Courtroom: 3 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 3 
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016 
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman 
Defendant present, in custody, with counsel. 
Mr. Cuddihy addresses the Court and Defendant will admit Summary 5 & 6 











Court addresses Defendant re: rights. 
Report of Violation dated 3-1-16 fi1ed in CR13-7217. 
Court Order Condition 13, Summary #5-Defendant admits. 
Agreement of Supervision Condition 17, Summary $6-Defendant admits. 
Court accepts admissions and grants State's motion to withdraw remaining 
Mr. Cuddihy addresses the Court re: disposition. 
Mr. Coleman addresses the Court re: disposition. 
Defendant addresses the Court. 
Court addresses Defendant 
92234 Court reinstates probation, credit for time already served (since 3-4-16 190 







~- -·-. ~---'. - ·. _. :-~ ~-:-·: : .· .. l_ -~ . - : ·-·· .. ·. 1:: .. ·. _ .. ' · .. ,_ ... ·.·--··-·-··,. 
Mr. Cuddihy addresses the Court re: CR16-1591. 
Court releases Defendant on his OR in CR16-1591. 
Court recess. 
158
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No. 4553 P. 1/3 
Richar-d M. Cuddihy, ISB No, 7064 
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC 
312 Seventeenth Street 
Post Office Di-awer 717 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 746-0103 
Fax: (208) 746M0113 
Attorneys for Defendant 
F\ LED 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO~-IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Case No.CR16-1591 
) 
Plaintiff, ) DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE 
v. ) TO STATE'S MOTION 
) FOR RECONSIDERATION 




COMES NOW the defendant, by and through hls attomey, Richard M. Cuddihy and 
objects to the State's Motion for Reconsideration bru:ied upon the following argument. 
ARGUMENT 
Here, the State argues since Mr. Fenton was on probation this Court should apply the 
attenuation doctrine to the illegal seizure as a:rtioulated by the U. S. Supreme Court j_n Utah v. 
Strieff. In Strieffth.e Court found a prewe.xisting arrest warrant for the driYer was ":intervening 
circumstances" sufficient to apply the attenuation doctrine and not suppress the initial illegal 
seizure of the person. The State argues here Mr. Fenton's status as a probationer is akin to a 
person with an arrest warrant. However, being on probation is not the same having !ill arrest 
DEFENDANT'S ll'ESPONSE 
TO STATE'S MO'flON 
:FOR RECONSIDERATION 
:Page 1 of3 
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wanant. A person with. an arrest warrant must be seized. A probationer may only seized upon 
reasonable suspicion. 
While Idaho Court's have applied the "attention doctrine" to illegal seizures of 
defendants with a valid arrest warrant; Idaho Cou1t's have not applied the "attenuation doctrine" 
to illegal seru:ches and/or detentions ofprobati.oners. 
"Relying upon Unltsd States v, Green, 111 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 1997), the 
Supreme Court held that the discovery of an arrest warrant can, In certairi 
circumstances, constitute an intervening circumstance that dissipates the 
taint of an otherwise illegal seizure of a person, Page, 140 Idaho at 846, 103 
P.3d at 459, The Court applled the 11attenuation doctrine," which permits Lise 
of evidence that' would normally be suppressed as fruit of police misconduct if 
the causal chain between the misconduct and the discovery of the evidence 
has been sufficiently attenuated." State v. Bigham, 141 Idaho 732. 734 
(Ida.App. 2005). 
Here. the State also argues that California Courts do not impose a "reasonable suspicion" 
requirement on the ability to search probationers. However~ Idaho Courts have not interpreted 
this issue the same as the California Courts. In State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 233. 657 P.2d 
1095, 1101 (Ct.App.1983), this Court, considering warrantless probation searches, held that a 
probation officer could make a warrantless search if: (1) he has reasonable grounds to believe 
that the probationer has violated some condition of probation, and (2) the search is reasonably 
related to disclosure or confirmation of that violation. The Court also ruled that a search could 
not be based on a mere hunch unsupported by any factual basis." See State v. Prestwich, 112 
Idaho 590 (Ida,App.1987). 
Here~ the officer absent any articulable suspicion illegally detained Mr. Fenton. After 
completing tl1e pm.pose of the stop and issuing a citation, the officer learned from N.fr. Fenton 
about his probationary status. Instead of releasing Mr. Fenton, the officer continued to detain 
Mr. Fenton absent any reasonable suspicion that Mr. Fenton was in violation of his probation or 
DEFENJ>ANT,S RESPONSE 
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. ·~ 
the law. The prolonged detention was absent any reasonable suspicion was also illegal. Both the 
initial detention of Mr. Fenton and expanding the length of the detention were constitutional 
violations. 
Since Idaho Courts have not found a defendant's probation status as an intervening 
circumstance pursuant to the attenuation doctrine concerning an illegal seizure; this Court should 
deny the State's Motion for Reconsideration. 
DATED this 16th day of September, 2016.-
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 161h day of September, I caused a true and con·ect 
copy of the foregoing Response to be: 
[x] faxed 
to the follo,x.ring: 
Nez Perce County Prosecnting Attorney 
PO Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Fax: 208-799•3080 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN· 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal law Division 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Idaho State 8ar#4051 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
NO. 772 P. 2 
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FILED. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR NEZ PERCE COUNlY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
LARRY GLENN FENTON, JR., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) District Court No. CR-2016-1591 
) 
) Supreme Court No. 
) 




) __________ } 
TO: LARRY GLENN · FENTON 1 JR., THE ABOVE-NAMED 
RESPONDENT, MACKENZIE WELCH, KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC, P. 0. 
BOX 717, LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE~ 
ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant, State of Idaho, appeals against the 
above-named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the OPINION AND 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 1 entered in the above~ 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- PAGE 1 
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entitled action on the 17th day of August, 2016, the Honorable Jay P. Gaskill 
presiding. A copy of the judgment or order being appealed is attached to this 
notice, as well as a copy of the final judgment if this is an appeal from an order 
entered after final judgment. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
and the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable 
orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (c)(7), I.AR. 
3. Preliminary statement of the issue on appeal: Whether the district 
court erred when it concluded that a probation search was tainted by a prior stop 
without reasonable suspicion. 
4. To undersigned's knowledge, no part of the record has been 
sealed. 
5. The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of 
the reporter's transcript: 
Hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress held August 4, 2016 
(Nancy Towler court reporter, estimated number of pages unknown). 
6. Appellant requests the normal clerk's record pursuant to Rule 28, 
I.AR. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal is being served on each 
reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the 
address set out below: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- PAGE 2 
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NANCY TOWLER 
P. o. Box 896 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
NO. 772 P. 4 
(b) That arrangements have been made with the Nez Perce 
County Prosecuting Attorney who will be responsible for paying for the reporter's 
transcript; 
(c) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee 
for the preparation of the record because the State of Idaho is the appellant 
(Idaho Code§ 31-3212); 
(d) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal ln 
a criminal case (1.A.R. 23(a)(8)); 
(e) That seivice is being made upon a" parties required to be 
served pursuant to Rule 20, l.A.R. 
DATED thrs 26th day of September, 2016. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - PAGE 3 
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CEBT!FICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 26th day of September, 2016, caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing NO1ICE OF APPEAL to be placed In the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
THE HONORABLE JAY P. GASKILL 
Nez Perce County District Court 
P. 0. Box 896 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
DANIEL SPICKLER 
Nez: Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
P. 0. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
JUSTIN COLEMAN 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney's Office 
P_ 0. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
MACKENZIE WELCH 
KNOWLTON & MILES1 PLLC 
P. 0. Box 717 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
NANCY TOWLER 
P. 0. Box 896 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
HAND DELIVERY 
STEPHEN W. KENYON 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
KKJ/dd 
KENNETH K. JO 
Deputy Attorney 
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lN THE DISTRICT COURT O.F nm SECOND JUDICIAl, :OISTRIC',r. OJJ' Tn:m 
STATE 0:F IDAIIO. J'.~ AND FOR T.IIE: COUNTX OF Nl.CZ XlERClt 
STATE OF ID.A.HO. 
Plainti~ 
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This matter cru;o.e be.fore t1;e Cow:t on the Defendan.t~s Motion to S-uppp~lsS. Th(') 
·•i ~ 
State ofidaho was represented by_ ft~in Coleman, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney fo1 JN"~z 
Perce County. The Defendant wcis; opresented by Mackenzie Welch, ofthc fmn 
Know~to.n & Miles. Evidence was 11 -e.sented to the CoUrt on /4,ugust 4. 2.0 I 6. '11t!'.l Cutn t. 
allowed the parties additio111tl tim~ 1~:, submit bdefu1g. The Court, beh>.g folly a~L vb~d ,.r1 . 
'• 
the matter. hereby renders its deic'i.ei: ,u. 
t • ' -.t 
•l 
,· 1 
OPINION AND OR'DER ON DEFBNDAl .'.r'S 
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FA~'.1 AND :fllOCEEDlNGS 
On February 28) 2016. O~ey Nick Eyfar of the Lewi~ton Po Hoo J)cpru. b:un.ut wrui 
- .; -a, 
on patrol ·when be saw a red/mar~ori GMC Yukon that he recogui,;cd from preyfous 
-· ., 
narcotic aotlvity. Officer Eylar obw.rved the Yukon enter the pDOOllg lo·c of A&:e r:ood:-i, 
' ~ •. . .. ,. 
~ - ... 
and then 'Wl'.le.n the vehicle left th~·pmcing lot fu~ was a ·white G.raud Prix fol/.o•wi1ig it• 
• I . 
out of the pm-king lot. Officer Eyi~ testified tb& :in his experionCf:l drug ac;rlv.\1Y. 'Y.!~ 
• t? "'.: • 
~~ C 
coDJ!D.o.n at the A&B Foods psrki;?&: lot. 
~1 t 
Officer Eylar foll~ fhei·~hiclcis as they traveled .souJ.h. o.u at11 Street a.ud lbcn 
. r ~ 
west on South.way. 'l'ID.til the ~eb:ltt~~ botli e~rtered into the Zi_p Trl'p gas itotlon, Tho 
'.r•., 
Yuk;on parlc.ed in a parking stop ai-4ie gas station auct tha Ota!'J.d l?ti.."C ]Jatlced at (he goi:i 
I I r ~ 
pumps. Officer Bylar also pal'kec1.i$,. a pal'ldng spot ru:idl\e was met thc-.re by 0fik.cr 
I• ,, 
Stormes. The ofllcel'S discussed. -tji~v'ehfoles and .thl!lll Officer Stonnos left the gDs .sto.lfoo 
I· • . 
pm:king lot, Shortly thereafter~ th~ {~liite Grand Prix left the.1nu:ldn_g lot and 01:aci:/?yh~r. 
·, :\ 
contacted Officer Stonues by radi/p io mfonu. l>im, OfficElr Eylar stayed aml co!rl-inuerl 1.o 
). \ 
') ;-
obs~e the Yul<:on, ,f! i 
}. i I • 1 ,, 
Officer. Stormes testified t}ia~ a:fte1· he was :informed the white Grand Pd:R; le.ft tlte. 
,I·• 
gas sta:tio~1, h.e o bsened the car d41!ng north tin Snalce River A veuue, Officer Sto1mes 
:, i~ 
estimated. hB was about l 00 yard~ <j' ~ 0 oar l~1gths, awa.y fr~m the white Graud .Pxix 
-when he contacted dispatch to ~c~ the license numb et of tltc car to ~ee jf tbe 
' ... 
... •l 
registration was cUJ:rent Officer St~nnes first reported to dispatch a 1ke.llsc 1l!l1:UJ)0t 
~ ,~ • I 
\ . 
•tida', l 8028, whioh dispatch xetuzpt:I as record not ;fo~cl. Officer Storcn'l"-s tl\~11 .aol(~(.( 
t ~, I • 
dispat~h t~ ruu the same ylaten~brt, 'but ch~gethelast nt.UI1.'bert9 the letter "'D~'. -~·J.-1.hi 
- , •i 1-- .. 
number also 1-etumed as record not fouud, 
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Offl.oer StOIInes cau.ghtlij{'\1/Uil the white Grand Prix and tbe intcrscctJ.011 uf 
I 
Snake Rlver Ave;Que and the Prof_r;ot Grade. He decided to inltlato a h;affi.c slC)j) Ul oxdor 
. . 
to investigate the whether the car. c~gist:1:ai.fon "?.ias tip to date. Offioer SLommi u\:for.1:1..,cd 
dispatch he was making the stop ::IJ:l,i he repeated tbe plate numb01: for a third time, l.l ds 
-time stating '~ora.i• 18028. Dispatbh did not rosp011cl on thfa plate numbc1· ucforo 
Stotm.es initiated the 1raffio stop. Later in the day~ well ru?ter tb.c SI.op wn.s r.o;m.1Jlotcd, 
~ 
stonnes found out that cli.s-patch cue get a rettl[l). on the third plate P,\UJ.Ab0i\ whk-1, tVEW {J)e I • 
correct plate num.be.r. 
. , ... 
Offioex- Sto.unes contacte( ·(ie driver ofthe wWte Gmml Pri~ who jdcn(illcu ,, 
himself as Lany Fenton,, Jr. Fen~·~J.i? provided Officer S·tonnes 1,;ry_Lh tl.10 J:ogb(nthm 
info1matioll. for the car and Officxi~s-to1mes was .able to verify tha.t the v-chlolo w«s 
11 f'.: . ·:; 
currently register~d} thus, fue rei,~i~ation ooncems were taken care of. Officer Stom\es 
.. 
also found out tha~ Fenton did not l.~ave a cu:p;oo;t driver's license o( proof of fasurnnc,c, so 
, 
Officer Sto;anes decided to wn,te ... d!ations foK tb.ese two violq.r:ious. 
! . .. 
Officer Stotm.es i-etw.ued tJthe vehicle io 'issue the citations to the dd.vcr: .H0 
I • 
.. , ~ 
handed the fu.'st oitatio;o. to Fent611, 1.nd at t~la.t time, Fenton infonn.ed hiw. tliat he w~s 'on 
' . 
• I • 
probation. StoII!les asked Ferxtox~ ~~e name of iho probntiou o:ffi.oer, ao.d \Yb.~.P. ~ ~0J'W03 
I,.. ~· \: . 
heard the name, he was able to d:;r,jm. that Fenton '-VR.S on folony pxobatiou. B::isc<l (JI! 
. ' 
this h;i.fonnation, Officer Stoun.~ 4,jd not issue th.e seoo.ucl citafioTI,, but i11stoad returned to 
t t""; ~ . 
his patrol car and contacted the lf1fatio11 office. Officer Storm.cs oipla.lnect to lhe 
;probation officer that he had S'toP,p~d Fenton for a traffJ.c ii.ur~ction nnd 3}3o t r.ifoycd lo the 
. ' ·. 
probation 0£6.oer the observations ~pfficer Eylar ha.cl. ~ade of the two ""obfolos vt ~&D 
.. 
.: ,"f 
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. '· r: ,. 
T.b.B probation offic~r st.a.trt,d. to Officer Storm~ that sb.c would ~~omo to Lho .~tr)p 
.~ li 
a:ud search tb.e vehlclo based upofi.' ti>.e lnfonnation Stormes boo p1'oV1clcd. Oft.k.oJ: ... 
.,. ti 
Sto.tme,s :tetumed to the Grand PrL:.CDmd gave Fenton the second citntion; ,b.c;, h) rormed 
Fenton that tho probatioii o.ffioer WPS co.ming Co the stop and tlmt she wnutc<l l1i1.,1 tr., ol;soJ. 
by, Tr, ttt 24. Officer Stormes tum~~d the: ovediead. lights off on. bis 1>atro1 vchfolH OJ!d 
I 
stayed near Fenton'S vehicle with h~s partner until the probatiou of.£ioo,; all:.iyc(I on r;cn1lo 
.. 1: 
approximately ten minutes late-r, ?:~oer Stonn,es testified 'lhnt Ile <lid no1 h1.fom \ 1•'011:to, 1 
. ..~. 
that he was :free to leave; ho\yeV-ei.r: dtonnes believed Fen:to1J. was free to leu ve bcc~u:ic if 
·: J 
Fenton chose to lea1,•e there wasn•~,: i;IJY1:hing Stonnes cou.ld ha"?o done lo stop b.lut 
I'° 
because the trafffo stop was ooncl:ic;ad. Tr, a.t 24, . ,. 
,. •.: ' 
When tb.e probatlon offio~ ~(mved she asked FentoJ~ to step out of rho vehicle nnd. 
he was handou:ffed for officer safe~ r~asons. Officer. Stozv.1es assfatou the prnb~.tio.n 
offioar with the search ofthe vehlpl~• Durlng fue search nwtb.ai.1wheta.i:tti.ne wa~ locutctl 
< 
in the vehicle. ,, ~ 
,. ., 
,. f ANALYSIS . 
~ ,. I 
. . . ~ 
'i ~· . . 
The Derendant B.Ss!:!rts he t,,i,is illegally stopped: searclle.d, and seized because ·1hc 
.. ·' 
faots available to· Officer StoTinei~t'the time he datained him did not give dsc to fl 
' . 
~. ·~·. • • 
reasm:iable suspicion that ori.ntlnaf.:9i~vity was afoot. Tho f outt1l t-, . memlment to the .r I 
' :I 
United States Constitutlo:u protec\S f;itlzens against um.eas,:11able soo.rcll anc! no~rc. tJ.S, 
I 
CONST. amend. N. Evidence ob~~~d in violation oftbis amcucTm~JJt gene.rally lt;\ay nol 
be used as evidence against the vi?~;m. ofan illegal gov~rnru~u:L a.cl.ion. St(tle v. Pl'lgfl, 
l . 
140 Idaho 841,846,103 P.3d4S4: 459 (2004); .. ~ee. also Wor1g&m 1). UtdttdSt,rte,\~'}_'lI 
. {· 
U,S. 47li 485, 83 S-Ct. 407,416. ~ i.Ed.2d 4411 453.(1,963). wW.ben a. d.cfrni.hml, mpyc!I . . y A • • •••. 
I ,. • 
•• t I 
l1 ~ 
',' 
OPINION A.."t-ID ORDER ON DEFEND~~T'B 
MOT.ION TO SUPPRESS '! ~: 4 ., . 
... 
;.; 






































to ~x.c1ude avidence on the groun.d.s'jfuatit was obtained fa1 viola.tio11 of tile Founh ·· 
,. it p ,i . • 
Amendment;.~ govem.ment cau$"e~the burden. ofprovj11g tbatthe seurch oJ scizurn Ji.>. ,, : 
q,uestio.u was reasonable." Stai-e't; $tishoP> 146 Id:al10 804,. 811,203 P.3d 1203~ 
• '\ I 
t, • . 
12io (2009); aiting State v. Ande~!t'f'I, 1401daho 484, 486~ 95 J! .3tl 635} 637 (2.004). 
Brief iuvestigatory detentions m.utth>e reaso.nable uuder the .Foutth Al.ucmlmen·t, See 
• {r 
Terry v. Oh.to, 392 U.S.1> 19. 88 s .. ?t. 1868, 18781 20 LJ?:d,2d. 889l 904 (1'.)Ci8). 
The issue fo this case is wh~~er Offioe:r S to:o:o.es had 1-eiumnab:le1 i,i:licnli.lJlle . . { 
suspic:i.onto stop the De:fendaofs_vfbicle based 1lp0ll wf'orn:raUon he .rccoiV•rJ £rom 
I !1 
dispatch -after he pl'ov:ided the in_cc~rtct license number to be ch0ckcd,. 'n)c ~; tnlo 
~ 
contends that Officer Stormes ha(tiasouable articulable suspicion Lhal, n l.rnffk vfolalitin 
:1 ( 
had oocurred or that ha needed to ~,;restiga.te :fiutl101• regarding the potoo.tlal rogfotrnH01.1 ..... . . , 
violation, Specifically, the State c.'-o~;teutls that at the time tb.~ stop was con<llJl:ted, tbe 
~= s ,. 
officer had :reasonable a.rticulal,le ~ifl)ioio11 to :mpport fui:> stop . 
. . 
The Defendan.trelies ouse°cd;e Y. J.1organg 154 Idaho 109,294 P .3d.J.l21 (201:l) t(.} 
assert that the,:0 \v.as not :rea.sonab~e §uspioion iu this casa. 1.u Mot·gan1 the o,fficor atomlc:d 
a vehicle driving without a front lip~nse plate, whicb. would be illegal if the yc-biolo wr.1.s 
:· 
registered inlruilio pursmmtto l.C, 149·428; Id.at 111,294 P.3d at 1123. T.his . ., ~ 
.. 
roquii:ement does not extend to ve{-li:?fos tegistered in othor .si.11.te,s~ wltich wus roc ... ,.gu{zetl 
' ...
by tlie office;r durlng cross-exanili}mio:u. Id. at 112~ 294 P .3d nt 117A, The o:fllcor had 
:~ ~ 
afao testified that it appeared the trlyer was eithe;r very lost or ·try.b:i.g to avoid hh:u. Th0 
~ l i 




The police o:ffioer1s suspicio;). of Morgan. was based primarily on 'II scricB 
of:fbur loft..h~d toms that'11organ made. Al:though tl1e ot:G.oor :ii.a led lh..1.t 
' .. 
; 
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he belie,1ed Morgan.may ~~e beb11 'tl.)'ingto aYoidb.i.ul,. the of.(icer 
·provided no .tactual justi;fi,P.~Ji;,n for that belief. Abse.nt other 
circumstances, chiving ar~~d the bloolc o.n a Fliday night does not l'fa;e 10 
the level of specifio, arlic1r,!f 1e fnot;J that justify ru1 :i:o.vesti¢ory st<ip . 
.. ' 
. ' ,, 
' ., ,. 
The case at hand lS s:imila:r 'tp }/[organ where the police officer bellC:\'Ved 1.h0l'C \:\Yns 
i~ : • 
a vl,olatio~ but then learned later fh~t there was not In 1he case Ett l1nud1 the oftJce.t· 
: ( ,. 
checked tb.e vehicle registration mf&mia.tion and co.ufln11ed the cal' WJ.S' fawfL\lly 
'• ,r • I 
registered. T.be State contends ~t ·(l police offioe{s re.;"UJonn.blol good-foitli. misJ.aJm d<>ci1 
~~ ':. 
' .· 
not violate. a person• s Fourth Am~~{-ttnent rights. 11.ei.en ,,_ North Cm-oUna, '135 S. Ct. 
5301 190 L. Ed, 2d 475 (2014). 'j ~-
i i: 
As the text iuclioates and "i¥e JPave repeatedly o.ff.1.rm.ed, ''tbo l\ltir1JAte 
touch5tone of tbe Fourth Afll;~dme11t is 'reason~\bJ.eness.' " Riley v. 
California, 573 U.S.-;-'-. 134 S.Ct, 2473, 2Lf 82, 189 L.Ed.Zd. 43 O 
{2014) (some :ln.temal quotat'lon marks omitted), To b6) xoaso.uablo fa not 1.0 
be pe.tfect) and so the Foll:(1:h~ Amendment allows for some mfatokes on lb.e 
part of government o:fflciat:3;, giving them. "'fair leeway for enforcing 01e 
lawm the oonununi:ty' s prot';:,ctioJl," Brinegar v. United States, 33 8 U.S. 
160~ 176, 69 S.C~ 1302~ 93 ~.,.Ed. 1879 (1949), We have rccogrliz.od tbnt 
.searches and sai:zw;e.s baseg. ~mmiet.alces offaot can bercasonabfo. The 
wm:a.o.tless seaioh of a hom~\ for fostauce, is reasonable if un.dcrL,tl<:e,n. 
with the conse11t of arel3id~E~ and remains lawful whQ~ offi:ers_ obt~\to. ·1JJ,c 
1 consen.t of someone who rmir.o;nably appem"S to be but 19 not LU fa1Jt o. 
resident. See llltn.ois v. Ro;!rr;~uez-1 497 U.S.177, 183-186, 110 .~.Ct. 
2793, l U L.Ed.2d 148 (l~~>). By the same token. if officers wil.h 
probable cause to a.nest a ~u~pect n:tlsfokouly arrest 011 individual matchiDg 
. the suspect' s description} ~-ef~hor fll,e seizure nor au aooompanyi:n1, s<?rarch 
ofthe anestee would be1ll!:.l;rful. SeeHillv. Califomta, 401 U.S. 797, 
802-805, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 2~ i~Bd.2d 484 (1971). The lwri:t is tl\at •lthf) 
;mistakes must be those of J·C1".1sQ{l.a.ble men," JJrtnega.r, supra, at 176. G9 
s,Ct. 1302: ·. :t 
Id. at 536, 
. t 
I ,. . ,, .. ~ 
•1 ·, 
In the caSfl- at hand, this CqP:itmus~ decide wlletb.er·1~e n;t.i.1::tflkq o.f foot iuai.le l\Y 
'the offi.cel' or .dfopatch iu the ~l~,lµ:r.ssion of the Hoe.use plate nmnbcr Wf.W olti C (; ti V•)ly 
reasonable, and fuus, whether the ~~take of.fact will opei:a:L~ to fc:n:givo m: vnHd~~l.t~ l-4.0 
OPINION AND ORDllR ON P:Bl?:SND}~•s 
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Fourth Amendment --·iolatlon. l\{f ~e of fact fill~ mistake l.'lf law WOTTi cJfa,:u[;scd j11 ,~/, 1r11 
v, Horton> 150 Idaho 300~ 303~ 24'6~P.3d 6731 676 (Ct. A.pp. 20JO). 
The parties, in essence) dw~ee "Yhcther. the offioer1$ n:ustako .hoi:e wn~: 
one of :fact or law. Bnd fu1f·Iib.e betweeu. the tv,ro is not ahva.ys easy lo 
d,:aw. For instance, in McCarthy, 133 Idaho Bt.124-25. 982 P .2.<l al .95 'J -
60, an offi.ce.t stopped a vE;bk.Je fot speeding btrt was mh:lnkon r.oncor11.1n.11, 
thelooatio:t1. of a sign where/the speed lhnit dcctea.sed from 3:5 m.pll t•.i 25. 
m.ph. The .state asseited th. . ·t',:.hc x:o.istalcc was one of ~tci· (1he .!iign's 
location) .BD.d we. oited Un{te\.-1. States Supremo Court precedent to t.hc 1):Cfcct 
that a mistake of fact wlll 'to::netimes operate to fotglve or y01idrth} a 
Fo1.1rth .~en.dme.ut 'Violaf::u.i.. Howevel', we did not blindly acc(lpt lhe 
state1~ characterization ofb{· office11s mistake as one of fact ~.3 tlto 
applicabla speed limit is c1~ii)inly a question ofla.w, \Ve J.].Oted n split of 
authority from other jurlscJ>!c:tons as to whether a mistake o;f lnw co.u cvet 
be held to be reasonable ~i:d~:further noted that the issue itl Idalw i:va;s-
uudeoided, See, G,g., Unite,d,;'itates v. King, 244 F.3d 736~ 737•--4). (9Ut 
C:ir.2001) (officer,s mistake ~flaw, although ,reasom,olc,. c-annotfonr1 l:i1.1n1,;1 
for reasonable suspicio;r,,. to i,,ntiate traffic stop); United Str;t.tes v, TwJffoy, 
· 222 F.3d 1092, 1096 n, 1 (9th Cir.2000) (of"fioe:r's i:.ou.ect u.11d.t)rstilUdiltg of 
tho Jaw1 togather with. a gopJj-faitb. e,:tor regarding 'tb.e faotsi cau ostab.lbl t 
reasonable suspicion) (als(, 1Jting McC«rthy, sup1'a ); compare People v, · 
Glick, 203 Cru.App.3d 799; ,f50 Cal.Rptr. 3151 318 (1988) (inist:1]1:e of fact 
and law treated the same) ~ People 11. Whfte, 107 Cal.App.4th 6361 132 
Cal.Rptr.2d 371, 376-77 (l,.0.~3) ( distinguishi.ng and disag1:coing wi1l1 
Gliclcrationale), See dl.so t)r4fe v. Yor,mgi 144 Il!aho 646) 649 ~ 1, 167 
)?,3d 783, 786n.1 (Ct-Api.iJ..D06);Statey, Schmadek~ 136.Idaho 595,599 
u. 3, 38 .P.3d 633} 637 n, 3J1;t.App.2001). UltiIDaa:toly~ iP.J..[cCcirthy wo 
held that the two types of ~µ,.:;takes were ''hle.,:IJ:ica.bly co.o.uecCe<l/' b1.1l 
i found ft wmeoessru:y to de~~F.~-e whether a mistake of law is um·ensonuble 
· per se booa-use1 -were that ~~'l~oonect cl1aractorization of the ml.stake, we 
. concluded that the off].cer\.:Ifj:lstake was not objectively reasonable:. 
ll~cCarthy, 133 Idaho at i~:.S~i982 P.2d at 960. 
Jd. at 303~ 246 P .3d at 676. 
" I ".r,, 
: ·1 
In tbi.s matter., Oflicer-Stor411,\~ candidly testified that ho wa~ a s:iguificarJ.l distimoo 
• ~t ~ I 
· fron1 the mrr when he fb;st react th~. tnse plate nmnbcr to d13.{latcl.t. It is clo..11· ho w,1s 110 t 
certain regarding the l:iumbers h~ ~~~ off ln his seoo,,d co~lunttn.ic;;tr_ion \.Vi!:l~ dfa;a:tch., 
whete he suggested the Jastnuinb!r!.nay be the lettor •tB'' 111.thcr th;;iu 'llle Ul.tr.tlbcr ui:;;,, 
- ,'J !Ji 
•, i . 
Officer Stormes 'provided disoatcFh~lfu a. license n.umber. three; tiW'-:lS uascd. urw.11 · lbo 
f" ..,.r -~ 
't. ll 
.:, ,I ... 
I • 
O.FINION AND ORDER ON DEr.ENDJ.!J-i'.,I''S 













! ·. I 
















~sv·26 201~ 4~27;~10.A11v GEN~;;-IV~I!.. -Wl~~l i 
AUG, 17. 20!6 11:09AM D, 1UCT COUR~ . N0.11\93 P. p, ~i 1,. 
-~ ;l:,- • • . t: :: 
, 'f :: 
~; . . :-: 
uncerlolnty oftb.e plate nl1nlboc. -~:6:>n>, based 1,pon tba facts 0£0~• ~,;c, tl:i" '~"' 1 
j. ~l . j' 
cannot :find the officer'~ mistake ~,r obJ<,ctively reasonable, ancl thus1 croat1:d a. ,! .: 
. ' ~ ~ 
reaso.uable, B.rt:iculablo b.isis for *'~affic stop. · 
. ¼ ~· . . 
.. Asimilm- issue was addre,~dmtlie state ofWashmgt.o.n. fa State.,,. C/'{Jt:ill l 70 
' D' 
Wash.App. 534i 319 P.3d 80 (201L~~ In. this case, a11 officer J:ao, the, clcfe.ndl:lllt1s IioCJ1Gt'l 
plate .nuuibe:r as part of a routine 9h~k during his nigb.tH.u.,e p-nkol. The ofJ-inct 
•• i'.· . • 
erron~ously entered the n.umheZ' ~ {1s4 Yl\dK'> instead of the a.cr.m,l aum bar-~l 5,f-, r . 
I. £: .' 
YDK'p- The incorrect np.m,bei- ret\~.E>Cl that the oar was stoleu m:ttl the office.r iniJ.fo.fot1 a -~ .. 
~ ~" 
tni.ffic stop on this basis, Id. at 53Jfps 8, 319 P .3d at 81. 
~~ j 
Extendfug Snapp Gii.}he facts presented hore would ehwato tuc 
innocence or culpability o}f t)l officer over tb~ real conccm of nri:1cfo I. 
sectlon 7: the right of citizfri;s fo be protected .from mrwa.r1'l'l.nted. l ll. va.:iioor: 
and .inirllBions . .As our Sum-e.'m.e Court explained in Day, "'[w]i:, st1:ppr.cs!l 
[unlawfully seized] eyid~c~_not to punish tile police7 w/11; 1mv1 ~erst!:;,· /un-•e 
erred inno~e11t!y. We supp;tJ~s unlawfully- seized evidence bocauso we do 
not want to become knovr.ib.tiy OOU'>.plicit m. &n un.constcl.utional e~excise <;}f 
power. See genera/Jy Olmsttad v. United Stc1t«s, 277 U.S. tl,38! 484-85> irn 
S.CL 564~ 72L.Erl. 944 (1~1~) (B;candeis, J., dissenting)/> 161 Wasb,2.d at 
894, 168 F.3d 1265 (emplias,ts added) .. · . 
T.hls means that \v'Jillh polioe may som~im.es 1·eas.on11hfy rely on 
inconect info:r.matlon provj_~ by third parties~ tb,ey :w,ay 11ot ra,uo,wbly 
; rely on their o\'>r'llmistake.n;~jsessment ofn:ta.terfol ;facts. See, e.g., !>"fate v. 
1 Mance, 82 Wash.App_ 539, [?18 P.2d527 (199'6) (holding thatpoliocmny 
: not tE)ly upon infonnationx~it is inco:crect or incomplete th.1·ouglt U1oir 
fault); Stat(j ,,. O-Cain. 10f1Wagh,App, 54Z. 31 P,9d 733 (2001) (ltolt.JiJJg· 
lhat a poliol!l dispatch indlc;.a4n_g vehlole driven by defendant had ueon -
reported stolen did not p.co~~;te reasonablo suspicion for in-.restigatory 
stop); Str.t.r.e-v. S@clholrn1 ~;$,~ash.App. 846,848,980 P.2d 1292 (1999) 
(noting that !<exclusive reUa,tce on the WA CIC stolen vpbioJc repmt Vfl)U]d 
not have provided su.fflojei~ttoa5is forthe State t.o establis.h prollabfo cawJc 
to an-est''); cf State v. Gczaklf, 152 Wash..zd 641 71,741 93 l1.3d. 872 (2004) 
(disun.guishing officers' ri/~l to rely on erro.uaous lloense :luforw.n.tfoJJ. 
from Dc;plilrf:ment of Licensii,ig~ which is not a _police age.o.cy a.ucl w].,1o~{c 
:in.formation is presi.µz1ptivel}'. reliable. from informa.tion.Buhjec1 to (he} 
''fellow of.fleer mW'). :: ~ 
' } 
. ~ ~ 
id. at542'--43, 319 P,3d at 83-84,; ~; 
·.: 
' 1' r{ 
• j• 
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' ii . 
While-this Court~ not bo~d by the d~tcrmination.iu Craed~ it is il1.sl.n1divc ,;,_,_ 
. ~ . . . ' 
the. 09:3e at fomd. In. this case, ~c,~:r Stonnes testified he proYi.dcd 'I.ho i1ioo1It.r,t .Uc.cm(!) 
1~ . 
nurnher to dfapatch. Officer Storfu.1,\ 'distance. from the Dcfe;odDnt' i!l vch:ick> :m.-.1:1 lli'l'vo 
been a factor in thls error. It is cllJ ill this cast'! that ofuor tban 1·bo c1;,~;::·J.·c;gnrrl in 1; -~he 
' . t~ ~ 0 
lioe.nse plate number, the Defeudijwas dri1'ing hi a. lawf1.1l 01w.nei-. 'l'l,\o officer did not 
i~ 
o_bs~rvi: an.y other traffic .iJ.lfracti~~ Fui:fuer. Officer Eylru.-~s ob.sarvotloll:.J ofthe vc-lJiclc · 
,r. i• 
at 1:b.e groce_zy store and gas stanoff 'laiso cud not give r.:\s~ to a reaso.na,ble r;us j}~don ·1:0 
. . :, 
conduct a t.rafiio .stop. fu tl.J.is case, fhe Ollly olaho of rcaw:uablo orlicufate susp1don hi 
. ' /. . 
~ ~i 
based upon the officer).s iucorrectftita:tion of the lAce11so plate nmnbox, _ Tlli1J, ·wil.hottt 
more. is not a su.fiicie.ut basis for t1-1i lraffio stop. The.r.cfore0 ·th El Defcr,dwJt~ is mo tiou. -to 
;.; f; • I 
)"_t -r-: 
suppress is granted. i:. i 
,, .!-. !l ~;s 
1! ~ONCLU5'ION 
t~ 
Based upon the foregoingk:a.lysis, th1:> dcl"e:uda.llt1s mofio.n to :.mrni,.-e.;s j_:i e.rmn>:.1L 
~ i OR'Dl!r.(l . 
. ff ~ 
f (. 
The Defendant's Motion t~ ju_ppress is hereby GRA.NTE.D. 
1 • •• . " 
IT.IS SO ORDERED. .= :. 
~: ~ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 











CASE NO. CR 2016~1591 
OPINION AND ORDER ON 
STATE'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
1bis matter came before the Court on the State's Motion to Reconsider this 
Court's order granting the Defendant's motion to suppress, filed, August 17, 2016. The 
State of Idaho was represented by Justin Coleman, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Nez 
Perce County. The Defendant was represented by Mackenzie Welch, of the firm 
Knowlton & Miles. The matter was submitted to the Court on the briefs filed by the 
parties. The Court, being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
The facts of this case are set forth in detail in the suppression order, and thus, will 
not be repeated here. The motion to suppress was granted because the officer did not 
have reasonable, articulable suspicion that a traffic infraction had occurred, beyond the 
officer's error in reciting the license plate number to dispatch. 
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The State asks this Court to reconsider the ruling based upon the attenuation 
doctrine. The State relies on a recent United States Supreme Court case, Utah v. Strieff, 
136 S. Ct. 2056, 195 L. Ed. 2d 400 (2016) in support of the argument that evidence from 
the search should have been allowed even in the face of an impermissible stop. In this 
case, the Court considered how the attenuation doctrine applies where an unconstitutional 
detention leads to the discovery of a valid arrest warrant. Id. at 2060. 1 
In Utah v. Streiff, law enforcement received an anonymous tip that reported drug 
activity at a particular residence. Law enforcement began intermittent surveillance of the 
residence, and the officer noted visitors who left a few minutes after arriving at the house. 
Streiff visited the house in this manner, so an officer followed him as he left the house 
and detained him at a convenience store parking lot. As pait of the stop, the officer 
relayed Strieft' s information to dispatch, who informed the officer he had an outstanding 
warrant. Strieff was arrested pursuant to the warrant, and in a search incident to arrest, 
methamphetamine was found on bis person. Id. at 2059-2060. 
The Court considered three factors regarding the attenuation doctrine: first the 
temporal proximity between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence; 
second the presence of intervening circumstances, and third, the purpose and flagrancy of 
1Toe Court noted there was a difference in application of the attenuation doctrine: 
We granted certiorari to resolve disagreement about how the attenuation doctrine applies 
where an unconstitutional detention leads to the discovery of a valid arrest warrant. 576 
U.S.--, 136 S.Ct. 27, 192 L.Ed.2d 997 (2015). Compare, e.g., United States v. Green, 
111 F.3d 515, 522-523 (C.A.7 1997) (holding that discovery of the warrant is a 
dispositive intervening circumstance where police misconduct was not flagrant), with, 
e.g., State v. Moralez, 297 Kan. 397,415,300 P.3d 1090, 1102 (2013) (assigning little 
significance to the discovery of the warrant). 
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060, 195 L. Ed. 2d400 (2016). 
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the official misconduct. Id. 2061-2062. The Idaho Supreme Court set forth these same 
factors in State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454 (2004). 
Generally, evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search may not 
be used against the victim of the search. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471,485, 83 S.Ct. 407,416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441,453 (1963). To 
determine whether to suppress evidence as "fruit of the poisonous tree," 
the coUit must inquire whether the evidence has been recovered as a result 
of the exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Green, 111 F.3d at 520. 
The attenuation doctrine-whether the causal chain has been sufficiently 
attenuated to dissipate the taint of the unlawful conduct-has been used to 
support the admission of evidence, including for example, voluntary 
confessions obtained after unlawful arrests. Id. at 522 (citing Brown v. 
lllinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)). There are 
three factors for a court to consider when determining whether unlawful 
conduct has been adequately attenuated. Id at 521 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. 
at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62, 45 L.Ed.2d at 426--427). The factors are: 
(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the 
evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the 
flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action. Id 
Id. at 846, 103 P.3d at 459. In Page, an officer discovered an outstanding warrant for the 
defendant after unlawfully detaining him. The Court determine the discovery of the 
outstanding warrant was an intervening circumstance that allowed the officer to continue 
to detain and eventually arrest and search the defendant. Id. at 846-84 7, 267 P .3d at 
1284-1285. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals considered the attenuation doctrine in State v. 
Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 267 P.3d 1278 (Ct. App. 2011). In this case, officers observed a 
vehicle in an usual location with respect to nearby homes. The officer approached the 
vehicle on foot and noted a sleeping bag covering the rear window. The officer could see 
Liechty sitting in the driver's seat, with something in bis hand. The officer was able to 
observe this even though there was a shade on the passenger side window he was looking 
through. Liechty leaned over to the passenger window to remove the shade, and at that 
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moment the officer opened the passenger door to make sure Liechty did not have a 
weapon in his hand. Standing in the open passenger doorway, the officer asked Liechty 
what he was doing, and if he had weapons. Liechty responded there was a kitchen knife 
under the backseat and the officer ordered him out of the vehicle and handcuffed him. 
The knife was located, Liechty was charged with possession of a concealed weapon. 
Methamphetamine was found when the car was searched. Id. at 165-166, 267 P.3d at 
1280-1281. 
The Court of Appeals considered the attenuation doctrine and found it was not 
applicable to the case. 
The state concedes that the time between the seizure and the discovery of 
methamphetamine was short. Regarding the second factor, the state asserts 
that the officer did not learn about the methamphetamine based on his 
seizure of Liechty. Rather, the state argues, Liechty1s clothing and the 
presence of women's underwear and binoculars in the vehicle, coupled 
with the officer's routine questions, were intervening circumstances that 
resulted in the discovery of the methamphetamine. Liechty1s seizure 
occurred from the moment that the officer opened the door, stood in the 
open passenger doorway, and began questioning Liechty. Liechty1s arrest 
led to the discovery of the methamphetamine, and his arrest was the direct 
result of questions posed by the officer while standing in the open 
passenger doorway. Liechty1s admission that there was a weapon in the 
vehicle was not the product of some other intervening circumstance, nor 
was there an arrest or search warrant that would have allowed for the 
search of Liechty's vehicle despite the officer's conduct. While we 
acknowledge that the officer did not appear to act flagrantly or with an 
improper purpose, we cannot conclude that the attenuation doctrine 
applies here. 
Id. at 170, 267 P .3d at 1285. 
In the case before this Court, the Defendant was stopped based upon the officer's 
error in stating his license plate number. There were no other factors which supported the 
traffic stop. After the officer confirmed the vehicle was registered, he issued citations 
because the Defendant did not have a current driver's license or insurance. When issuing 
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the citations, the officer learned the Defendant was on probation, so the officer held back 
one citation, and returned to his patrol car to contact the probation officer. Based upon 
that communication, the probation officer asked the officer to infonn the Defendant that 
she was coming to search the vehicle. The officer issued the second citation and 
infonned the Defendant that the probation officer was on the way. Once the probation 
officer arrived, the vehicle was searched and drugs were found. 
The State asks the Court to consider the Defendant's status as a probationer as 
akin to a person with an outstanding search warrant. This Court declines to do so. While 
a probationer may have agreed to a diminished expectation of privacy in exchange for 
being placed on probation, this is not equivalent to an active search warrant, which 
authorized the immediate arrest of an individual. The Court finds the case at hand 
distinguishable from Utah v. Strieff and State v. Page. The matter is similar to State v. 
Liechty. In this case, but for the officer's error, the Defendant's vehicle would not have 
been stopped, and the probation office would not have been contacted-thus a search 
would not have occurred. Therefore, the State's motion for reconsideration is denied. 
ORDER 
The State's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this..3) T"-day of September 2016. 
JAYP. GA 
OPINION AND ORDER ON STATE'S 





CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER ON 
STATE'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER was: 
✓FAXED,or 
___ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this 3it,... 
day of September, 2016, to: 
Mackenzie Welch 
Fax: (208) 746-0118 
Justin Coleman 
Fax: (208) 799-3080 
Deputy 
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STATE OF IDAHO~ 
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Case No. CR 16-1591 
MOTION TO APPOINT STATE 
APPELLATE~UBLICDEFENDER 
COMES NOW, the above-na,ed Defendant. by and through his Attorney of record, 
Richard M. Cuddihy, and hereby moves the Court to appoint the Office of the State Appellate 
Public Defender to represent the above named Defendant in his pending appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court/Court of Appeals, as the Defendant has been declared indigent and is currently 
represented by the public defenders office. This Motion is based on the records and files of this 
case. 
·-1· l-, 
DATED this __1_ day of October, 2016. 
MOTION TO APPOINT STATE 
APPELLATEPUBLICDErENPRR 
Richa:rd M. Cnddiby 
Pnge l ofl 
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qct. 7. 20'!6 4:08PM No. 4908 P. 2/2 
CERTIFlCATE OF DELIVERY 
~~ . 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this.1_ day of October. 2016, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Appoint State Appellate Pnblic Defender to be: 
[X] Faxed to: 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor 
P .0. Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Fax: 208-799-3080 
[X] Mailed to: 
State Appellate Public Defende:,; 
3647 N Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703-6914 
.Attorney General 
Post Office Box 83720 · 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Larry G. Fenton, Jr. 
RISINGSUN 
322 AdalD.s Lane 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Case No. CR 16-1591 
ORDER APPOINTING STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
After reviewing the records and files herein and after considering the Motion to Appoint 
State Appellate Public Defender and being fully advised in the premises. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender is 
appointed to represent the above named Defendant in the pending appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court/Court of Appeals. 
IT IF FURTHER ORDERED that Richard Cuddihy of Knowlton & Miles, PLLC, shall 
continue to represent the above-named in all other aspects of this case, subject to the further order 
of this court. 
'1111\.., DATED this_ day of October, 2016. 
ORDER APPOINTING STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Judge ( ~ 
~--) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
i't\_ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1l_ day of October, 2016, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following: 
[X] Mailed to the follo~iing: 
State Appellate Public Defender 
P.O. Box 2816 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorney General 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Larry G. Fenton, Jr. 
RISINGSUN 
322 Adams Lane 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
ORDER APPOINTING STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
[X] Sent Via Valley Messenger Service 
Richard Cuddihy 
Knowlton & Miles, PLLC 
31217th Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
Post Office Box 1267 , 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
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I, Patty 0. Weeks, Clerk of the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District of the State of I4aho, in and for Nez Perce 
County, do hereby certify that the following is a list of the 
exhibits offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the 
Supreme Court or retained as indicated. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the 
9," nt\ r- r -i seal of the Court this ;~ l 1/ day of t~ (; UPn1trtL( .. ) 2016. ' ·-r:A 
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State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr 
Sorted by Exhibit Number 
Description 
State's exhibit 1 - ISP Forensic 
Services Controlled Substance 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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I, Patty 0. Weeks, Clerk of the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Nez Perce, do hereby certify that the foregoing Clerk's Record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound by me and 
contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents, and 
papers designated to be included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate 
Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross-Appeal, and 
additional documents that were requested. 
I further certify: 
1. That all documents, x-rays, charts, and pictures offered 
or admitted as exhibits in the above-entitled cause, if any, 
will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court with 
any Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record. The above 
exhibits will be retained in the possession of the 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
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undersigned, as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
2. That the following will be submitted as exhibit to the 
record: 
o Transcript of Preliminary Hearing filed 6/1/2016 
o Transcript of Pretrial Motion Hearing filed 8/25/2016 
o DVD attached to Motion to Suppress and Brief in Support 
filed 6/24/2016 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of said court this ~,JJ0ti\ day of I\JDVt'.~'i"')bcv\ ___ 2016. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
LARRY GLENN FENTON, JR., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 44546 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Patty 0. Weeks, Clerk of the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Nez Perce, do hereby certify that copies of the Clerk's Record 
were placed in the United States mail and addressed to Lawrence 
G. Wasden, Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-
0010 and Eric D. Frederickson, SAPD, P.O. Box 2816, Boise, ID 
83701 this ./.j1·;;::~ay of /J~>(/iir·rCiff./L, 2016. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of the said Court this ,J. g,··.:t'. .. day of /v';'t'lt,tl-'d)(.(A,/ 2016. 
PATTY 0. WEEKS 
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